

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM 1730 TO 1734 AS REVEALED IN THE
DESPATCHES OF ANGELO EMO, VENETIAN BAILO

BY

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY
SUPERVISION BY MARY LUCILLE SHAY
ENTITLED THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM 1730 TO 1734 AS REVEALED
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INTRODUCTION

Angelo Emo, Venetian Bailo¹

The capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 was an event of great importance to Venice. She had enjoyed² commercial privileges there for more than three hundred years. Her status was not, however, changed materially. In 1454 Mohammed II granted trading privileges to the Republic and the extraterritorial right of her bailo to govern and administer³ justice among the Venetians.

The Ottoman Empire was, nevertheless, the natural enemy of the Republic; they were neighbors; they were rivals for the same territories and for control of the same seas.⁴ A series of wars between the two Powers began in 1470 and lasted until 1718. The story of this long struggle may be briefly summarized: Venice lost territory in practically every contest; that gained was held only for a short time. Negropont, the first possession lost, was captured by the Turks in 1470.⁵ Nine years later

¹ See Appendix A: Glossary.

² Young, George, Constantinople, p. 93.

³ Text of treaty, Romanin, Samuele, Storia Documentata di Venezia, IV, pp. 528-535.

⁴ Yriarte, Charles, La Vie d'un Patricien de Venise au Seizième Siècle, p. 176.

⁵ Hazlitt, W. Carew, The Venetian Republic, II, p. 7.

Venice surrendered Scutari, Lemnos, and Euboea, in addition to paying an indemnity of one hundred thousand ducats and promising an annual tribute of one hundred and ten thousand ducats.⁶ An interval of comparative peace followed until 1529, when hostilities began and continued for eleven years. Another war started in 1562, but the Turks gained no decisive advantages until they forced Venice to cede Cyprus in 1570. After Venice had aided Spain in defeating the Turks in the Battle of Lepanto, the Republic adopted a pacific policy⁷ which lasted nearly three-quarters of a century and which was abandoned only when an attack was made on Candia in 1645. For twenty-four years Venice withstood the Turks, but the tremendous expenditure of energy⁸ and the outlay of one hundred twenty-six million ducats was in vain. In 1669 a treaty of peace permitted Venice to retain the ports of Suda, Carabusa, and Spinalonga, and gave the remainder of the island to the Ottoman Empire.⁹ These losses were alarming. Venice sought to check the advance of the Turk. She was

⁶ Marriott, John A.R., The Eastern Question, p. 83.

⁷ Hazlitt, op. cit., p. 107 et seq.

⁸ Hazlitt estimated this amount to be the equivalent of £300,000,000, considering the value of money from 1644 to 1669 to have been worth five times its rate in 1913: p.245 and note.

⁹ Noradounghian, Gabriel Effendi (Editor), Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de L'Empire Ottoman, I, p.132.

successful in the next war, 1684-1699, and gained the Morea. This acquisition of territory simply meant another war, 1715-1718, which restored the Morea to the Turks¹¹ and which was the last contest between the Republic and the Ottoman Empire.

During this period of warfare Venice continued to carry on commerce with the Ottoman Empire. This commerce became so great in proportion to other interests that after 1557 the Senate had to keep two record books, one for Constantinople and one for its other business.¹² The bailo was most important in these relations. He represented the Republic at the Porte. The extra-territorial privileges granted to Venice made him the head of the Venetian colony as administrator and judge. In addition he recommended candidates for the consulships of Smyrna, Salonika, Crete, and Rhodes, and supervised their work.¹³ Among the diplomatic representatives of Venice he ranked with those to the Papal See and the Holy Roman Empire.¹⁴ In Constantinople only the French and English ambassadors preceded him in ceremonial functions.¹⁵ Like the other ambassadors of Venice, he

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Hazlitt, op. cit., p.246 et seq.

11

Marriott, op. cit., p.135.

12

Jones, Theodore F., "The Archives of the Venetian Republic," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, I, p.73.

13

Venezia e Le Sue Lagune, I, p.76; Part II, p.163.

14

Yriarte, op. cit., p.174.

15

Young, op. cit., p.148.

had to submit to a number of regulations. He must keep the Senate informed by frequent despatches, daily ones if necessary, and make an oral report upon his return. He could not take his family with him, he was forbidden to accept presents, he could correspond only with the Government.¹⁶

The selection of a bailo was a momentous matter. His qualifications were, according to Yriarte, profound knowledge and proved patriotism.¹⁷ According to Don Alonzo de la Cueva, Spanish Ambassador to Venice in 1619, the bailo was always a man of great attainments, eloquence, and dexterity.¹⁸ After the decline of Venetian power and commerce, his value consisted in his ability to prevent any restrictions or withdrawals of privileges.

In 1730 the relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire were rather critical. Disputes between their subjects in neighboring territories within the Morea had continued since the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718.¹⁹ Venice was weak and desired peace.²⁰

In 1730 for the third time an Emo was sent as bailo to

16

Hazlitt, op. cit., pp. 498, 528, 529.

17

Yriarte, op. cit.

18

Ibid., p.175.

19

Diedo, Giacomo, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia, IV, p.181, et seq.

20

Molmenti, Pompeo, Venice, Part III, Vol. I, p. 12.

²¹
Constantinople. Angelo Emo was well-fitted to represent Venice there. He came from a family whose patriotic devotion had been shown for centuries. He had held a number of offices, and he was an indefatigable worker and an ardent patriot, with a desirable combination of diplomacy and firmness.

The Emo family is said to have come from Dalmatia to Venetia in 997. Three hundred years later Pantaleone Emo, with all his descendants, was enrolled among the patricians by the Great Council.²² This act showed the importance of the family. In 1297 there were only 210 members enrolled, while fourteen years later the list consisted of 1017 names.²³ During the period from 1297 to 1797 members of the Emo family served in all the important offices of the Republic except that of doge. For this office Leonardo²⁴ and Jacopo²⁵ were candidates in the sixteenth century, Francesco twice in the seventeenth,²⁶ and Giovanni in the eighteenth.²⁷ An Emo was elected to the next

²¹
The others were Giovanni in 1475 and Giovanni in 1720; Rumor, Sebastiano, Storia Breve degli Emo, pp. 64, 98.

²²
Ibid., pp. 15, 16.

²³
Thayer, William Roscoe, A Short History of Venice, p.106.

²⁴
Rumor, op. cit., p. 76.

²⁵
Ibid., p. 79.

²⁶
Ibid., p. 80.

²⁷
Ibid., p. 99.

highest honor, that of Procurator²⁸ of St. Mark's, four times:
Giorgio in 1516,²⁹ Jacopo in 1584,³⁰ Giovanni in 1723,³¹ and
Angelo, the Admiral, in 1786.³²

Members of the family served in the Council of Forty,³³ in
the Council of Ten six times,³⁴ of which they had the headship
five times,³⁵ in the Ten Sages twice,³⁶ as electors of the doge
four times,³⁷ and in the Senate many times.³⁸ They also held a
number of offices in the possessions. The Emos were elected
proveditors³⁹ of Rimini⁴⁰ and Zante;⁴¹ proveditors general of

²⁸ See Appendix A: Glossary.

²⁹ Rumor, op. cit., p. 70.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 79.

³¹ Ibid., p. 99.

³² Romanin, op. cit., VIII, p. 297. In 1821 the name of
Capodilista was added by marriage. Descendants of the Emo-
Capodilista family reside in and near Padua: Libro d'Oro della
Nobilità Italiana, 1916-1919, p. 274.

³³ Rumor, op. cit., p. 58.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 61, 63, 78, 80, 95, 101.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 61, 63, 78, 80, 101.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 87, 101.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 58, 59, 62, 63.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 62, 63, 67, 75, 78, 79, 80, 87, 88, 89, 95.

³⁹ See Appendix A: Glossary.

⁴⁰ Rumor, op. cit. p. 69.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 79.

42 43 44 45
Dalmatia, Polesine, Terra Firma, and Trentino; and bailo
46 47
of Corfu. Frequently they held the office of podesta: of
48 49 50
Chioggia twice, Marostica once, Padua four times, Rovigo
51 52 53 54
once, Treviso twice, Verona five times, and Vicenza twice.
Minor offices were held in Brescia, Dalmatia, Friuli, Istria,
55
Padua, Udine, and Vicenza. Some members were sent as ambassa-
56 57 58
dors to the Italian city-states, Austria, and Hungary.
Some took part in the Italian wars of the Middle Ages, against

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- 42
Rumor, op. cit., p. 59.
43
Ibid., p. 100.
44
Ibid., p. 73.
45
Ibid., p. 69.
46
Ibid., p. 79.
47
See Appendix A: Glossary.
48
Rumor, op. cit., pp. 59, 87.
49
Ibid., p. 89.
50
Ibid., pp. 71, 73-74, 79, 95.
51
Ibid., p. 100.
52
Ibid., pp. 59-60.
53
Ibid., pp. 61, 62, 73, 74, 101.
54
Ibid., pp. 62, 83-84.
55
Ibid., pp. 58, 59, 61, 65, 72, 73, 74, 77, 88, 94, 101.
56
Ibid., pp. 60, 61, 65.
57
Ibid., pp. 60-61.
58
Ibid., p. 64.

Austria in 1507, and against the Turks in 1570, in the seven-
⁵⁹
 teenth and in the eighteenth centuries.

This was a rich heritage of public service. As Sebastiano
⁶⁰
 Rumor observed, "They are many: men of arms and the toga."
 The immediate family of Angelo Emo was also especially active.
⁶¹
 His father, Pietro, was proveditor of the Adige in 1677 and
 1686, councillor in 1682, 1696, and 1699, proveditor of the
 sanitary board of Istrie in 1691, magistrate in Terra Firma in
 1692, member of the Council of Ten in 1707 and 1710, and senator
⁶²
 from 1708 to 1716. Gabriele, the first born of Pietro, was
 elected to the Senate in 1702, 1712, 1713, 1714, and 1716. He
 was podesta of Brescia in 1707 and a member of the Council of
⁶³
 Ten in 1708, 1711, and 1715. Another son, Prospero, was
⁶⁴
 senator from 1712 to 1715 and proveditor of the Adige in 1716.
 Giovanni, the youngest son, was one of the most important men

59

Rumor, op. cit., pp. 57, 58, 59, 61-62, 69, 73, 74, 76, 90.

60

Ibid., p. 57.

61

Pietro m. Fiordelise Valmarana
 (Born in 1632)

Gabriele (B. in 1663)	Angelo (B. in 1666)	Prospero (B. in 1669)	Giovanni (B. in 1670)	Eugenia
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Rumor, op. cit., Table IIIb.

62

Ibid., p. 94.

63

Ibid., p. 100.

64

Ibid., p. 101.

of his time. In 1711 he was sent as ambassador to France, to England in 1715, and Bailo to Constantinople in 1720. He left the last named post in 1724, having been elected Procurator of St. Mark's.⁶⁵ When Cardinal de Bernis, French Ambassador to Venice, arrived there in 1752, he asked who was the most influential man, and the reply was "the procurator Emo." The Cardinal found the experience and sagacity of the Procurator such that he could be regarded the first man of the Republic;⁶⁶ the Cardinal also observed that in spite of the great age of Giovanni Emo,⁶⁷ he was among the senators who knew the most about public affairs.⁶⁸

The services of Bailo Angelo Emo compared favorably with those of the other members in patriotic endeavor and in number of offices held. In his speech to the Full College in 1735, upon his return from Constantinople, he said his vow of obedience to the Republic was his first act after attaining the age of reason.⁶⁹ His service did begin at an early age; at eighteen

⁶⁵

Rumor, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

⁶⁶

De Bernis, François-Joachim de Pierre Cardinal, Mémoires et Lettres, I, p. 184.

⁶⁷

He was eighty-two at that time.

⁶⁸

De Bernis, op. cit., note on p. 421.

⁶⁹

Emo, Angelo, Dispacci di Constantinopoli alla Repubblica di Venezia dall'anno 1730-1735, Speech, 20 May, 1735. IV, pp. 425 a-b. The University of Illinois possesses two manuscript copies of these 244 despatches. One copy is practically complete and is referred to in the footnotes as LS (Large Set, i.e., large volumes). One volume is missing in the other copy, which is a valuable check upon the Large Set since the copyists

he was a volunteer in the war against Turkey for the Morea, and the following year he was made proveditor of Zara. He assisted in the taking of Navarino and Modone in 1686 and of Athens in 1687. He was a minor officer in the army in 1693, and became its paymaster in 1697. His most distinguished military service was in a victory over the Turks at Sign in 1715. This event was commemorated by the following inscription, which was placed in St. Mary of Miracles at Lonigo, and remains there above the flag taken from the enemy:

Addi XIV Agosto MDCCXV
Per la Liberazione di Scin⁷⁰
Sotto il Comando dell'Ecc. Gen. Ang. Emo.

He held the offices of proveditor of Corfu in 1702, of senator in 1704, and of proveditor general of Morea in 1704. Three years later and again in 1711 he was councillor of Canareggio, proveditor extraordinary of Terra Firma in 1710, proveditor general in Dalmatia from 1713 to 1715, and podesta of Padua in 1716. His most important office was that of Bailo at Constantinople from 1730 to 1734;⁷¹ he also had the title of

of the latter have omitted some pages and some phrases. The abbreviations used in the two sets are, moreover, not identical. References are made to the two sets only when there is a discrepancy; in all the other footnotes the references are for the Large Set. The abbreviation SS means Small Set. See Appendix B for a list of the despatches, with the places where written and the dates; and the Introductory note to the Bibliography for additional information regarding these manuscript copies.

⁷⁰

"Sign (and not Scin, as in the inscription) is a little city with Turkish and Venetian fortifications seven leagues north of Spalatro:" Rumor, op. cit., note on p. 95.

⁷¹

Ibid., pp. 95-96; Diedo, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

Ambassador Extraordinary to the Porte from 1732 to 1733.

When he left Constantinople, it was a half-century since he had begun his public service. He served again in Padua as captain and vice-podesta in 1740,⁷³ and was proveditor general in Terra Firma for the second time in 1742.⁷⁴

Very soon after he started on his voyage to Constantinople he began writing and sending his official reports. Fourteen of these despatches were written during the voyage and five after his duties were over in 1734 and 1735. Of those written from Constantinople, the fewest written in a month were two, and the greatest number nine, but his general practice was to write four or five a month.⁷⁵ From internal evidence they were

⁷² Emo, op. cit., 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 237b-238a;
 11 July, 1733, IV, pp. 63a-67a.

⁷³ Rumor, op. cit., note on p. 96.

⁷⁴ Diedo, op. cit., pp. 388.

⁷⁵

Table 1: Showing number of Angelo Emo's despatches, written while on active duty, September, 1730-October, 1734, and number of Giovanni Emo's despatches while on active duty, September, 1720-January, 1724 (The University of Illinois possesses also a manuscript copy of these despatches from Constantinople.):

No. of Despatches Written Per Month	No. of Months in which Written by Angelo	No. of Months in which Written by Giovanni
0	0	1
1	0	2
2	8	9
3	7	4
4	11	8
5	10	5
6	8	8
7	3	2
8	2	2
9	1	0

Conclusion from this table and after considering the length of the two terms of office: Angelo wrote more frequently than

written in almost all instances the same day that they were
 dated.⁷⁶ This conclusion is supported by the use of such
 phrases as "in these moments,"⁷⁷ "three days ago,"⁷⁸ "last
 week,"⁷⁹ or the writing of a postscript with the statement that
 he was just closing his despatch or packet when news arrived.⁸⁰
 Sometimes more than one was written on the same day according
 to his plans. In one he wrote on a number of topics and stated

 Giovanni Emo; the former wrote 193 despatches in the same number
 of months in which the latter wrote 166.

Table 2: Showing number of Angelo Emo's despatches accord-
 ing to years:

May - December, 1730	29
January - December, 1731	69
January - December, 1732	54
January - December, 1733	51
January - December, 1734	39
March, 1735	2
	<u>244</u>

For purposes of comparison the statement made by Yriarte is
 interesting. He stated that Antonio Barbaro, Bailo to
 Constantinople, wrote more than 50 despatches in 1569; Yriarte,
op. cit., p. 184. See also Appendix B.

⁷⁶
 The only clear exception to this practice is found in
 studying two despatches (No. 168 and No. 169), both dated
 28 May, 1733. In the first it was stated that there were rumors
 of changes in officials, in the second it was stated that
 conditions were settled: Emo, Angelo, op. cit., III, p. 344a;
 IV, p. la et seq.

⁷⁷
Ibid., 7 March, 1731, I, p. 182a; 21 March, 1733, III,
 p. 291a; 26 August, 1733, IV, p. 120a; 7 May, 1734, IV, p. 320a;
 9 May, 1734, IV, p. 323b; 3 July, 1734, IV, p. 356b.

⁷⁸
Ibid., 15 December, 1733, IV, p. 201b.

⁷⁹
Ibid., 21 March, 1733, III, pp. 288b-289a.

⁸⁰
Ibid., 25 January, 1731, I, p. 151b; 10 March, 1731, I,
 pp. 197a-b; 28 July, 1731, II, pp. 36a-b; no date given, evident-
 ly on or near 20 December, 1731, II, p. 195b; 18 January, 1732,
 II, pp. 271b-272a; 7 March, 1732, LS, II, pp. 285a-b; SS, III,
 p. 52a; 21 March, 1733, LS, III, p. 291a.

that he was reserving for another the information pertaining to one topic.⁸¹ At times he had not planned to write another but did so after receiving additional information.⁸² There was no definite plan of writing the despatches on the day events occurred or at stated intervals. Some were written a few days later, and others one, two, or three weeks later.⁸³ Even the arrival of instructions did not cause replies to be written immediately. Instructions, for example, which arrived November 10, 1731, were answered on November 16.⁸⁴

Duplicate⁸⁵ copies of the despatches were sent to Venice by carriers via Cattaro and Vienna with five exceptions. Emo

⁸¹
Emo, op. cit., 29 March, 1732, II, p. 287b; 4 May, 1734, IV, p. 310b. In the last example, the second despatch was not written the same day as planned but three days later; 7 May, 1734, IV, p. 320a.

⁸²
Ibid., 30 November, 1731, II, p. 173a.

⁸³
Ibid., Revolt of Janissaries 28 September, 1730, reported 2 October, I, pp. 37a-43a; audience of Russian Resident Neplyneff reported following week, 21 March, 1733, III, pp. 288b-289a; interview of French Ambassador Villeneuve and Grand Vizier reported "two weeks after," 24 November, 1732, III, p. 207a; letters from Persia "three weeks" ago reported 24 January, 1733, III, p. 234a.

⁸⁴
Ibid., 16 November, 1731, II, p. 149a.

⁸⁵
Ibid., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 58a; 14 January, 1731, I, p. 126b; 20 January, 1731, I, pp. 139a-b; 28 November, 1733, IV, p. 182a; 2 December, 1733, IV, p. 182b; 17 April, 1734, IV, p. 304b; 19 August, 1734, IV, p. 375a.

called the Cattaro route "the usual way,"⁸⁶ and it was the preferred one because of the accommodation to Venetian merchants in Constantinople in communicating with those on the eastern Adriatic coast.⁸⁷ He considered the Vienna route the quicker,⁸⁸ and he accepted the offers of the Austrian Resident Talman so frequently that more despatches were sent, according to his statements, by that route than by Cattaro.⁸⁹ The exceptional change of routes was made in the sending of the Imperial Letter, announcing Mahmud I's accession to the throne, to Corfu as the least expensive and the most cautious way.⁹⁰ This sea route was used again in sending two despatches pertaining to the renewal of the Treaty of Passarowitz. In explaining his use of this route then, he characterized it as the quickest way and less observed by the other foreign ministers.⁹¹ Despatches were sent with Captain Dandolo when he took the renewed Treaty

86

Emo, op. cit., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 58a; 14 January, 1731, I, p. 126b; 20 January, 1731, I, pp. 139a-b; 3 Maggio, 1731, I, p. 254b; 28 July, 1731, II, p. 30a; 3 February, 1732, II, p. 237b; 30 June, 1732, III, p. 92b; 16 June, 1733, IV, p. 41b.

87

Ibid., 2 December, 1733, IV, p. 182b.

88

Ibid., 9 October, 1734, IV, p. 408b.

89

He did not always record the routes used. For example, the despatch, 28 March, 1731, was sent to Corfu: I, p. 219a. The next statement regarding routes appears in the despatch: 18 May, 1731, I, p. 262b. There is a greater gap in exact information: despatch, 28 July, 1731, was sent via Cattaro, II, p. 30a, and the next reference appears in despatch, 5 October, 1731, II, p. 101a. It is not probable that none were sent for more than two months.

90

Ibid., 24 April, 1731, I, p. 234a.

91

Ibid., 5 April, 1733, III, p. 302a; 11 April, 1733, III, p. 305b.

to Venice for ratification.

There was no regularity in the sending of the despatches.
93
They were most frequently sent in groups, and they were some-
94
times accompanied by enclosures.

The despatches were replied to by instructions which acknowledged their arrival in Venice. Emo repeated some of this information in later despatches. According to the acknowledgments the despatches arrived in Venice five or six weeks after
95
they were written. The fact that Emo did not reply immediately after he received instructions warrants the assumption that the Venetian officials acted likewise.

92

Emo, op. cit., 28 May, 1733, IV, p. 8a. The sea route was used two other times: 28 March, 1731, I, p. 219a; 15 December, 1733, IV, p. 201b.

93

Ibid., 14 January, 1731, I, p. 126b; 20 January, 1731, I, pp. 139a-b; 14 March, 1731, I, p. 198a; 14 June, 1731, I, p. 296b; 28 December, 1731, II, p. 195 b; 5 April, 1732, III, p. 1a; 21 May, 1732, III, p. 40a; 28 August, 1732, III, p. 147b; 27 September, 1732, III, p. 169b; 27 October, 1732, Vol. III, p. 190a; 16 June, 1733, IV, p. 41b; 27 October, 1733, IV, p. 147b; 2 December, 1733, IV, p. 182b; 28 May, 1734, IV, p. 324a; 24 July, 1734, IV, p. 367b.

94

Petitions of Venetians and memoranda were mentioned but not included in the manuscript copies.

95

Despatch of 4 November, 1730, mentioned in instructions of 23 December--22 February, 1731, I, p. 157b; of 30 November, 1730, mentioned in instructions of 27 January or 3 February, 1731--14 March, 1731, I, p. 197b; of 31 May, 1731, mentioned in instructions of 14 or 21 July--29 September, 1731, II, p. 94b; of 9 July, 1733, mentioned in instructions of 14 August--23 March, 1734, IV, p. 287b.

The system of sending the instructions was similar to that of the despatches. These also were sent in duplicate, via Cattaro and Vienna, the greater number mentioned travelling by the northern route. Because of the nature of the courier system several might arrive in Constantinople at the same time. Emo's acknowledgments revealed very little of the contents of the instructions.

The foregoing observations merely suggest the contents of the despatches. They contained a mass of facts, remarks, characterizations, descriptions, and rumors, which pertained to the major relations and negotiations, with protestations of patriotism, vigilance, and religious fervor. Then there were miscellaneous topics, such as: the baptism of the children of

96

Emo, op. cit., 25 January, 1731, I, p. 150b; 18 May, 1731, I, p. 262b; 5 April, 1732, III, p. 5a.

97

Ibid., 5 April, 1731, I, p. 233a; 31 May, 1731, I, p. 283a; 14 September, 1731, II, p. 85a; 30 October, 1731, II, p. 131a; 5 April, 1732, III, p. 1a; 14 June, 1732, III, p. 68a; 20 September, 1732, III, pp. 152a-b; 9 February, 1733, III, p. 251a.

98

Ibid., 13 October, 1730, I, p. 50a; 22 February, 1731, I, p. 157b; 14 March, 1731, I, p. 197b; 3 July, 1731, II, p. 8a; 14 September, 1731, II, p. 85a; 16 November, 1731, II, p. 149a; 25 April, 1732, III, p. 22a; 30 June, 1732, III, p. 92b; 29 July, 1732, III, p. 108a; 28 August, 1732, III, p. 152a; 9 February, 1733, III, p. 251a; 12 June, 1733, IV, p. 26b; 16 June, 1733, IV, p. 41b; 13 August, 1733, IV, p. 86a; 22 December, 1733, IV, p. 208b; 22 January, 1734, IV, p. 233a; 27 June, 1734, IV, p. 345b.

99

Ibid., 14 August, 1731, II, p. 42b; 10 October, 1733, IV, p. 135a; 12 September, 1734, IV, p. 393a.

two dragomans in the embassy chapel,¹⁰⁰ a controversy with Holland regarding the nationality of the son of a deceased Dutch father and a Venetian mother,¹⁰¹ the bad condition of the embassy building,¹⁰² the wedding of the Austrian representative's daughter,¹⁰³ the lending of a cook to the Capitan Pasha of the Arsenal,¹⁰⁴ the progress of the Giovani di Lingua,¹⁰⁵ and a quarrel between Venetian and French sailors.¹⁰⁶

Strictly official information was obtained in the Bailo's audiences with the Sultan and the grand viziers, and in conferences with the Reis Effendi,¹⁰⁷ the Capitan Pasha of the Arsenal, Turkish dragomans,¹⁰⁸ other ambassadors and ministers, or his own dragomans. He was not an eye-witness of all he reported. He was one of the "many eyes and many ears" of the Republic of Venice. Vandal examined the despatches of Emo, his

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- 100
Emo, op. cit., 30 November, 1730, I, p. 89a; 5 April, 1732, III, pp. 10a-b.
- 101
Ibid., 13 October, 1730, I, pp. 50a-57b.
- 102
Ibid., 21 February, 1731, I, p. 157b; 28 July, 1731, II, pp. 36b-42b; 30 October, 1731, II, pp. 132b-133a; 5 April, 1732, III, pp. 9b-10a.
- 103
Ibid., 28 March, 1731, I, pp. 218b-219a.
- 104
See Appendix A: Glossary. Emo, op. cit., 26 April, 1731, I, p. 242a.
- 105
See Appendix A: Glossary. Emo, op. cit., 31 May, 1731, I, pp. 288a-296b.
- 106
Ibid., 18 January, 1732, III, pp. 215b-218b.
- 107
See Appendix A: Glossary.
- 108
Ibid.

predecessor, and his three successors, and wrote: "If, at this epoch, Venice was playing only a secondary role in the Orient, her diplomats had not lost entirely the capacity for observation and the flair which had made them renowned. They can and ought to be examined as witnesses."¹⁰⁹

A characterization of Pera in the days of the Marquis de Villeneuve, the French Ambassador, and Emo is a significant suggestion of Emo's methods: Pera was a little city where the coming and going of ambassadors were watched by their colleagues with a mistrustful curiosity.¹¹⁰

Emo was well aware of this watching, as when he stated his preference for the sea route for despatches as being less observed by the foreign representatives.¹¹¹

He acquired another part of his information through confidential reports, especially in regard to the Turkish navy. He found his informant from the arsenal faithful.¹¹² Such confidences were obtained partly through gift-presenting¹¹³ and partly through a tactful managing

109

Vandal, Albert, Une Ambassade Française en Orient sous Louis XV, p. XIV of preface.

110

Ibid., p. 226.

111

Emo, op. cit., 5 April, 1733, III, p. 302a.

112

Ibid., 1 December, 1734, IV, pp. 419a-b.

113

Ibid., 8 November, 1731, II, pp. 147a-b; 31 March, 1732, II, p. 307b; 30 June, 1732, III, p. 94a; 18 August, 1732, III, p. 130a; 20 March, 1733, III, p. 282b; 21 August, 1733, IV, p. 107a; 22 December, 1733, IV, p. 211a; 17 April, 1734, IV, pp. 304b-305a; 9 October, 1734, IV, pp. 408b, 409a.

114
of persons. Sometimes official letters of the Porte were
read by Turks who repeated their contents to him. 115 The progress
of the war with Persia was reported in letters to the wife of
Dr. Testabusa, the Venetian who attended the Turkish Commander
Achmet Pasha. 116

Emo was not without a critical sense; he did not believe
all he heard; he analyzed his source. Many times he characteriz-
ed the account as coming from "a reliable person," 117 or "a good
source," 118 or he used similar phrases. 119 Sometimes he selected
from several versions the one which came from "an almost reliable

- 114
Emo, op. cit., 27 October, 1732, III, p. 194b; 20 March,
1733, III, p. 275a; 28 November, 1733, IV, p. 179a.
115
Ibid., 18 May, 1731, I, p. 269a; 30 November, 1731, II,
pp. 169b-170a; 24 November, 1733, IV, pp. 174b-175a.
116
Ibid., 3 July, 1731, II, pp. 8b-9a; 25 February, 1732, II,
p. 272a; 5 April, 1732, III, p. 6a; 24 January, 1733, III, p. 234b.
117
Ibid., 1 November, 1730, I, p. 64b; 17 December, 1730, I,
p. 105a; 22 February, 1731, I, p. 159b; 26 April, 1731, I,
p. 240b; 27 April, 1731, I, p. 249b; 16 November, 1731, II,
p. 159a; 20 September, 1732, III, p. 159b; 27 September, 1732,
III, p. 170b; 27 October, 1732, III, p. 192a; 25 November, 1732,
III, p. 210b; 24 December, 1732, III, p. 226a; 21 February, 1733,
III, p. 270a; 11 April, 1733, III, p. 313a; 19 June, 1734, IV,
p. 342b; 12 September, 1734, IV, p. 397a.
118
Ibid., 11 October, 1730, I, p. 47a; 25 January, 1731,
I, p. 148a; 1 September, 1734, IV, p. 380a.
119
Ibid., 4 April, 1731, I, p. 226b; 15 August, 1731, II,
p. 56b; 3 February, 1732, II, p. 240b; 7 March, 1732, II, p. 285a;
15 May, 1732, III, p. 34b; 18 August, 1732, III, p. 125b; 28
August, 1732, III, p. 148b; 19 October, 1732, III, p. 189a; 1
August, 1733, IV, p. 79a; 26 August, 1733, IV, p. 120a; 28
October, 1733, IV, p. 155a; 9 May, 1734, IV, p. 321a.

120 person" or "the least impure" source. 121 At other times he qualified his statements simply with the general phrase "it is 122 rumored." He knew the value of suspended judgment. The rumors regarding Ali Pasha after his appointment as Grand Vizier were unfavorable, but were reported by Emo with the statement that he would be able to send a different account after seeing 123 the Vizier. 124 He seldom mentioned the name of his confidant, an advisable precaution in the days when secrecy prevailed and exile or death might be the punishment meted out by the Turkish 125 Government to those discovered giving information.

Such secrecy made the task of collecting material difficult, yet that was only a part of a bailo's duty. The writing of the despatches was an equally important one. Molmenti characterized 126 those of the eighteenth century as "admirably lucid reports." In addition to the ability to write clear reports, Emo possessed another talent, that of an attractive style. After all, there

120
Emo, op. cit., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 58a; 5 October, 1731, II, p. 105b.

121
Ibid., 9 December, 1733, IV, p. 188a; 14 August, 1734, IV, p. 371b.

122
Ibid., 14 August, 1731, II, p. 50a; 16 November, 1731, II, p. 158a; 22 April, 1732, III, p. 11a.

123
Ibid., 22 April, 1732, III, p. 13b.

124
The exceptions to this rule: Dragoman Ghika, Emo, op. cit., 18 August, 1732, III, p. 131a; the Mufti, 27 March, 1731, I, pp. 210b-212a (pp. 211a-b blank) and 28 May, 1733, III, p. 337b; Mehemet Effendi, 30 June, 1732, III, p. 94a; Mamut in the Arsenal, 17 April, 1734, IV, p. 305a and 1 December, 1734, IV, pp. 419a-b.

125
Ibid., 2 July, 1734, IV, p. 350a.

126
Molmenti, op. cit., p. 38.

was little variety in his subject matter: the political conditions at the Porte, the progress of the navy program, the war with Persia, and the relations with the European Powers. These topics were important to Venice and consequently to him. He made events and persons in Constantinople realistic to the officials in Venice. He gave many details, but the clearness of the sequence and the choice of words prevented confusing pictures. His first audience with Sultan Mahmud I demonstrated his descriptive ability. It was January 2, 1731. He described the departure from the embassy in his official costume, two hours before dawn by the light of torches and lanterns, the extreme cold, the falling snow, the crossing of the bay between Pera and Constantinople, the forming of the procession of Turkish troops and Venetians, the beginning of the march at daybreak, the entrance into a spacious court where great numbers of Janissaries stood motionless and silent, the dismounting, the entrance into the council room, the silk-covered chair on which he sat, the Sultan's window above the Vizier's sofa, the officials present, the petitions presented, the serving of the customary dinner with the rapidity for which the Turks were known, the request to the Sultan for an audience, the return of the card which the Vizier kissed, the donning of the caftan,¹²⁷ the seizure of his arms by the two Kapujis,¹²⁸ and finally his entrance into the

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See Appendix A: Glossary.

128

Ibid.

129
Sultan's presence. Then a word picture of Sultan Mahmud I followed: "He was dressed in a crimson robe brocaded in gold and trimmed with the fur of black wolves and wore a little turban with a heron's feather and an ornament of large diamonds. His appearance is mediocre, a round brown face, a short black beard,
130
and a well-nourished body."

Figures of speech aided the clarity and the attractiveness of his descriptions. He did not use a great number, he used variations of the same metaphor for similar conditions, and thus did not mix comparisons or leave them unfinished. The revolt of 1730 was a "great fire;" its leader, Ali Patrona, was the
131
"first spark." The Porte sought to smother the "fire" during the succeeding winter months, but it lay smoldering, and in the
132
spring it broke forth again. Constantinople in January, 1731, was "this grand theatre," on whose stage there were "new actors"
133
with the change of the Grand Vizier. In September of that
134
year there was another vizier and a "new scene." Other figures of speech were those of the sea and the wind, natural ones for a Venetian in the days of sailing vessels. The Ottoman

129

Emo, op. cit., 9 January, 1731, I, pp. 118b-122a.

130

Ibid., p. 122a.

131

Ibid., 11 October, 1730, I, p. 44b.

132

Ibid., 3 April, 1731, I, p. 220a.

133

Ibid., 25 January, 1731, I, p. 145a.

134

Ibid., 14 September, 1731, II, p. 83a.

Empire was a "vast sea," but Topan Osman, the Vizier, knew how to conduct "his navigation."¹³⁵ Bonneval, the French adventurer, was "sailing on a dangerous sea," and "the wind might carry him farther than he thought."¹³⁶ In some of his own negotiations, Emo was "on the sea," "tossed about by the winds," but he promised to "bring his vessel into port."¹³⁷ Among the shorter metaphors were the following suggestive ones: Mahmud I was "the Sultan mobile to every wind,"¹³⁸ the Grand Vizier was "the first star of this Empire,"¹³⁹ and Emo's negotiations were along "a thorny way."¹⁴⁰

Then there are occasional bits of humor, which are delightful because they are not frequent and because they are terse summaries of much that has preceded. After the revolt of 1730, quantities of gold were found buried in the Grand Vizier's garden. Emo observed that not every one will produce such radishes.¹⁴¹ In spite of the unpleasant relations between the Bailo and the Capitan Pasha in 1733, there was no refusal of the Venetian gifts by the servant, "a sin he had never committed in

135

Emo, op. cit., 20 December, 1731 II, p. 182b.

136

Ibid., 3 February, 1732, II, p. 243b.

137

Ibid., 27 June, 1734, IV, p. 349b.

138

Ibid., 30 November, 1731, II, p. 176a.

139

Ibid., 21 May, 1732, III, p. 43b.

140

Ibid., 13 August, 1733, IV, p. 86a.

141

Ibid., 1 November, 1730, I, pp. 65a-b.

his life."¹⁴² In a controversy between Austria and France regarding attacks upon the latter's ships in the Archipelago, the Porte prolonged negotiations and Emo remarked that the ships would be worn out some day and thus the negotiations would be brought to an end.¹⁴³

Angelo Emo has been shown thus far in connection with his official duties as one who was efficient in collecting information in spite of difficulties, as one who had a critical sense, as one who had the ability to reproduce for others what he had seen. The personality of the man revealed itself further in his despatches. Although he lived and did his most important work in the first half of "that joyous century,"¹⁴⁴ when Venice was "the gayest city in Italy,"¹⁴⁵ "the metropolis of pleasure, the haven of the world's pleasure-seekers,"¹⁴⁶ he was not a typical eighteenth century Venetian in seeking amusements. He belonged rather to the minority which sought "to exercise a wholesome action on a body which was already decrepit and outworn."¹⁴⁷ He merely mentioned the dinners of the foreign representatives in Pera. The details of the dinners served by the Grand Vizier at

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Emo, op. cit., 15 December, 1733, IV, p. 202a.

¹⁴³

Ibid., 28 October, 1734, IV, p. 412a.

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Molmenti, op. cit., p. 76.

¹⁴⁵

Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴⁶

Monnier, Philippe, Venice in the Eighteenth Century, p. 26.

¹⁴⁷

Molmenti, op. cit., p. 15.

audiences were impersonally given and seemingly from a sense of duty in reporting everything which would show a continuation or a change in the policy of the Porte.

The outstanding characteristics of Angelo Emo were his patriotism and religious fervor. The first statement in his first despatch was a vow of obedience to the Senate.¹⁴⁸ Again¹⁴⁹ and again he asserted his desire to serve faithfully; next to the salvation of his soul his chief interest was "my country."¹⁵⁰ The short speech made to the Full College upon his return consisted almost entirely of statements regarding his patriotism.¹⁵¹ The astonishing thing is that this repetition does not leave the impression of boastfulness, conceit, and insincerity. Such avowals were common in the despatches of other

148

Emo, op. cit., 27 May, 1730, I, p. 1a.

149

Ibid., 28 June, 1730, I, pp. 3b-4a; 4 September, 1730, I, p. 22a; 15 September, 1730, I, p. 29b; 12 November, 1730, I, p. 77b; 17 December, 1730, I, p. 102a; 14 January, 1731, I, p. 126b; 28 March, 1731, I, p. 217b; 31 May, 1731, I, pp. 283a-b, 286b; 3 July, 1731, II, p. 8a; 14 September, 1731, II, p. 85a; 30 October, 1731, II, p. 131a; 30 November, 1731, II, p. 170a; 20 December, 1731, II, p. 189b; 4 June, 1732, III, pp. 61b-62a; 14 June, 1732, III, p. 68a; 21 September, 1732, III, p. 164a; 11 July, 1733, IV, pp. 68b-69a; 12 November, 1733, IV, pp. 159b-160a; 22 December, 1733, IV, pp. 208b-209a.

150

Ibid., 2 October, 1730, I, p. 43a.

151

Ibid., 20 May, 1735, IV, pp. 425a-b.

152

Venetian ambassadors. Those of Emo were made in a variety of statements and with a dignity which prevents their being tiresome, and they were supported by other conditions and facts, such as the frequency of writing, the obtaining of information, and the perseverance in spite of the declining power of his mother-city. In not a single instance did he complain of his compatriots, but repeatedly praised all his companions for their devotion to Venice.

153

When the other diplomats left Constantinople in the summer of 1732 because of an epidemic, he remained to carry on negotiations.

154

Another example of his ardor was his attitude toward his health. He was sixty-four years old when he went to Constantinople. In the despatches from May 27, 1730, to May 21, 1733, he did not complain of his health. Then attacks of gout began, which occurred during the remainder of his term. He viewed them as hindrances to his duties, but he continued his work in spite of them, signing despatches in bed and even going to an audience with the Grand Vizier. An audience, according to Sir James Porter, was

152

Jones, op. cit., p. 74; Brown, Rawdon, Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Venetian, I, p. xvii of preface.

153

Emo, op. cit., 28 June, 1730, I, pp. 4b-5a; 28 September, 1730, I, pp. 31b-32a; 12 November, 1730, I, pp. 78b-79a; 10 March, 1731, I, pp. 188b-189a; 24 April, 1731, I, pp. 234a-b; 5 October, 1731, II, pp. 108b, 110a; 13 September, 1733, IV, p. 127b; 2 December, 1733, IV, p. 187a; 9 October, 1734, IV, pp. 409a-b; 23 March, 1735, IV, p. 425a.

154

Ibid., 11 July, 1732, III, pp. 103a-b.

155

Ibid., 21 May, 1733, III, p. 328a.

156

Ibid., 28 May, 1733, III, p. 336a; 1 June, 1733, IV, p. 25b.

an unpleasant ceremony at its best.¹⁵⁷ After a night of fever, Emo went to an audience in May, 1733. He was carried from his residence to the boat in a chair, but after reaching Constantinople he rode to the palace on horseback, sat through an audience of almost two hours, retraced the usual part of his way on horseback, and was forced to go at once to bed when he¹⁵⁸ reached the embassy.

"The true interest of my country is the object most dear to me after God," Emo wrote in April, 1734.¹⁵⁹ He almost invariably coupled his civil duties with his pious longings. Just as his protestations of patriotism might sound mechanical or be analyzed as typical of the time, so might the frequency of his religious expressions. His fervor was, however, not personal only. He was grateful to God for the return of Venetians to the¹⁶⁰ Christian faith and in keeping Turkey too occupied in Persia

157

"In the middle of this chamber an old square stool is prepared for the ambassador; and he is there fixed, if the stool can support him, at least for two hours, hearing the decision of causes he does not understand; tho' if it be a pay-day for the Janisaries and Spahis, and this the Turks generally chuse, he is entertained with seeing about two thousand four hundred yellow bags of money told out and distributed; and this lasts at least twice two hours; so that in a cold day, without a fur, his very vitals may freeze; and at any time the spine of his back must suffer cruelly, for he has nothing to lean against to support or ease it."- Porter, Sir James, Observations on the Religion, Law, Government, and Manners, of the Turks, II, pp. 36-37.

158

Emo, op. cit., 28 May, 1733, IV, pp. 2b-5a.

159

Ibid., 10 April, 1734, IV, p. 296b.

160

Ibid., 10 March, 1731, I, pp. 190a-b.

to permit her making war on Europe.

A few of his statements suggest a less ideal character. There was a touch of intolerance in his attitude toward the Turks. He considered them avaricious, dissimulating, and faithless.¹⁶² Only a few such characterizations were made, but they were positive, unsoftened and unqualified. Other comments showed a suave, proud Venetian. He gave himself credit for eliciting information from Neplyneff, the Russian minister,¹⁶³ "through a hint advanced with much dexterity." He took pride in his diplomatic handling of Turkish officials and in the results of his negotiations.¹⁶⁴ When the Grand Vizier postponed his audience because of the December snow and wind, he was delighted at such discretion, "a novel fruit here, never tasted by other Foreign Ministers."¹⁶⁵ In fairness to him, it may be said that some of his pride may have been for the courtesy shown to the representative of Venice rather than to him personally. This feeling was not so great as to prevent his reporting a rather harsh characterization of himself by Resident Talman.

161

Emo, op. cit., 14 August, 1734, IV, p. 372b.

162

Ibid., 14 August, 1731, II, p. 44a; 29 October, 1731, II, p. 115a; 30 November, 1731, II, pp. 170a-b, 172a; 1 August, 1733, IV, p. 77a; 28 May, 1734, IV, p. 329a.

163

Ibid., 7 March, 1732, II, p. 282b.

164

Ibid., 20 September, 1732, III, p. 153a; 1 June, 1733, IV, p. 14b; 12 June, 1733, IV, p. 26a; 12 November, 1733, IV, p. 159b; 24 November, 1733, IV, pp. 178a-b.

165

Ibid., 24 December, 1732, III, p. 233b.

There had been a controversy among the diplomats as to whether they would grant the Resident's request for an escort upon his formal entrance into Constantinople. Emo's reply had misled Talman, and when the Venetian escort did not appear, Talman said that his reply was not so resolute as that of the English Ambassador, and a negative answer would have been better than pleasant words without action.¹⁶⁶

As an official Angelo Emo was a devoted citizen whose vigilance, tireless efforts, and religious feeling made him record faithfully, with a decided literary ability, a great quantity of material; that which he collected and preserved serves as a valuable contemporary account of the Ottoman Empire.

166

Emo, op. cit., 22 April, 1732, III, p. 15a.

CHAPTER I

Political and Social Conditions in the Ottoman Empire

Angelo Emo arrived in Constantinople September 27, 1730,¹ on the eve of the revolt which replaced Achmet III by Mahmud I. Two weeks later Emo reported the cause of the revolt to have been the ruse of the Sultan and the ministry in departing from the city as if to take part in the war against Persia.² This may be considered the incidental cause of the revolt. The real or underlying causes were more fundamental than this immediate provocation.

The revolt may be viewed as another indication of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Historians have characterized the sultans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as mediocre and unimportant rulers. They no longer led their armies in battle.³ The Janissaries were more interested in maintaining their privileges than in fighting. They were no longer selected, but inherited their membership in the corps.⁴

Achmet III had gained the throne in 1703 by a revolt which

¹ Emo, op. cit., 2 October, 1730, I, p. 37b.

² Ibid., 11 October, 1730, I, pp. 45a-b; Diedo, op. cit., p. 234.

³ Marriott, op. cit., pp. 4-5; Young, op. cit., pp. 126, 156.

⁴ Sorel, Albert, The Eastern Question in the Eighteenth Century, pp. 28-29; Marriott, op. cit., pp. 102-103; Young, op. cit., p. 176.

deposed Mustapha II.⁵ The first part of Achmet's reign of twenty-seven years showed renewed energy in the Government. Azov was recovered from Russia, and the Morea recaptured from Venice.⁶ An important change was introduced in the government of the Danubian provinces. The voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia had been selected from the local nobility, but they betrayed Turkish interests and aided Russia during the war in 1711. From that year until 1821 Greeks of Constantinople were appointed as viceroys of the two provinces.⁷

Certain weaknesses appeared, however. Defeated by Austria,⁸ the Porte was forced to cede Temesvar and Belgrade in 1718, and the remaining twelve years of the reign were in great contrast to those preceding. There were two redeeming features of these last years: the improving and beautifying of Constantinople by repairing the principal monuments, erecting fountains, and building palaces;⁹ and the establishment of the first printing press.¹⁰ Achmet had become tired of public affairs. His son-in-law,

⁵ Creasy, Sir Edward Shepherd, History of the Ottoman Turks, II, p. 107.

⁶ Ibid., p. 156; Hammer, Joseph von, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, VII, p. 388.

⁷ Creasy, op. cit., pp. 156-157; Young, op. cit., p. 163.

⁸ Alberi, Eugenio, Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, Series III, Vol. I, p. xiii.

⁹ Vandal, op. cit., p. 84; Hammer, op. cit., pp. 244, 359 et seq.

¹⁰ Omont, Henri Auguste, Documents sur Imprimerie a Constantinople au XVIII^e Siècle, p.5.

Ibrahim Damad, served him as Vizier in the true sense of the word.¹¹ The Sultan wished to be amused. Nothing charmed him so much as a well-managed festival in a beautiful palace.¹² The Grand Vizier met these wishes by multiplying the places of pleasure, by erecting summer palaces with elegant pavilions, by importing architects who used Versailles and Ispahan as models. The festivals were great displays. The city was illuminated during the nights of the major and minor Bairam,¹³ and decorated at the birth or marriage of the Sultan's children. There were representations of naval battles, combats of lions, tilts between Arabian and Tartar horsemen. One of the most splendid celebrations was the fete of the tulips.¹⁴

Achmet enjoyed all this pomp, yet he loved gold for its own sake.¹⁵ It was also the duty of the Grand Vizier to please his sovereign with a full treasury. Ibrahim Damad succeeded well. In spite of the elaborate amusements and ceremonies, Achmet left

¹¹
"The word vizier means burden-bearer, the idea being that an official so designated lifted from the shoulders of the sovereign the burden of state, and bore it upon his own shoulders."--Lybyer, Albert Howe, The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent, p. 164.

¹²
Vandal, op. cit., p. 83; La Crix, Jean François, de Abbrégé Chronologique de L'Histoire Ottomane, II, pp. 721-722.

¹³
See Appendix A: Glossary.

¹⁴
Vandal, op. cit., pp. 83-87; Hammer, op. cit., pp. 270 et seq., 363 et seq., 390.

¹⁵
Vandal, op. cit., p. 83.

immense treasures,¹⁶ the Grand Vizier and the Kiaya¹⁷ almost unbelievable amounts. There were found buried in one of the courts of the palace three iron chests belonging to the Vizier. Each contained eighteen bags, in each of which were sixty thousand sequins.¹⁸ Zinkeisen estimated a sequin to be ten livres.¹⁹ With that as a basis for calculation, the amount found would be about \$6,480,000. One of the Vizier's servants confessed that this money was derived partly from the sale of justice. Precious stones²⁰ and other costly objects²¹ were found that the Vizier had collected. The money accumulated by the Kiaya was 4,500,000 livres,²² or about \$900,000. These amounts, tremendous in themselves, were much greater in purchasing power in 1730 than in 1930, with the great change in the value of money.

16

Emo, op. cit., 17 December, 1730, I, p. 108a.

17

See Appendix A: Glossary. Emo, op. cit., 15 October, 1730, I, pp. 58a-b; 1 November, 1730, I, p. 65a.

18

Zinkeisen, Johann Wilhelm, Geschichte des Osmanischen in Europa, V, p. 630 and note. Zinkeisen used as his source: "Relation des deux Rebellions arrivées à Constantinople en 1730 et 1731, dans la déposition d'Achmet III et l'élévation au trône de Mahomet V, composée sur des Mémoires originaux reçus de Constantinople. À La Haye 1737."--note on p. 626. He found that these figures were the same as given by Hanway, Jonas, An Historical Account of the British Trade over the Caspian Sea, IV, p. 48.

19

Zinkeisen, op. cit., note on p. 630.

20

Hanway, op. cit., p. 48.

21

Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 630.

22

Ibid., note on p. 630.

Such extravagance and avarice caused dissatisfaction. The possibility of a revolt was known in France. The instructions to the Marquis de Villeneuve in 1728 reminded him that the Sultan's throne was more fragile than any other and that the office of the Vizier was surrounded on all sides by precipices.²⁴ With a background of unrest, the populace was easily aroused. When Tahmasp Kuli Khan of Persia captured Tabriz and sent the Turkish soldiers of the garrison to Constantinople with their noses and ears cut off, the Grand Vizier considered it advisable not to let them be seen. His order that the ship bringing them be sunk was carried out, but their fate was learned.²⁵ The Sultan and Ibrahim no longer had the desire for war that they had had in 1710 and 1715; consequently they negotiated with the Persians for peace and sought to appease the people by pretending they were preparing for war. On August 3, 1730, they marched from Constantinople in splendid array and crossed to Scutari. There they remained and continued to negotiate for peace. Finally the people realized the deception. The luxury-loving court had no intention of defending the national honor. The excessive taxes had been levied for a war which might not take place.²⁶

²³ Creasy, op. cit., p. 155.

²⁴ Vandal, op. cit., pp. 73, 74.

²⁵ De La Croix, op. cit., p. 716.

²⁶ Vandal, op. cit., pp. 148-151.

The time for a revolt was propitious. The officials were still on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus. The revolt started September 28 with three apparently insignificant leaders. Ali Patrona, an Albanian Janissary who had served in the navy and who was an old clothes dealer in 1730, was the chief rebel. His assistants were Muslu, a fruit dealer, and Emir Hali, a coffee vender. These three with about a dozen followers went to the bazaar, seized a torn banner and old weapons, ran through the streets calling to all true Moslems and lovers of their country for support, and then established themselves in the square of the Atmeidan.²⁷ By night this small band had grown to a couple of thousand.²⁸

The news was carried to the Sultan by the Capitan Pasha,²⁹ the Kaimakam, and the Agha of the Janissaries.³⁰ The Sultan and

²⁷ The Atmeidan was a square within the city where religious ceremonies and secular observances took place. "There each Sultan first reviewed his troops after accession, and there bestowed his largesses, the invariable and welcome accompaniment of each new reign. There the circumcisions and marriages of the reigning family were celebrated with Oriental extravagance and pomp. Sometimes gladiatorial fights....furnished amusement to the faithful. There the mounted pages of the palace contended in the wild game of the djerid, a sport as maddening and as dangerous as the contests of the arena." The Atmeidan was the place where rebels usually assembled: Grosvenor, Edwin A., Constantinople, I, pp. 349-350.

²⁸ Emo, op. cit., 2 October, 1730, p. 37b; Vandal, op. cit., p. 152; Zinkeisen, op. cit., pp. 626-627; Hammer, op. cit., p. 381; Hanway, op. cit., p. 44. The last four agree with Emo in stating the date of the revolt as September 28. Creasy's statement that the revolt started September 20 is incorrect: op. cit., p. 155.

²⁹ See Appendix A: Glossary.

³⁰ Ibid.; Emo, op. cit., pp. 37b-38a. Hanway states that the news was carried by the Mufti, Kaimakam, and Kiaya: op. cit., p. 45.

the officials returned to Constantinople during the night. It was believed that the rebels would be dispersed on the twenty-ninth, and Emo stated that they might have been if the favorable moment had been seized while they were unorganized and uncertain about the next step. That moment was soon gone.³¹ The conferences within the palace regarding whether force was to be used were too deliberate.³² The rebels were organized, an oath of obedience to Ali Patrona was sworn, and order was established among them. Janissaries began to join the group. During the day arms were seized, the prisons opened, and the slaves of five galleys released from their chains.³³ Then began the rebels' demands for the lives of the five ministers: the Grand Vizier, the Capitan Pasha, the Kiaya, the Mufti, and the Reis Effendi.³⁴³⁵ These demands increased the following day. The Sultan suggested exiling the ministers, but the mob desired their death. To save himself, the Sultan who loved flowers was willing to sacrifice

31

Emo, op. cit., p. 38a.

32

Hanway, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

33

Emo, op. cit., pp. 38b-40a; 18 January, 1731, I, p. 136a.

34

See Appendix A: Glossary.

35

Emo, op. cit., 2 October, 1730, p. 39a. Other accounts differ from Emo, and state that the Kaimakam was demanded instead of the Reis Effendi: Hanway, op. cit., p. 47; Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 627. Grassi gives the Kaimakam instead of the Capitan Pasha: Charte Turque, II, p. 272. Hammer states that four were demanded, the Grand Vizier, Capitan Pasha, Kiaya, and Mufti: op. cit., p. 383. He followed Emo's account in another example where it differed from the source used by Zinkeisen.

three of the men who had served him: Ibrahim Damad, his son-in-law and the conqueror of the Morea; the Capitan Pasha; and the Kiaya. He showed some mercy by delivering them strangled. With a mixture of delight and fury, the mob showed its true character and gave a hint of the treatment the ministers fortunately escaped. Their bodies were maltreated, but the mob soon tired of seeking satisfaction in that manner. "The Sultan believed perhaps that there had been sufficient sacrifice for his safety, but the thirst of a people in revolt is never satisfied with a little blood," philosophized Emo. It was suggested that a substitute had been given for Ibrahim. His corpse was dragged to the palace, and the demands began again for the heads of the Reis Effendi, the Mufti, and many others. Then they began clamoring for the abdication of Achmet III. He surrendered and exchanged places with his nephew, who had been in the kafes for twenty-seven years, and the nephew became Mahmud I. The revolt

³⁶The Kaimakam: Hanway, op. cit., p. 48; Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 628; the Capitan Pasha: Hammer, op. cit.

³⁷Emo, op. cit., pp. 38a-40a.

³⁸Ibid., p. 40a.

³⁹Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 629; Emo, op. cit., pp. 40a-b; Diedo, op. cit., pp. 234-236. Diedo was a contemporary of Angelo Emo. The Council of Ten gave permission, August 19, 1750, for his Storia della Repubblica di Venezia dalla Sua Fondazione sino l'anno 1747 to be published, and it was published in 1751. His being a senator and his very close reproduction of Emo's account (in fact exact reproductions of phrases of eight and nine words appear, but without quotation marks) warrant the assumption that he used the despatches. He named the same officials that Emo did and not the variations in footnotes 35 and 36.

had begun on Thursday, the new reign began on Sunday. The statement made in 1768 by Zegelin, the Prussian Resident at Constantinople, was applicable to the revolt of 1730: "Though the form of government [Turkish] is despotic, it is such that when the people is enraged, the Government is no longer master and must yield to the torrent."⁴¹

Mahmud had made a favorable impression at the beginning when he had appeared at a grated window to satisfy the mob and when the Agha of the Janissaries and other military officials interviewed him.⁴² This impression was no doubt aided by the customary gift made by a new sultan, of twenty-five piasters to each soldier.⁴³ A better view of Mahmud was had as he rode to and from the Mosque of Eyub, where the ceremony of girding a new ruler with the sword of Othman was performed; he left "in every one an agreeable idea of his royal appearance and propitious predictions for the future."⁴⁴

Even so, conditions were not settled. Mahmud dared not assert himself immediately. Ali Patrona's influence continued for nearly two months. He appeared barelegged and in an old

40

Emo, op. cit., p. 41b.

41

Sorel, op. cit., p. 26.

42

Emo, op. cit., p. 40b.

43

Ibid., p. 41a.

44

Ibid., 11 October, 1730, I, pp. 43b-44a. Emo gave the date of this ceremony as October 6: 11 October, 1730, I, p. 43b; Zinkeisen, October 7; op. cit., p. 330. Hammer examined the source used by Zinkeisen and Emo's despatches, and followed the latter: op. cit., p. 392.

uniform before Mahmud.⁴⁵ He rode with the Sultan to the Mosque of Eyub for the "coronation" ceremony,⁴⁶ and every day he appeared at court.⁴⁷ He wished nothing for himself, he refused offices,⁴⁸ and he continued to wear torn clothes. Even when he put on a new uniform, it was said that he wore his beloved rags beneath.⁴⁹ The Sultan misled him by attentions. Ali Patrona had obtained cancellation of the new taxes imposed by the preceding administration,⁵⁰ and he boasted that his influence had caused the increase of the number of the Janissaries from forty to seventy thousand, of the Topjis.⁵¹ from twelve to twenty thousand, and of the Spahis.⁵² The liberality of Mahmud continued. Money poured from the well-filled treasury to be distributed among the old and the recently enrolled troops.⁵³

Conditions began to improve. Shops which had been closed for two weeks were opened. The rebels encamped in the Atmeidan began to disperse.⁵⁴ Nearly all were gone by the first of

45

Creasy, op. cit., p. 158.

46

Zinkeisen, op. cit.

47

Emo, op. cit., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 58b.

48

Ibid., 11 October, 1730, I, p. 44b.

49

Ibid., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 58b.

50

Hanway, op. cit., p. 52.

51

See Appendix A: Glossary.

52

Ibid.; Emo, op. cit., 11 October, 1730, I, pp. 44a-b.

53

Emo, op. cit., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 58a.

54

Ibid., pp. 58b-59a.

November. The former Reis Effendi, who had escaped the mob, was discovered in his hiding place and brought to the palace to give the new Reis Effendi the benefit of his experience, but this step was not tolerated by the rebels. They forced him to leave. ⁵⁵

Meanwhile the power of Ali Patrona had begun to wane. The booty obtained from the pillaging of the deposed ministers' possessions, and the money distributed by Mahmud ⁵⁶ created a desire. Ali Patrona began to accept bribes, a practice which had brought about the revolt and a practice which was not agreeable to his followers. ⁵⁷ Pride and insolence began to replace his modesty. About November 12, he asked that Yanaki, a butcher who had loaned him money during the three days of insurrection, be made hospodar of Moldavia. The Grand Vizier was surprised at the request but granted it, although Ghika had secured re-
appointment for the second triennium from the preceding ⁵⁸ Government. Ali Patrona also obtained an important post for ⁵⁹ Muslu, that of Kulkiaya. Mahmud had succeeded in the meantime ⁶⁰ in winning some of the officers of the Janissaries. The many

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Emo, op. cit., 1 November, 1730, I, pp. 62a-b.

⁵⁶

Ibid., 11 October, 1730, I, p. 47a; Vandal, op. cit., p. 158; Zinkeisen, op. cit., pp. 630-631.

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Hanway, op. cit., p. 53.

⁵⁸

Emo, op. cit., 12 November, 1730, I, pp. 72a-b.

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See Appendix A: Glossary; Emo, op. cit., 28 November, 1730, I, p. 80b.

⁶⁰

Ibid., 12 November, 1730, I, pp. 73a-b.

purses produced by Ghika were effective. Yanaki never acted as hospodar, and it was significant that he was even abandoned⁶¹ by Ali Patrona. This was a hint of the almost immediate end of the authority exercised by the rebel leader. His fatal act of insolence was the convening of a council, November 23, and his demand for a declaration of war against Russia. In an argument at this meeting with the Khan of the Tartars, he showed⁶² how impractical and ignorant he was. Mahmud plotted against him with the Khan, Abdullah Pasha, and Yanon Khoja, the Capitan Pasha. A council was called, November 25, in order, as was announced, to issue a declaration of war against Persia. Ali Patrona was also to have the great honor of being made Pasha of three tails and to receive a post in Sofia. The night before Yanon Khoja had hidden four hundred well-armed soldiers in the palace. When he gave a signal, about thirty soldiers entered promptly and attacked the rebels, who were killed, and after them their twenty-six followers who had accompanied them to the palace. The bodies of the slain were shown to the people.⁶³ This was only the beginning of a reign of terror, in which some Janissaries were strangled, while others were thrown

61

Emo, op. cit., 28 November, 1730, I, p. 81b.

62

Hanway, op. cit., p. 55; Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 634; Hammer, op. cit., p. 398.

63

Emo, op. cit., 30 November, 1730, I, pp. 91b-94b; Hammer, op. cit., p. 398; Hanway, op. cit., p. 58; Zinkeisen, op. cit., pp. 634-636. For this council Hanway has the date November 8 and for the preceding council November 6. The others have November 25.

into prison. Malcontents were sought for among the other
divisions of the army.⁶⁴

To the people a second-hand clothes' dealer, a fruit vender, and a coffee seller had been only the means to an end. There was no attempt to avenge their deaths, but the Janissaries noticed that one of their privileges had been disregarded, that of being killed as punishment only in secret and at night.⁶⁵

The revolt had revealed the instability of the Government, and there were other evidences of this condition. In spite of the agreeable impression made by Mahmud at first, he did not prove to be a man of firmness, initiative, and independence. He consulted his deposed uncle frequently,⁶⁶ but his mother and the Kizlar Aghasi⁶⁷ were the most influential advisers.⁶⁸ The frequent changes of viziers during the reign were said to have been the result of the advice of the Kizlar Aghasi. He had seen the revolutions of 1703 and 1730 and ascribed their cause to the long terms, great power, and ambition of the viziers for glory and conquest; accordingly he advised Mahmud to change them frequently, not permitting any to remain in office more

⁶⁴ Emo, op. cit., pp. 89b, 95a; 17 December, 1730, I, p.107a.

⁶⁵ Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 636.

⁶⁶ Emo, op. cit., 12 November, 1730, I, pp. 75b-76a.

⁶⁷ See Appendix A: Glossary.

⁶⁸ Emo, op. cit., p. 76a; 14 August, 1731, II, p. 50a; 15 August, 1731, II, pp. 55a-b.

69

than three years. Hanway gave Achmet III credit for this advice and reported his saying to Mahmud: "Remember that your father lost the place in which you are now seated, by his blind complaisance for his Mufti Feizoullah Effendi; and that I lose it myself, by having trusted too much to my vizir Ibrahim Basha. Learn from our examples not to confide in your ministers without due circumspection. If I had always followed my old maxims, I should never have left mine so long in place, or omitted to have demanded frequent and regular accounts of the affairs of the empire. Perhaps I might have then finished my reign as gloriously as I began it. . . ."

70

Whoever gave the advice might have been both flattered and surprised at the frequency of changes of the officials. During the four years and four months which Emo spent in Constantinople, there were four grand viziers and a provisional one who served until Ali Pasha was able to reach Constantinople from Asia.

71

There were seven changes in the office

69

Porter, op. cit., I, p. 91. This statement by Sir James Porter seems too general and not exact for the policy of the ministry in 1730. Vandal, the French historian who examined Emo's Despatches and those of the Marquis de Villeneuve, and Emo stated the policy of the ministry in 1730 to have been one of peace.

70

Hanway, op. cit., p. 51. A similar speech may be found in Grassi, op. cit., p. 278, and in Mignot, Vincent, The History of the Turkish, or Ottoman Empire, IV, p. 324.

71

Mehemet Pasha, October, 1730, to January, 1731: Emo, op. cit., 2 October, 1730, I, p. 41a; 25 January, 1731, I, p. 145b. Ibrahim Pasha, January to September, 1731: Emo, op. cit., 14 September, 1731, II, pp. 81b-82b; 27 September, 1731, II, pp. 86a-b. Topal Osman, September, 1731, to March, 1732: Emo, op. cit., 29 March, 1732, II, pp. 285b-286b. Defterdar Ali Pasha, provisional. Ali Pasha, May, 1732, to July, 1735: Emo, op. cit., 29 March, 1732, II, p. 289a; 15 May, 1732, III, p. 26b; Hammer, op. cit., p. 437.

of capitan pasha, frequent dismissals of other officials, and many more rumors of changes to be made. These changes were made because of the opposition of the people to the officials, the wishes of the Queen Mother and the Kizlar Aghasi, or the antagonism of the officials for one another. The almost

Abdi, October to November, 1730: Emo, op. cit., 2 October, 1730, I, p. 41a; 12 November, 1730, I, p. 71b. Ali, November, 1730: Emo, op. cit., 12 November, 1730, I, p. 71b. Yanon Khoja, November, 1730, to May, 1731: Emo, op. cit., 28 November, 1730, I, p. 81a; 18 May, 1731, I, pp. 272b-273a. Abdi, July to September, 1731: Emo, op. cit., 3 July, 1731, II, p. 16a; 29 September, 1731, II, p. 90b. Saim Mehemet, September to November, 1731: Emo, op. cit., 29 September, 1731, II, p. 90b; 30 November, 1731, II, p. 173a. Marabut, January to June, 1732: Emo, op. cit., 18 January, 1732, II, p. 213b; 14 June, 1732, II, p. 67a. Bekir, June, 1732, to May, 1733: Emo, op. cit., 14 June, 1732, III, p. 67a; 28 May, 1733, III, p. 344a. Yanon Khoja, May, 1733, and during remainder of Emo's term.

New Agha of Janissaries: Emo, op. cit., 2 October, 1730, I, pp. 41a-b; 30 November, 1730, I, p. 96a; 3 April, 1731, I, p. 223b. New Reis Effendi: Emo, op. cit., 17 December, 1730, I, p. 104a. New Mufti: Emo, op. cit., 18 May, 1731, I, p. 272a; 25 February, 1732, II, p. 271b; 29 March, 1732, II, p. 289b; 27 October, 1733, IV, pp. 150a-b. Minor officials: Emo, op. cit., 30 October, 1731, II, pp. 130a-b; 30 July, 1732, III, pp. 122b-123a; 18 August, 1732, III, p. 129b; 3 July, 1734, IV, p. 356b; 19 August, 1734, IV, pp. 376a-b.

Emo., op. cit., 1 November, 1730, I, pp. 61a-62b; 12 November, 1730, I, pp. 71b-72a; 28 November, 1730, I, pp. 80a-b; 17 December, 1730, I, p. 104a; 18 January, 1731, I, p. 134b; 18 May, 1731, I, p. 273a; 28 July, 1731, II, pp. 35a-36b; 14 August, 1731, II, p. 49b; 14 September, 1731, II, pp. 83a-b; 16 November, 1731, II, p. 157b; 28 December, 1731, II, p. 201a; 7 March, 1732, II, p. 281b; 4 June, 1732, III, pp. 52b-53a; 19 October, 1732, III, p. 186b; 28 May, 1733, III, p. 344b; 1 June, 1733, IV, p. 24b.

constant dismissals and promotions showed the lack of stability of Mahmud and the Government.

The first Grand Vizier of the new reign was Mehemet Pasha.⁷⁵ His term was short, from October 1, 1730, to January 22, 1731. In less than a month after his appointment there were rumors that a new vizier was to be selected. Mehemet was considered too inexperienced for the office and his earlier relations with the deposed Sultan and Ibrahim Damad were recalled.⁷⁶ He in turn hated his critics, the rebels, but he was too timid to⁷⁷ oppose them.⁷⁸ The dissatisfaction and rumors continued until he was finally replaced by Ibrahim Pasha. The latter was favorably received. His training under the Kiuprilis and his military experience in Hungary made him acceptable.⁷⁹ He worked studiously to dispel dissatisfaction. He spent hours in the Divan, patiently hearing petitions. He visited the food shops in order to reduce the high prices.⁸⁰ In spite of these efforts and the attempt to get rid of suspicious persons by executing or

⁷⁵ Emo, *op. cit.*, 2 October, 1730, LS, I, p. 41a; SS, I, pp. 28a-b; 25 January, 1731, LS, I, p. 145b.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 1 November, 1730, I, pp. 61a-62b.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 12 November, 1730, I, 73a.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 1 January, 1731, I, p. 109a; 18 January, 1731, I, p. 134b.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 25 January, 1731, I, pp. 145b-146a.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 22 February, 1731, I, p. 163a.

81
exiling them, prices continued high and the people were rest-
82
less.

Another force had been working within the palace. Fatima, the daughter of Achmet III and the widow of Ibrahim Damad, led the group of irreconcilables who wished to restore the deposed
83
Sultan. They had an assistant in the city in the person of Kara Ali the Arnaut, that is, the Albanian. For two months, it was said, he had been gathering his forces for a general revolt. He considered an opportune time to be during a night
84
of Ramazan when people frequented the streets and could gather in groups without being observed. The revolt started early in the morning of March 25. The first action was an attack on the shops which sold arms. The leaders were soon joined by others until there were about two thousand persons in the group. The rebels established themselves in the Atmeidan. They then made an attack on the house of the Agha of the Janissaries. He escaped with a slight wound, and his house was ransacked. The Janissaries refused to join the rebels. A council was held in the palace, and immediately an army was formed of Kapujis,
85
Bostanjis, and Levantines. It was reported that Mahmud wished

81
Emo, op. cit., pp. 163a-164a; 24 February, 1731, I, p.174a;
9 March, 1731, I, pp. 184b-185a.

82
Ibid., 9 March, 1731, I, p. 185b; 17 March, 1731, I,
pp. 205b-206a.

83
Vandal, op. cit., p. 167; Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 636.

84
See Appendix A: Glossary.

85
Ibid.

to accompany the troops, but the council did not approve of such action. The Prophet's standard was placed outside the main entrance of the palace. The troops marched out with the Grand Vizier, the Capitan Pasha, and the Agha at their head. The rebels were soon dispersed, three or four hundred being killed. The Vizier then sent a number of detachments through the city to search for the leaders. By noon quiet was restored, the Vizier and his troops had returned to the palace. Soon after the Grand Signor sent a Hatti-sherif to the troops praising their fidelity. This praise was followed by his gifts to those who had served him.

This revolt was a minor one in comparison with the duration of time and results of that of the preceding September. The two were similar in that the instigators and the majority of the groups were Albanians. An antagonistic feeling toward this people was the result. A Hatti-sherif was issued which banished them from Constantinople. Another group of malcontents likewise discriminated against was the Lazes of Asia. In order to decrease the opposition group suspected persons were executed or exiled, the Sultana was imprisoned, and three thousand

86

See Appendix A: Glossary.

87

Emo, op. cit., 27 March, 1731, I, pp. 208a-214a; Hammer, op. cit., p. 400; Hanway, op. cit., pp. 61-62; Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 636. There is a discrepancy as to the date of the revolt. Emo gave March 26, Hammer the twenty-fourth, Hanway and Zinkeisen the twenty-fifth.

88

Emo, op. cit., 28 March, 1731, I, pp. 214b-215a.

89

Ibid., pp. 214b-215b.

90

Ibid., 3 April, 1731, I, pp. 220a-b.

of the most contumacious Janissaries were sent to the Persian frontiers. Mahmud had tried to divide the troops after the first revolt, but his plan had met with objections. After this second revolt he was permitted to carry out his plan. Other precautionary measures were the closing of the coffee shops⁹¹ and baths and the careful guarding of the ministers' houses. In order to pursue a mixed policy of repression and graciousness to the army, which was not agreeable to the Agha, Abdullah Pasha,⁹² a new head was appointed, Saim Mehemet Pasha. "The bloody experiments," to quote Emo, were continued in Constantinople and surrounding territory at such a rate that on the eleventh day after the revolt Emo recorded that more than ten thousand⁹³ heads had been sacrificed. This number might have been exaggerated in order to terrorize the people, but there is no doubt that great numbers were killed.

Circumspection, precautions, and executions became the chief policy of Ibrahim Pasha. Exactly one month after the revolt the customary audiences at the Divan had not been resumed, and the coffee shops remained closed, so as to prevent the gathering of idlers. "Sad, it may be believed, is the aspect of this city," Emo wrote. Even at Bairam, when there was usually freedom and festivity, the ministers exercised extreme

91

Emo, op. cit., pp. 222a-223a.

92

Ibid., p. 223b.

93

Ibid., 5 April, 1731, pp. 229b, 230a.

vigilance. It was customary for the sultan to go to the Mosque of Eyub for the religious ceremonies. This year, however, Mahmud went to Santa Sophia, which was closer to the palace. His cortege consisted of Janissaries, many persons from the palace, and great numbers of Levantines. These last two groups were unusual on such occasions. While he was away from the palace, the city gates were closed. Guards were stationed about the city in the squares, in places frequented, and near the Arsenal. No attempt at revolt occurred, and conditions seemed promising. The Divan was opened.⁹⁴ Soon Mahmud began again to visit his various palaces, the Arsenal, and Tophaneh.⁹⁵

Although Constantinople seemed to regain tranquillity, the ministry continued to be apprehensive. The opposition element was pursued during May, June, July, and August. Albanians and Lazes were hunted.⁹⁶ In connection with this policy the name of Topal Osman became prominent.⁹⁷ because of his thorough search for coals of fire which might still be glowing embers. As proof of his vigilance he sent from Albania early in July twelve heads,⁹⁸ later in the month forty-five,⁹⁹ and in August fifteen.¹⁰⁰

94 Emo, op. cit., 26 April, 1731, I, pp. 237a-238b.

95 Ibid., 4 May, 1731, I, p. 262a.

96 Ibid., pp. 261b-262a; 18 May, 1731, I, pp. 262b-263a; 14 June, 1731, I, p. 298a; 3 July, 1731, II, pp. 17a-b; 21 July, 1731, II, p. 23b et seq.; 15 August, 1731, II, p. 55b.

97 Ibid., 18 May, 1731, I, pp. 263a-b.

98 Ibid., 3 July, 1731, II, pp. 19a-b.

99 Ibid., 28 July, 1731, II, p. 36a.

100 Ibid., 18 August, 1731, II, p. 60a.

The scarcity of food and high prices still caused unrest. The Vizier went about the city to investigate the economic situation. He was able to improve conditions, but his policy remained "to¹⁰¹ anaesthetise locally the complaints with the blood of many." After four months of extermination by the sword, the bow-string, and the sea, the end sought had not been attained. Rebellion was in the hearts of the people and fear in those of the ministers. The state of affairs was shown in connection with a fire which occurred in Galata during the night of July 21. It was customary for the Sultan and the ministers to appear at a fire, or to appear early in the morning if it had occurred during the night. "High was the sun" when Mahmud appeared, and then he remained in a nearby kiosk. He neither mixed with the crowd nor sought to animate the workers, the usual conduct of a sultan at a fire. The Vizier and other officials came and gave orders, but they threw no money as reward. When the Janissaries drank the wine found in some of the houses, the ministers foresaw that insolent words might be followed by a revolt and withdrew. It was believed that if the wine had not diverted the Janissaries, a revolt would have occurred. Ibrahim had a hundred of the most disagreeable ones arrested. There¹⁰² were murmurs against his remaining in office. According to rumors, he was paying a great price to the Queen Mother and the

101

Emo, op. cit., 14 June, 1731, I, p. 298a.

102

Ibid., 28 July, 1731, II, pp. 31a-b, 34a-b.

Kizlar Aghasi for their support.

About the middle of September, the plot for a revolt was discovered. Upon investigation little groups with arms and banners were found about the city. They admitted that they were plotting against the Vizier and the Agha of the Janissaries. Some of the accused were strangled and their bodies exposed. The Vizier was forced to resign by the Kizlar Aghasi, Sultana Valideh,¹⁰⁴ Defterdar,¹⁰⁵ and Mufti.¹⁰⁶ Emo summarized his term: "Cruelty and avarice were his vices; strong will, mental capacity, and practical knowledge his virtues; and if virtue were governed by dissimulation, sagacity, and industry, he could take a place among the expert and reputable ministers."¹⁰⁷

The heads of Albanians had won for Topal Osman the governorship of Rumelia;¹⁰⁸ his zeal and fervor were rewarded by his being appointed Grand Vizier.¹⁰⁹ He made a favorable impression by announcing his plan of separating the guilty from the innocent, by reopening the shops,¹¹⁰ and by showing a friendly

103

Emo, op. cit., 14 August, 1731, II, pp. 49b-50a.

104

See Appendix A: Glossary.

105

Ibid.

106

Emo, op. cit., 14 September, 1731, II, pp. 79a-82b.

107

Ibid., pp. 82b-83a.

108

Ibid., 14 August, 1731, II, p. 44b.

109

Ibid., 27 September, 1731, II, pp. 86a-b.

110

Ibid., 5 October, 1731, II, pp. 101b-102b.

attitude to the ambassadors of Venice¹¹¹ and France.¹¹² In contrast to the cruelty and avarice of his predecessor, he was clement and liberal.¹¹³ He had not, however, been in power two months when he began to show intolerance and resentment because of the suggestions of the Kizlar Aghasi to the Mufti and Defterdar.¹¹⁴

As described by Hanway,¹¹⁵ the Marquis de Villeneuve,¹¹⁶ and Jean Nicodeme,¹¹⁷ Topal Osman was brave, generous, and grateful. Emo saw another Topal Osman as an administrator: a man who punished every light transgression of the law with death, who covered his cruelty with the mantle of justice, who taxed every kind of food, who was feared more than any of his predecessors,¹¹⁸ and who was violent, vain, impetuous, and irascible.¹¹⁹ The following incidents revealed his choleric

¹¹¹ Emo, op. cit., 27 September, 1731, II, p. 88b.

¹¹² Ibid., 5 October, 1731, II, pp. 102b-103a.

¹¹³ Ibid., 29 October, 1731, II, p. 117a.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 16 November, 1731, II, p. 157b.

¹¹⁵ Hanway, op. cit., pp. 100-108.

¹¹⁶ Vandal, op. cit., pp. 167-168, 178-179.

¹¹⁷ From a letter written by Jean Nicodeme, the French physician attending Topal Osman on the campaign of 1733 in Persia, to the Marquis de Villeneuve. Topal requested that copies of this letter be made for his son and a friend; naturally it recorded only commendable characteristics: Hammer, op. cit., pp. 600-608.

¹¹⁸ Emo, op. cit., 20 December, 1731, II, pp. 182b-185a.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 180a; 18 January, 1732, II, pp. 213b, 218b-219a; 3 February, 1732, II, p. 228a; 31 March, 1732, II, p. 303a.

temper. When the intimacy of Ventura, a Turkish dragoman, with the Russian Resident was discovered, Topal Osman had Ventura beheaded. All the dragomans of the embassies were summoned and prohibited in the harshest of tones from going anywhere except to their respective embassies and the palace. A violation of these orders was to be punished by death.¹²⁰ A month later the ambassadors had to obtain permission for their dragomans to present the usual compliments to the newly appointed Capitan Pasha.¹²¹ The other incident had even less to commend it. While the English Ambassador, Kinnoul, was spending a day and an evening on board an English vessel, guns were fired for amusement and their reports were interpreted in the palace as the beginning of another revolt. When the real state of affairs was known, the Sultan reproved the Vizier for permitting such freedom. The dragomans of all the embassies were summoned in the morning, and the Ambassador was brought uncereemoniously to the palace. While he waited in an outer room, he heard the angry voice of the Vizier declaring the Ambassador was not to be admitted. His dragoman was told there was no longer an ambassador of England in Constantinople. Two English merchants were arrested in place of the captain of the ship who could not be found. The accusations against the ambassador were withdrawn

¹²⁰

Emo, op. cit., 20 December, 1731, II, pp. 176b-178b.

¹²¹

Ibid., 18 January, 1732, II, p. 214a.

after the deposition of Topal Osman.

There might have been more such outbursts if the Reis Effendi had not been just the opposite in disposition. He sought to moderate the intense ardor of Topal Osman. The loyalty of the Reis Effendi to his superior was not felt by all the officials. The Vizier had an enemy in the Defterdar, Ali Pasha, who brought about Topal's dismissal because of his foreign policy. He was most friendly to France out of gratitude to the Frenchman who had ransomed him from slavery. "You can write to the King that even if the Grand Signor had chosen a vizier from the center of France, he would not have a heart more French than mine," he said to the Marquis de Villeneuve. An indication of this pro-French feeling was shown by his restoring French religious privileges in the Ottoman possessions. Such restoration was unpopular. His experience in the army and in the pursuit of rebels had no doubt aided in the development of his ruthless, commanding character. His militaristic nature desired a war, but he was not interested

122
Emo, op. cit., 29 March, 1732, II, p. 292 et seq.;
Hammer, op. cit., p. 416.

123
Ibid., 18 January, 1732, II, p. 224a.

124
Ibid., 17 February, 1732, II, p. 235b; 29 March, 1732, II, pp. 285b-286b.

125
Ibid., 29 March, 1732, II, p. 297a.

126
Vandal, op. cit., pp. 170-173.

127
Mignot, op. cit., p. 347.

in the war then going on with Persia.¹²⁸ His military experience had been acquired in Europe, and he desired a war of revenge against Austria.¹²⁹ He showed this inclination by listening to Bonneval, the French adventurer who had been trying to obtain a hearing at the Porte. Topal had him brought to Constantinople, consulted him, and examined his maps of Belgrade and Temesvar.¹³⁰ The Vizier was also making frequent trips to the Arsenal.¹³¹ In order to attack Austria, peace was made with Persia. This peace caused the deposition of the Mufti and Topal Osman. The former was dismissed because he advised peace,¹³² the latter because he approved it.

The first three viziers of Mahmud had had short terms: Mehemet Pasha almost four months, Ibrahim Pasha about nine months, and Topal Osman just about six months. That of the fourth vizier, Ali Pasha, was by way of contrast a much longer one. He remained in office during the remainder of Emo's stay in Constantinople,¹³³ from May, 1732, to December, 1734, and for seven months longer. He received the appointment after serving as general of the army

128

Emo, op. cit., 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 241b-242a.

129

Vandal, op. cit., pp. 169, 172-173.

130

Emo, op. cit., pp. 242a-243b; 17 February, 1732, II, pp. 256a-b, 257a; 29 March, 1732, II, pp. 290b-291b; Vandal, op. cit., pp. 173-177. See pages 65-66.

131

Emo, op. cit., 6 February, 1732, II, p. 248b.

132

Ibid., 29 March, 1732, II, p. 298b; Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 640.

133

Hammer, op. cit., p. 437.

against Shah Tahmasp of Persia.

During the interval of six weeks while he was coming from the Asiatic frontiers, Defterdar Ali Pasha acted as provisional Vizier. Expressions of dissatisfaction were heard again. The Vicegerent arrested in March a number of persons, and executions followed without delay.¹³⁵ There were complaints about Mahmud's being ruled by the favorites of the palace, the Queen Mother and the Kizlar Aghasi.¹³⁶ The silence of the Porte about the peace made with Persia also aroused rebellious feelings.¹³⁷ The reports of the new Vizier were unfavorable.¹³⁸

Then Ali Pasha arrived, and as usual in the case of a new vizier, he created a favorable impression.¹³⁹ Rebellion seemed less evident.¹⁴⁰ This impression was substantially strengthened among the foreign representatives by the promptness in granting their audiences. The Marquis de Villeneuve requested an audience and was received the following day. This was indeed a novelty. There had been usually an interval of two weeks or more between a request and an audience. The other ambassadors

134

Emo, op. cit., 29 March, 1732, II, pp. 288b-289a.

135

Ibid., 31 March, 1732, II, pp. 303b-404a.

136

Ibid., 22 April, 1732, III, p. 11a.

137

Ibid., pp. 11a-b.

138

Ibid., pp. 13b-14a.

139

Ibid., 15 May, 1732, III, pp. 26b-27a.

140

Ibid., p. 29a.

and ministers were received soon after, so that within three weeks Ali Pasha had had five audiences.¹⁴¹ Another act of courtesy was the immediate admittance of the Marquis de Villeneuve and Emo without requiring them to wait.¹⁴²

In contrast to the face which changed from austere to serene expressions, the untrimmed beard, the fervid temperament, the direct and ready speech of Topal Osman, who was nearly seventy,¹⁴³ appeared Ali Pasha, who was little more than forty, with a serious, melancholic face, with a better kept beard, which was rumored to be dyed, and with little to say.¹⁴⁴ Their treatment of public questions contrasted also. After the negotiations between Emo and Ali Pasha over some unpleasant problems, the former commented that Topal Osman would not have been so discreet as Ali Pasha.¹⁴⁵

The new Vizier scattered gold most liberally at two fires, at the Arsenal, and in other places,¹⁴⁶ but the first impression gradually declined. Before he had been in Constantinople two months there were rumors against him. He studiously attempted to attach himself to those who were powerful, the Kizlar Aghasi,

141

Emo, op. cit., 21 May, 1732, III, pp. 40b-41a; 4 June, 1732, III, pp. 45b-46a.

142

Ibid., 21 May, 1732, LS, III, p. 41b; SS, III, p. 90b.

143

Ibid., 29 October, 1731, LS, II, pp. 114b-115a.

144

Ibid., 21 May, 1732, III, pp. 42b, 43b.

145

Ibid., 30 June, 1732, III, p. 89b.

146

Ibid., 21 May, 1732, III, p. 44a; 30 June, 1732, III, pp. 96a-b.

the Defterdar, the Mufti, and the Sultana Valideh. This lack of independence was not favorably received. Again little groups were found about the city. Meetings in coffee shops were prohibited. Suspicious persons were thrown in the sea. Rebellion was not so easily crushed. Fires occurred in various parts of the city, and combustible material was found in a number of places. Cards denouncing the dependence of the Sultan upon his favorites were found in the mosques and at the doors of the Mufti's house and palace. It was even believed that on a certain Wednesday in July Achmet III would be restored to the throne. The vigilance and caution of the ministry was such that nothing occurred. The people were surprised; then they began to give the Vizier credit for keeping the city within his control. His cautious, deliberate methods gained him more favor. Moderation seemed to be his governing principle. The result was that internal conditions became more settled than they had been for two years. The finding of little rebellious groups, the rumors of a new vizier, and the scarcity of food were less common. As conditions improved, Ali Pasha became more powerful and independent than he had been. He was able

147

Emo, op. cit., 11 July, 1732, III, pp. 100a-b.

148

Ibid., 29 July, 1732, III, pp. 116a-117a.

149

Ibid., 28 August, 1732, III, pp. 151a-b; 20 September, 1732, III, pp. 156b-157a.

150

Ibid., 11 February, 1733, III, pp. 261a-262b; 11 April, 1733, III, pp. 311a-b.

to dismiss the influential Defterdar¹⁵¹ and Mufti¹⁵², to dismiss others and to appoint his favorites.¹⁵³

Ali Pasha was also an able diplomat. While he was more friendly to France than to Austria and Russia as regards the question of succession to the Polish throne,¹⁵⁴ he was able to mislead their representatives by his flattering the Marquis de Villeneuve and not displeasing Residents Talman and Neplyneff.¹⁵⁵ He adopted and maintained a course which was rather mysterious to all the foreign diplomats.¹⁵⁶ There was, however, evidence of an increasing antagonism toward Austria and Russia. Bonneval was consulted again as he had been by Ali Pasha's predecessor. These conferences, which began early in 1734, were long and frequent during the succeeding months.¹⁵⁷

"And so the military and political wheel of this Empire is perpetually turning," Emo wrote in 1732 two months after Ali Pasha came to power.¹⁵⁸ It might be said that political events

151

Emo, op. cit., 20 March, 1733, III, p. 283b.

152

Ibid., 27 October, 1733, IV, p. 150a.

153

Ibid., 19 August, 1734, IV, pp. 376a-377a.

154

Ibid., 14 November, 1733, IV, pp. 160b-161a; Vandal, op. cit., pp. 180-181.

155

Emo, op. cit., 9 December, 1733, IV, p. 187b.

156

Ibid., 19 January, 1734, IV, p. 231b; 19 June, 1734, IV, p. 339a; 17 November, 1734, IV, p. 414a.

157

Ibid., 26 February, 1734, IV, p. 244a; 24 July, 1734, IV, pp. 365a-b; 19 August, 1734, p. 375b; 1 September, 1734, IV, p. 380a; Vandal, op. cit., pp. 228-229. See pages 65-66, 154.

158

Emo, op. cit., 30 July, 1732, III, p. 122b.

and conditions in the Ottoman Empire from September, 1730, to December, 1734, occurred rhythmically: a new vizier who was greeted as one who would improve conditions, a short period of tranquillity, then dismissals of minor officials, unfavorable rumors, outspoken opposition, and finally dismissal of the vizier, and the beginning again of the same development. Yet there were outstanding characteristics during the terms of the viziers which qualify such an observation. The internal affairs were the foremost problem of the first two viziers, Mehemet and Ibrahim. These men were less capable and made a less positive impression than Topal Osman and Ali Pasha. Internal conditions were more settled during the terms of the last two, and especially during Ali's leadership. Because of this improvement, both of these viziers had a greater interest in foreign affairs than Mehemet and Ibrahim. The viziers were all rather unimportant during this period when the real influence lay in the hands of a group within the palace, the Sultana Valideh, the Kizlar Aghasi, and the Defterdar.¹⁵⁹ They forced Ibrahim and Topal Osman to resign. Ali Pasha showed some power in dismissing the Defterdar, but the Kizlar Aghasi forced Ali Pasha to resign in 1735 "in spite of so mild, wise, and salutary a rule."¹⁶⁰

159

Emo, op. cit., 30 May, 1731, I, p. 274b; 3 July, 1731, II, pp. 16b-17a; 24 December, 1732, III, pp. 224b-225a; 21 August, 1733, IV, p. 106b; 14 September, 1733, IV, p. 134a; 27 February, 1734, IV, pp. 253a-b; 13 April, 1734, IV, p. 300a.

160

Hammer, op. cit., p. 437.

Another cause for unsettled conditions in the city during this period was the epidemics, which generally lasted for several months. The first one started in July, 1730, before¹⁶¹ Emo reached Constantinople, and had finally moderated by¹⁶² February, 1731.¹⁶³ Another epidemic started in July, 1732, and took the same amount of time to run its course, ending in¹⁶⁴ February, 1733. This was the worst of the four. The Grand Vizier lost a brother, a nephew, and about three hundred of his¹⁶⁵ court. The ambassadors of England and Holland lost some of¹⁶⁶ their official families. A shorter epidemic occurred later¹⁶⁷ in 1733. After a longer interval of more healthy conditions¹⁶⁸ than usual, the fourth epidemic started in August, 1734, and¹⁶⁹ was practically over by October.

This account of political and social conditions, as given by Emo, was not a pleasant one. There were, nevertheless, at least two redeeming features. Birth continued to count for

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- ¹⁶¹ Emo, op. cit., 25 July, 1730, I, pp. 16b, 17b.
¹⁶² Ibid., 21 February, 1731, I, p. 155b.
¹⁶³ Ibid., 11 July, 1732, III, p. 103a.
¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 11 February, 1733, IV, p. 256b.
¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 19 October, 1732, III, pp. 180a-b.
¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 26 November, 1732, III, p. 213b.
¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 21 August, 1733, IV, p. 111a; 13 September, 1733, IV, p. 129a.
¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 13 August, 1734, IV, p. 371a.
¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 9 October, 1734, IV, p. 408b.

little in the Ottoman Empire in a century when it meant so much
in the European states. Three men who could neither read nor
write¹⁷⁰ started the revolt in 1730. A man, the Kizlar Aghasi,¹⁷¹
who had been bought for thirty piasters, and a woman who
was virtually a slave, the Sultana Valideh, were more powerful
than the Sultan and the viziers. Ali Pasha was the son of an¹⁷²
Italian doctor, yet he rose to the first office in the Empire.
Another commendable feature was the appreciation of ability
regardless of age. Ibrahim was sixty years of age when he
became Grand Vizier.¹⁷³ Topal Osman was nearly seventy when he
was appointed to that office,¹⁷⁴ and at seventy-four Yanon¹⁷⁵
Khoja was in active service as Capitan Pasha.

170

Grassi, op. cit., p. 281.

171

Vandal, op. cit., p. 178.

172

Emo, op. cit., 21 May, 1732, III, p. 43a; Hammer, op. cit., p. 404.

173

Ibid., 25 January, 1731, I, p. 146a.

174

Ibid., 29 October, 1731, II, p. 114b; Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 645.

175

Vandal, op. cit., p. 160.

CHAPTER II

The Relations of the Ottoman Empire with Venice

The political and social conditions of the Ottoman Empire reacted on the negotiations and relations between the Porte and Venice. Frequently the problems of internal affairs made the negotiations of Angelo Emo of secondary importance. It was the practice of the Porte to send two galleys to Tenedos to receive a bailo, if he came by sea. When Emo arrived the first of September, 1730, at Tenedos, the two galleys had not¹ been sent because of the disturbed conditions in Constantinople² brought about by Persia's renewal of war and the dissatisfaction which was to culminate in the revolt of September 28. Finally only one galley was sent, because many were being used to carry provisions and military supplies to Trebizond. This delay was one of the reasons for his not entering Constantinople until³ September 27, another being the strong contrary winds. About two weeks after his arrival, his dragoman requested an audience. Dragoman Ghika of the Porte replied that it was not the time⁴ for compliments, since the ministers were agitated and insecure.

¹ Emo, op. cit., 4 September, 1730, I, p. 22a.

² Ibid., 5 September, 1730, I, pp. 22b-23b, 24a.

³ Ibid., 29 September, 1730, I, pp. 33a-34a.

⁴ Ibid., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 59a.

This second delay proved fortunate for Emo, because he did not receive all his baggage until the first week of November.⁵ His public entrance took place on December 14;⁶ then two weeks passed before he had his first audience. He gave as the reasons for this interval the departure of the Khan of the Tartars and the slowness, inexperience, and difficult temperament of Mehemet, the Grand Vizier.⁷ His first audience with the Vizier took place on December 26,⁸ and with Mahmud on January 2, 1731.⁹ The chief interest of the next Vizier, Ibrahim, was to stamp out rebellion; consequently negotiations were neglected. Emo complained that his memorials went about in a circle. They were presented to the Reis Effendi who handed them to Ibrahim who, without coming to any decision, returned them to the Reis Effendi.¹⁰ During the provisional vizierate of the Defterdar negotiations were at a standstill.¹¹ A request in October, 1732, for an audience was not granted promptly

⁵ Emo, op. cit., 1 November, 1730, I, p. 61a; 4 November, 1730, I, pp. 68b-69a.

⁶ Ibid., 17 December, 1730, I, p. 98a.

⁷ Ibid., 1 January, 1731, I, p. 108b.

⁸ Ibid., p. 109a.

⁹ Ibid., 9 January, 1731, I, 118b.

¹⁰ Ibid., 14 August, 1731, II, pp. 45a-b.

¹¹ Ibid., 5 April, 1732, III, p. 3b; 22 April, 1732, III, pp. 21a-b; 25 April, 1732, III, pp. 23a-b.

because of an epidemic.

The relations of Venice with the Ottoman Empire from 1730 to 1734 were unique in that the Republic was not vitally interested in certain problems of the Porte which involved other European Powers. The war between Persia and the Porte concerned treaties between the latter and Russia and the expansion of Russia. As an ally of Russia, Austria was interested. These allies were to be opposed to France in the war of the Polish Succession. Venice had no personal interest in these two most important foreign problems and maintained neutrality in the war of the Ottoman Empire with Austria and Russia from 1736 to 1739. Her interests were indirectly served by the fact that the Turks were too much occupied to seek to gain more of her territory; there was evidence that her rulers feared that another war might be waged by the Porte upon them. When Bonneval fled to the Turkish possessions in 1729, the Venetian Inquisitors of State condemned him to death and instructed Bailo Dolfin to arrange for the assassination of the Frenchman, with "the aid of a secret poison or a thrust of an anonymous dagger." The former delayed carrying out his instructions and died in the following year.¹³ His successor was Angelo Emo who reported the indifference of the Porte and then the increasing interest

12

Emo, op. cit., 19 October, 1732, III, pp. 178b, 180a.

13

Vandal, op. cit., p. 139.

in the exploits of the French soldier.

Emo's despatches contained other observations, facts, and rumors which might mean war. Among these were the many reports about the Turkish navy. The question of naval parity between Venice and the Ottoman Empire or of Turkish superiority was of supreme importance to the Republic, because of her own difficulties with corruption in the arsenal, with a navy weakened by the service of mercenaries and lack of discipline, and because of the facility of naval attacks against her possessions. When the deposed Capitan Pasha Abdi told the Marquis de Villeneuve the plan to negotiate with Venice to build ships for the Turkish navy, the Marquis replied that such a plan was absurd, because no state would aid in making her neighbor powerful on the sea. Emo promised the utmost vigilance in obtaining information about the Turkish navy. He used gifts

14

Emo, op. cit., 15 October, 1730, I, p. 60a; 30 November, 1730, I, p. 90a; 14 January, 1731, I, pp. 129b-130b; 10 March, 1731, I, p. 196a; 14 June, 1731, I, p. 300a; 29 September, 1731, II, pp. 99a-b; 8 November, 1731, II, pp. 148a-b; no date, evidently on or near 20 December, 1731, II, pp. 194b-195a; 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 242a-243b; 17 February, 1732, II, pp. 256a-b; 7 March, 1732, II, pp. 276a-b; 29 March, 1732, II, pp. 290b-291b; 21 May, 1732, III, pp. 45a-b; 14 June, 1732, III, p. 67b; 29 July, 1732, III, p. 117b; 11 February, 1733, III, p. 264b; 9 December, 1733, IV, p. 192b; 26 February, 1734, IV, p. 244a; 29 May, 1734, IV, pp. 336b-337a; 14 August, 1734, pp. 373a, 374a; 19 August, 1734, IV, p. 375b; 1 September, 1734, IV, p. 380a.

15

Molmenti, op. cit., p. 12.

16

Emo, op. cit., 29 September, 1731, II, pp. 97b-98b.

17

Ibid., 26 April, 1731, I, pp. 241a-b; 15 June, 1731, I, pp. 302a-b; 27 September, 1732, III, p. 172a; 22 December, 1733, IV, p. 211a; 19 January, 1734, IV, pp. 229b-230a; 23 March, 1734, IV, pp. 281b-282b.

and money to advantage in order to keep informed,¹⁸ and he forwarded to Venice a multitude of facts. The Turkish building program was very important to Venice. He reported the granting¹⁹ of a firman for the construction of ten ships,²⁰ three, five,²¹ four,²² and six;²³ the completing of ships;²⁴ the launching of new ships;²⁵ the continuing²⁶ or slackening²⁷ of work in the arsenal because of the policy at the time or of the lack of material.²⁸ Knowledge regarding the distribution of these ships

18
See note 113, p. 18.

19
Emo, op. cit., 17 December, 1730, I, pp. 107a-b.

20
Ibid., 4 May, 1731, I, pp. 260a-b; 27 October, 1732, III, pp. 190a-b.

21
Ibid., 24 December, 1732, III, pp. 224b-225a.

22
Ibid., 21 February, 1733, III, pp. 271b-272a.

23
Ibid., 13 April, 1734, IV, p. 300b.

24
Ibid., 21 February, 1733, III, p. 271b; 20 March, 1733, III, p. 277b; 23 September, 1734, IV, p. 400a.

25
Ibid., 20 September, 1732, III, pp. 162a-b; 23 September, 1734, IV, p. 400b.

26
Ibid., 14 August, 1731, II, p. 49a; 29 September, 1731, II, pp. 97a-b; 5 October, 1731, II, pp. 105a-b; 30 October, 1731, II, pp. 133a-134a; 8 November, 1731, II, pp. 146a-147a; no date, evidently on or near 20 December, 1731, II, pp. 190a-192a; 18 January, 1732, II, p. 215a; 6 February, 1732, II, p. 248b; 15 May, 1732, III, p. 35b; 24 November, 1732, III, p. 205b; 26 November, 1732, III, p. 218a; 11 February, 1733, III, pp. 266a-267a; 13 June, 1733, IV, pp. 37b-38b; 26 July, 1733, IV, p. 73b; 21 August, 1733, IV, pp. 106b-107a; 14 November, 1733, IV, pp. 167a-b; 30 January, 1734, IV, p. 241b; 17 April, 1734, IV, p. 304b.

27
Ibid., 11 July, 1732, III, p. 102b; 18 August, 1732, III, pp. 130a-b.

28
Ibid., 29 May, 1733, IV, p. 11a; 23 September, 1734, IV, p. 400b; 28 October, 1734, IV, p. 412a.

was also very valuable; consequently he wrote how many were being used near Cape Bianco, ²⁹ on the Black Sea, ³⁰ and in carrying troops and supplies for the war with Persia. ³¹ Those which were sent near Cape Bianco might interfere with Venetian commerce or molest Venetian possessions. Those which were used on the Black Sea or between Constantinople and Alexandretta served Venice indirectly in keeping the attention of the Porte engaged elsewhere. Of the six capitan pashas Yanon Khoja demanded the greatest amount of space in the despatches. He planned an expedition to the Albanian coast which never took place, ³² and made two expeditions thither. This activity alarmed Emo because of the impetuous character of Yanon Khoja and because of the rumors that he was sailing to gather booty and slaves. ³³ Emo accordingly sent a notice to the Proveditor-General of the Sea. ³⁴ Yanon Khoja's boast to the Marquis de Villeneuve that he was going to build a fleet which would be always ready

29

Emo, *op. cit.*, 22 February, 1731, I, pp. 160a-b; 9 March, 1731, I, p. 186a; 17 March, 1731, I, p. 205a; 18 May, 1731, I, p. 271b; 25 April, 1732, III, p. 24b; 15 May, 1732, III, p. 35b; 20 March, 1733, III, pp. 277b-278a.

30

Ibid., 9 March, 1731, I, p. 186a; 18 May, 1731, I, p. 271b; 5 April, 1732, III, pp. 9a-b; 25 April, 1732, III, p. 25a; 13 April, 1734, IV, p. 300a.

31

Ibid., 9 March, 1731, I, p. 186a; 14 August, 1731, II, pp. 50b-51a; 29 July, 1732, III, p. 111b; 9 January, 1734, IV, pp. 225b-226a; 19 January, 1734, IV, p. 229b.

32

Ibid., 18 January, 1731, I, p. 136a; 4 May, 1731, I, pp. 258a-b; 18 May, 1731, I, p. 271a.

33

Ibid., 18 June, 1733, IV, pp. 49b-50b; 9 July, 1733, IV, pp. 51a-b; 7 May, 1734, IV, p. 320a; 28 May, 1734, IV, p. 331b; 28 October, 1734, IV, p. 412a.

34

Ibid., 18 June, 1733, IV, pp. 49b-50b.

for every occasion³⁵ was not a pleasant announcement for Venice. Emo's remarks on the navy also revealed the lack of a consistent policy and the decline of Turkish power. Yanon Khoja was beyond doubt the most capable man for the building program, but he was dismissed twice. In the intervals between his periods of service, the construction schedule suffered.³⁶ The state of the navy was such that the Porte requested the ambassadors and ministers in Constantinople to permit the rental of ships belonging to their governments and citizens.³⁷ These requests were officially refused, but some French ships and one Austrian,³⁸ and one Venetian ship were chartered.³⁹

A part of the despatches consists of reports of the relations between the Porte and Venice which were typical during the mission of any bailo and were pacific in character: these were related to the audiences and the presentation of gifts. Another part gave details of the negotiations which dealt with more troublesome problems, such as the disputes between Turkish and Venetian subjects in adjoining territories, the inroads on

35

Emo, op. cit., pp. 47b-48a.

36

Ibid., 30 May, 1731, I, p. 278a; 15 June, 1731, I, p. 301b; Vandal, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

37

Emo, op. cit., 26 November, 1732, III, pp. 218b-219b; 24 January, 1733, III, p. 242a; 29 May, 1733, IV, pp. 12a-b.

38

Ibid., 26 November, 1732, III, p. 220a.

39

Ibid., 14 November, 1733, IV, p. 167b.

Venetian commerce by the corsairs of Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli, and the renewal of the Treaty of Passarowitz.

"I tell you nothing of the order of Mr. W_____ 's [Wortley's] entry, and his audience. These things are always the same, and have been so often described, I won't trouble you with the repetition," Lady Mary Wortley Montagu wrote in 1717.⁴⁰ Emo differed from Lady Mary, who was writing informally, and described in great detail his formal entrances and his thirteen audiences although he knew that similar accounts had been sent by his predecessors.⁴¹ His keen observations prevented his own accounts from being tiresome. He was kept waiting at his first audience while Mehemet Vizier was praying, and he observed "not brief was the prayer."⁴² He commented upon the dinner served during an audience by writing "the quantity of food satisfied the eye more than the palate."⁴³ These detailed reports were important to Venice. They showed that the Porte was not changing the ceremonial procedure in her relations with Venice.

Emo's first experience with ceremonial routine was the

⁴⁰ Montagu, Lady Mary Wortley, Letters, 1709 to 1762, pp. 134, 139.

⁴¹ Emo, op. cit., 9 January, 1731, I, p. 122a.

⁴² Ibid., 1 January, 1731, I, p. 110b.

⁴³ Ibid., 11 July, 1733, IV, p. 65b.

salute fired from the fortress of Tenedos. He recognized it as not being of major importance in itself but as maintaining a practice, a lapse of which would be bad.⁴⁴ The arrival of a bailo did not mean an official recognition by the Porte. A formal entrance into the embassy building was necessary. As previously stated, Emo arrived in Constantinople on September 27, 1730, and his formal entrance did not take place until December 14.⁴⁵ For this ceremony, he, in his official costume of robe and cap, was met by the caiques⁴⁶ sent from the Arsenal and with his suite was transported in these from Pera to Galata. There the Chaussh-bashi met him, and while coffee was being served, an usual part of the function began.⁴⁷ The Chaussh-bashi announced

44

Emo, op. cit., 15 September, 1730, I, pp. 28a-b.

45

His successor, Simon Contarini, arrived October 25, 1734: Emo, op. cit., 28 October, 1734, IV, p. 409b; and the public entrance took place late in November: 1 December, 1734, IV, p. 418a.

46

See Appendix A: Glossary.

47

"When the first civilities are passed over, an insinuation is made to the ambassador, that he must expect the chaush-bashi [See Appendix A: Glossary] will ride at his right hand. This part of the ceremonial, long contested, but never given up by the Turks, except only when they have been beaten into it, leaves the ambassador the sole resource of protesting; all other opposition is in vain; he, however, insists, that a gentleman of his retinue shall ride at his left. With whatever seeming reluctance they admit this claim, if urged with proper resolution it succeeds. It has indeed been often productive of serious contestation and disorder in the march; and sometimes almost of a suspension of the audience:" Porter, op. cit., II, p. 35. The Marquis de Villeneuve had this same experience: Vandal, op. cit., p. 80.

that Battaggia, Emo's companion, was to follow the Bailo in the procession. Emo had foreseen this announcement and had made arrangements with Battaggia. When the procession advanced and the chaush-bashi rode at Emo's right, Battaggia promptly took his place to Emo's left. The chaush-bashi made a sign that Battaggia was to ride back of Emo; Emo made a sign that he wished his companion to ride at his left. As soon as the width of the street permitted, the chaush-bashi had a number of the officers of the Spahis place themselves at Emo's left. The procession continued in this manner, without any quarrelling, through the streets of Galata to the Venetian embassy.⁴⁸ Emo made another formal entrance when he was appointed ambassador extraordinary to congratulate Mahmud upon his accession to the throne. In both of these events the same procedure was followed: he, in the usual costume, was met by the chaush-bashi in the accustomed place; coffee and sherbet were served; perfumed water was poured over the hands; horses were sent from the Sultan's stable. In the procession the Turkish Spahis and Janissaries preceded the Bailo, and the Venetians followed. Their group consisted of the Bailo's assistant, his secretary, military officers, dragomans, giovani di lingua, captains of ships, merchants, and other nationals. Emo rode between two persons in the second procession as in the first.⁴⁹

48

Emo, op. cit., 17 December, 1730, I, pp. 98a-100b.

49

Ibid., 24 December, 1732, III, pp. 227a-229a.

Such formal entrances were followed by audiences with the Grand Vizier and the Sultan. The appointment of a new vizier also meant an audience. A farewell audience occurred at the end of a mission; Emo had one when his duties as ambassador⁵⁰ extraordinary were finished and another at the termination of his duties as bailo.⁵¹ Such audiences were only ceremonial and consisted of routine compliments. Just how empty these compliments were may be seen by the phrases used. In the same despatch Emo gave the characteristics of Mehemet, the Vizier,⁵² as slowness, inexperience, and difficult temperament, and recorded himself as having said to the Vizier: "the report of his rare virtues anticipated in the hearts of subjects and in foreign nations the consolation of his just and glorious government."⁵³ Rebellion and dissatisfaction existed within the Empire and war with Persia was threatening, yet Emo spoke of "this most happy Empire" in two of his audiences.⁵⁴ Sultan Mahmud was addressed as one whom "God had wished to crown with all the virtues of a great, powerful, just monarch."⁵⁵ Emo described

50

Emo, op. cit., 11 July, 1733, IV, pp. 64a-67a.

51

Ibid., 1 December, 1734, IV, pp. 416a-417a.

52

Ibid., 1 January, 1731, I, p. 108b.

53

Ibid., p. 111a.

54

Ibid., 1 January, 1731, I, p. 111a; 9 January, 1731, I, p. 122b.

55

Ibid., 9 January, 1731, I, p. 122b.

the Sultan as "mobile to every wind,"⁵⁶ but professed "a profound
veneration for the heroic virtues of so great a Prince who
makes the happiness of his vast empire the admiration of the
nations."⁵⁷ Other general remarks were made about the desire of
the Republic that the sacred capitulations and peace be maintained;⁵⁸
the Vizier and the Sultan promised that this would be done.

Perfunctory procedure, not unlike that of today, was
customary. The Sultan replied to the letter of congratulation
from the Republic by giving Emo a letter in July, 1733. This⁵⁹
official copy was kept by him until his return to Venice. A
copy of the letter had been given him in May, which he had sent⁶⁰
to Venice with a despatch.

A custom, centuries old,⁶¹ was the wrapping in silver
cloth of communications to be given, such as the letter announcing
Mahmud's accession,⁶² the text for the renewed Treaty of

⁵⁶ Emo, op. cit., 20 December, 1731, II, p. 176a.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 11 July, 1733, IV, p. 66b.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 1 January, 1731, I, pp. 111a-b; 9 January, 1731, I,
pp. 122a-123a; 21 February, 1731, I, pp. 152a-b; 29 October, 1731,
II, pp. 111b-113b; 21 May, 1732, III, pp. 41b-43a; 24 January, 1733
III, p. 246a; 11 July, 1733, IV, pp. 66a-67a.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 11 July, 1733, IV, p. 68b.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 29 May, 1733, IV, p. 14a.

⁶¹ Foster, Charles Thornton, and Daniell, F. H. Blackburne,
Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, I, p. 159.

⁶² Emo, op. cit., 7 March, 1731, I, p. 178b.

63
Passarowitz, the reply of Mahmud to the congratulations of
64 Venice, and the signed copy of the renewed Treaty. 65

Memorials were presented and negotiations carried on in other audiences with the Grand Vizier, which were held according to the special problems arising. This type of an audience was more important than the routine assemblies, but even then the amount of time spent on the actual negotiations was little. The usual two hours were spent mainly in hearing petitions of Turkish subjects, 66 in paying the Janissaries, 67 in consuming the dinner served, 68 and in informal conversation. 69 The greater part of the negotiations and the actual solution of problems were the result of many conferences with the Reis Effendi, the Capitan Pasha, the dragoman of the Porte, and the

63

Emo, op. cit., 28 May, 1733, IV, p. 3b.

64

Ibid., 11 July, 1733, IV, p. 67a.

65

Ibid., 12 November, 1733, IV, p. 158a.

66

Ibid., 9 January, 1731, I, p. 120b; 11 July, 1733, IV, p. 65a.

67

Ibid., 11 July, 1733, IV, pp. 65a-b. Contrary to custom, the Janissaries were not paid when Emo had his first audience with Mahmud, because of the extraordinary payments distributed by the Sultan at his elevation to the throne: Emo, op. cit., 9 January, 1731, I, p. 123b.

68

Ibid., pp. 120b-121a; 11 July, 1733, IV, p. 65b.

69

Ibid., 24 December, 1732, III, pp. 232a-b; 28 May, 1733, IV, p. 5a; 20 August, 1733, IV, pp. 101a-102b.

dragomans of the embassy.

Another duty of Emo's, which was quite different from that of a twentieth century diplomat, was the sending of gifts to Turkish officials. According to custom, certain gifts were presented for Bairam each year; also after formal entrances, audiences, and official conferences; and again to newly appointed officials. For this purpose the embassy had a Ragionateria,⁷¹ and a list which gave the number and kind of articles expected. Emo wrote that he sent thirty-six costumes, according to

70

Emo, op. cit., 1 January, 1731, I, pp. 115b-116a; 25 January, 1731, I, pp. 149b-150a; 5 April, 1731, I, pp. 230b-231a; 27 April, 1731, I, pp. 252a-254a; 8 September, 1731, II, pp. 75b-78a; 27 September, 1731, II, pp. 88b-89a; 18 January, 1732, II, pp. 219a-223b; 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 228a-232b; 22 April, 1732, III, pp. 17a-18b; 11 July, 1732, III, pp. 104a-105a; 29 July, 1732, III, pp. 108b-110b; 30 July, 1732, III, p. 119b; 20 September, 1732, III, pp. 162b-163a; 19 October, 1732, III, pp. 181a-b; 9 February, 1733, III, pp. 252b-245a; 1 April, 1733, III, p. 292a; 5 April, 1733, III, pp. 298a-304a; 11 April, 1733, III, pp. 306a-309a; 21 May, 1733, III, pp. 317b-327b; 28 May, 1733, pp. 336b-345a; 13 August, 1733, IV, pp. 92a-b; 20 August, 1733, pp. 100a-101a; 10 October, 1733, IV, pp. 135a-136a; 27 October, 1733, p. 148a; 12 December, 1733, IV, p. 193a et seq.; 15 December, 1733, IV, p. 202a et seq.; 9 January, 1734, IV, pp. 224a-b; 1 March, 1734, IV, p. 260a et seq.; 4 May, 1734, IV, p. 308b et seq.; 7 May, 1734, IV, pp. 319b-320a; 9 May, 1734, IV, p. 323b; 28 May, 1734, p. 324a et seq.; 19 June, 1734, IV, pp. 340b-341a; 3 July, 1734, IV, p. 356a; 15 July, 1734, IV, p. 357a et seq.

71

See Appendix A: Glossary.

practice, for Bairam in 1731. In other years he mentioned
the necessity of sending gifts for Bairam.⁷³ Twenty-one
costumes were a customary number to be sent to the Capitan
Pasha and his assistants after an official conference,⁷⁴ although
only fourteen were given once in addition to some Piacenza
cheese, sugar, wax, and pennants for his mast.⁷⁵ There was
evidently no fixed number of costumes for the vizier. Ibrahim
was given twelve,⁷⁶ Topal Osman two with some Triaca,⁷⁷ and
Ali Pasha forty-three.⁷⁸ After Emo's first audience with
Mahmud, he sent to the Sultana Valideh twenty-four dresses, with
perfumes, looking glasses, comb cases, and other articles.⁷⁹
He sent two costumes to Marabut as the newly appointed Capitan
Pasha,⁸⁰ two to the new customs official,⁸¹ several to the new

72

Emo, op. cit., 5 April, 1731, I, pp. 230a, 231a.

73

Ibid., 31 March, 1732, II, p. 307b; 9 February, 1733,
III, p. 254b; 19 January, 1734, IV, p. 232b.

74

Ibid., 6 February, 1732, II, p. 249a; 9 February, 1733,
III, p. 254a; 28 May, 1734, IV, p. 233la.

75

Ibid., 9 July, 1733, IV, pp. 55b-56a.

76

Ibid., 21 February, 1731, I, p. 154b.

77

See Appendix A: Glossary. Emo, op. cit., 29 October,
1731, II, pp. 116b-117a.

78

Ibid., 4 June, 1732, III, p. 61a.

79

Ibid., 18 January, 1731, I, p. 132a.

80

Ibid., 18 January, 1732, I, pp. 214a-b.

81

Ibid., 10 March, 1731, I, pp. 191b, 192b.

⁸²
Agha of the Janissaries, some to the new Mufti and Bostanji-
⁸³bashi, some to the new voivode of Galata and Pera, ⁸⁴six to
⁸⁵the new Kiaya, four and a mirror to one newly appointed
⁸⁶Defterdar, and four to another new Defterdar.⁸⁷ The captains
of Turkish ships promised to protect Venetian ships and, accord-
ing to custom, were rewarded with four costumes, cheese, and
⁸⁸cordial. Later one was given a telescope, and another some
⁸⁹wax and costumes. Again they were each given two costumes,
⁹⁰cheese, and Triaca; once pistols, cheese, and "something from
⁹¹the Ragionateria;" another time three costumes, cheese, sugar,
⁹²and wax.

The greatest presentation was made after the audience of
Emo as ambassador extraordinary. According to an ancient

⁸²

⁸³Emo, op. cit., 18 August, 1732, III, pp. 129b-130a.

⁸⁴See Appendix A: Glossary. Emo, op. cit., 27 October,
1733, IV, p. 151a.

⁸⁵

⁸⁶Ibid., 23 March, 1734, IV, p. 288b.

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⁸⁸Ibid., 15 July, 1734, IV, p. 358a.

⁸⁹

⁹⁰Ibid., 21 September, 1732, III, p. 168a.

⁹¹

⁹²Ibid., 19 August, 1734, IV, pp. 378b-379a.

⁹³

⁹⁴Ibid., 17 March, 1731, I, p. 205a.

⁹⁵

⁹⁶Ibid., 4 May, 1731, I, pp. 260b-261a.

⁹⁷

⁹⁸Ibid., 21 May, 1732, III, pp. 44a-b.

⁹⁹

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 27 February, 1734, IV, p. 254b.

¹⁰¹

¹⁰²Ibid., 7 May, 1734, IV, p. 317a.

custom, Venice sent Mahmud cloth of gold as a special gift
upon his accession to the throne.⁹³ Emo sent also:

Costumes to the Vizier;

Money for tips to the Vizier's domestics;

Gifts to the Vizier of the Bank, Dragoman Ghika,

and all the chief and subordinate officials;

72 costumes of every kind to the Sultan;

6 costumes to the Sultana Valideh and the

Kizlar Aghasi;

24 costumes and 4 mirrors to the Chausb-bashi and

Spahi Agha;

28 costumes, 2 gold and 6 silver watches with

chains, 4 mirrors, miscellaneous things, and

money to the guard of the embassy, the Agha

of the Vizier, the man who owned the house

where Emo spent the night before the audience,

the chief cook and assistants who served the

⁹⁴
dinner;

20 costumes and other smaller things to the Mufti;

21 costumes to the Capitan Pasha and his officials;

⁹⁵
⁹⁶
13 costumes and money to others.

93

Emo, op. cit., 26 November, 1732, III, p. 212b.

94

Ibid., 24 January, 1733, LS, III, pp. 247b-249b; SS, IV, p. 19b.

95

Ibid., 9 February, 1733, LS, III, p. 254a.

96

Ibid., 20 March, 1733, III, p. 282b.

This policy of presenting gifts was by no means mere routine. The requests of the Turks and the personal interest of Angelo Emo made it one of the most important and most amusing topics in the despatches. It was used to obtain information and to facilitate negotiations. The Ragionateria was used to encourage and to reward. The Reis Effendi and Dragoman Ghika were more accessible than the Grand Vizier; consequently they were especially favored. The Reis Effendi received at various times during Emo's term of service:

- 3 costumes (as a reward for his action regarding
a Venetian ship attacked by corsairs);
- 4 costumes, a combcase, and other things;
- 4 costumes, a little gold watch and chain;

97

See p. 18.

98

Emo wrote regarding the Reis Effendi: - "It is necessary for me not to offend the Reis Effendi, the minister who handles the most important affairs of the Empire and through whom pass all those negotiations of the Princes who have relations with this Court:" 7 March, 1731, I, p. 178a.

99

Of Ghika he wrote: - "A man of good will, honest sentiments, mediocre ingenuity, and [easily] frightened; still since he is always near the chief ministers, I shall maintain his friendship, and hope for the favor which he is capable of rendering:" 27 September, 1731, II, pp. 88b-89a.

100

Emo, op. cit., 30 November, 1730, I, pp. 85a-b.

101

Ibid., 21 February, 1731, I, pp. 154b-155a.

102

Ibid., 10 March, 1731, I, pp. 193b-194a.

- 4 costumes, a mirror, Triaca, and flowers (in
gratitude for his settling a troublesome
dispute between Venetians and Turks at
Vonitza and Prevesa);¹⁰³
- 12 cushions of velvet embroidered with gold;¹⁰⁴
¹⁰⁵
- 4 glass boxes;
- 6 costumes, 12 cushions of velvet embroidered with
gold, and a silver cooling chest (after the re-
newal of the Treaty of Passarowitz);¹⁰⁶
- 4 costumes and 12 velvet cushions embroidered with
gold (to hasten negotiations).¹⁰⁷

When Emo was advised by Dragoman Ghika that the Reis Effendi
would like a silk costume similar to one seen among those sent
to the Grand Vizier, Emo sent him six costumes, including one
of the desired material, a box of candy, and a box of miscellan-
eous things. He sent at the same time three costumes each for
the secretary and the first assistant of the Reis Effendi.¹⁰⁸

A request of the secretary for four glass cupboards could not

103

Emo, op. cit., 18 January, 1732, II, p. 225b.

104

Ibid., 30 June, 1732, III, p. 94a.

105

Ibid., 26 November, 1732, III, p. 217a.

106

Ibid., 27 October, 1733, IV, pp. 149a-b.

107

Ibid., 13 August, 1734, IV, pp. 369b-370a.

108

Ibid., 20 March, 1733, III, pp. 281b-282a.

be granted immediately, but Emo had them delivered within four
109

days. Another request of the secretary for glass was
110

granted, and to other assistants of the Reis Effendi Emo
111 gave eighty piasters and a silver watch with a chain. He

gave to the Kiaya, because of his close friendship with the
112 Reis Effendi, three costumes, perfume, and other things.

Dragoman Ghika was given at various times:

113
4 costumes and 50 pieces of glass;

114 1 mirror, 115 12 locks, and glass for 20 windows
116 in his new house;

3 costumes for his wife (in gratitude for his part
117 in settling a dispute at Vonitza);

Some costumes (when Ali Pasha succeeded Topal
118 Osman);

119
4 costumes;

109
Emo, op. cit., 7 May, 1734, IV, p. 319b; 9 May, 1734, IV,
p. 323b.

110 Ibid., 19 August, 1734, IV, p. 378b.

111 Ibid., 26 November, 1732, III, p. 216b.

112 Ibid., 22 April, 1732, III, p. 22a.

113 Ibid., 5 April, 1731, I, p. 232a.

114 Ibid., 29 September, 1731, II, p. 100b.

115 Ibid., 18 January, 1732, II, pp. 225b-226a.

116 Ibid., 26 November, 1732, III, p. 217a.

117 Ibid., 18 January, 1732, II, p. 225b.

118 Ibid., 4 June, 1732, III, p. 61b.

119 Ibid., 30 June, 1732, III, p. 94b; 10 April, 1734, IV,
p. 296b.

- 6 costumes for his wife, a box provided with an assortment of things for his brother, and a silver chocolate service for himself (after the renewal of the Treaty of Passarowitz);¹²⁰
- 4 costumes and sweet drinks (at the birth of his first born);¹²¹
- 5 costumes for his wife and a cooling chest for himself (as a reward for his assistance in negotiations regarding the corsairs).¹²²

The temperamental Yanon Khoja as Capitan Pasha and Pasha of Lepanto needed to be handled diplomatically. Emo fulfilled his requests and withheld gifts according to circumstances. In addition to the usual gifts sent after visits to him, he was sent during four years:

- 6 vases of Triaca, a mirror, some Piacenza cheese, and some oil (as a reward for his assistance in negotiations regarding the corsairs);¹²³
- 1 gun and some cloth (in return for his promise to protect Venetian ships from the Algerians);¹²⁴

¹²⁰ Emo, op. cit., 27 October, 1733, IV, p. 150a.

¹²¹ Ibid., 19 January, 1734, IV, p. 232b.

¹²² Ibid., 6 September, 1734, IV, p. 390a.

¹²³ Ibid., 30 November, 1730, I, pp. 85a-b.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 22 February, 1731, I, pp. 161b-162a.

2 canaries and 12 phials of Triaca; ¹²⁵
¹²⁶
 2 costumes;
 A gold watch and chain, candy, and flowers (for ¹²⁷
 his granddaughter's wedding); ¹²⁸
 Chocolate and a silver basin;
 2 canaries with cages for the Sultana Valideh. ¹²⁹

As Capitan Pasha Yanon Khoja had asked for two pistols, which
 Emo did not have but ordered from Venice. ¹³⁰ By the time they
 arrived Yanon Khoja had been dismissed from Constantinople and
 appointed Pasha of Lepanto. His attitude was not at all friendly
 to the Venetians of the neighboring territory; Emo accordingly
 withheld the pistols for a month. ¹³¹ After they had been
 presented he reported that they had extinguished all the bad
 intentions the Pasha had had against Cumano, the Venetian
 Consul. ¹³² Emo considered Yanon Khoja avaricious. ¹³³ When the

¹²⁵ Emo, op. cit., 18 May, 1731, I, p. 266b.
¹²⁶ Ibid., 6 February, 1732, II, p. 250a.
¹²⁷ Ibid., 9 July, 1733, IV, pp. 56a-b.
¹²⁸ Ibid., 19 January, 1734, IV, p. 229b.
¹²⁹ Ibid., 4 May, 1734, IV, p. 312a.
¹³⁰ Ibid., 22 February, 1731, I, pp. 161b-162a.
¹³¹ Ibid., 29 July, 1732, III, p. 113a; 28 August, 1732,
 III, p. ^{145b}.
¹³² Ibid., 27 September, 1732, III, p. 175b.
¹³³ Ibid., 22 March, 1734, IV, p. 278a.

latter sent word to the ambassadors of his expedition to the Albanian coast and requested them to call before his departure, Emo concluded there was "certainly less courtesy than avarice¹³⁴ in this formality." When Emo was preparing to leave Constantinople, he planned to avoid visiting Yanon Khoja because of the necessity of presenting gifts. The latter expressed surprise that the Bailo would leave without a farewell call, and¹³⁵ Emo felt compelled to go.

It was quite clear that costumes were the favored gift.¹³⁶ Emo gave more than 656 during his term in addition to material for others. They were of wool, satin, silk, velvet, plain damask brocaded in gold, gold-brocaded material, and material

134

Emo, op. cit., 7 May, 1734, IV, p. 320b.

135

Ibid., 1 December, 1734, IV, pp. 417b-418a.

136

Other articles given to other officials and persons not included in the foregoing and following pages:- Extracts: 4 November, 1730, I, pp. 69a-b; 5 April, 1731, I, pp. 231b-232a; Drugs: 28 November, 1730, I, p. 33a; 3 July, 1731, II, p. 18a; 8 November, 1731, II, p. 147b; 7 March, 1732, II, p. 277a; 9 October, 1734, IV, p. 409a; Sweet drinks: 15 September, 1730, I, pp. 28b-29a; 28 September, 1730, I, p. 33a; 4 November, 1730, I, pp. 69a-b; 3 July, 1731, II, p. 18a; 8 November, 1731, II, p. 147b; 7 March, 1732, II, pp. 274a, 277a; Piacenza cheese: 12 November, 1730, I, p. 82b; 15 May, 1732, III, pp. 39b-40a; 22 December, 1733, IV, p. 213b; Wax candles: 7 March, 1732, II, p. 277a; Mirrors: 4 November, 1730, I, pp. 69a-b; 30 June, 1732, III, pp. 94a-b; 26 November, 1732, III, pp. 220a-b; Cushions: 27 October, 1733, IV, pp. 149a-b; A silver watch and chain: 14 June, 1732, III, p. 71b; A gold watch and chain: 27 February, 1734, IV, pp. 259a-b; 28 May, 1734, IV, p. 328a; 13 August, 1734, IV, pp. 369b-370a; Canaries: 9 October, 1734, IV, pp. 408b-409a; Guns: 9 July, 1733, IV, p. 56b; Telescopes: 4 November, 1730, I, pp. 69a-b; 11 July, 1732, III, p. 103b; 22 December, 1733, IV, p. 212b; 9 October, 1734, IV, pp. 408b-409a.

brocaded in both gold and silver. The Ragionateria was a great treasury, but it had its limitations, "and quite naturally after so many changes of chief officials." ¹³⁷ Emo had no magic lamp to rub. He was forced to buy articles, ¹³⁸ or to await their arrival from Venice. ¹³⁹ Once he sold some remnants of velvet and silk, and used the money to pay for a beautiful little box and for tips. ¹⁴⁰

The receivers were, moreover, not always gracious. Emo remarked after sending gifts to new ministers that such occasions never came without complaints. ¹⁴¹ Bechir, the Capitan Pasha, sent his assistant to obtain some sugar and a piece of green cloth brocaded with gold, which would be sufficient for six dresses. The assistant informed Emo that this material, although a small amount, was lacking among the gifts sent after his formal entrance as ambassador extraordinary and that the gifts had been much inferior to those sent on such occasions. Emo admitted in his despatch that he had sent less than the registers showed

¹³⁷

Emo, op. cit., 5 October, 1731, II, p. 111a.

¹³⁸

Ibid., 30 November, 1730, I, p. 85a; 18 May, 1731, I, pp. 266b-267b; 21 July, 1731, II, p. 29a; 5 October, 1731, II, p. 111a; 11 July, 1732, III, p. 103b; 9 July, 1733, IV, pp. 56a-b; 11 July, 1733, IV, pp. 68a-b.

¹³⁹

Ibid., 18 January, 1731, I, pp. 133b-134a; 18 August, 1731, II, p. 63b; 14 September, 1731, II, p. 84b; 21 September, 1732, III, pp. 166a-b.

¹⁴⁰

Ibid., 9 October, 1734, IV, p. 409a.

¹⁴¹

Ibid., 29 October, 1731, II, p. 116a.

had been the practice. The assistant refused to take the material offered, because it was in two pieces and not of the desired color. Emo sent the sugar and some other gifts.¹⁴² Two other incidents revealed the attitude of the Turks toward the Ragionateria and gave Emo an opportunity to exercise his ingenuity. When the great victory of Topal Osman, then Seraskier,¹⁴³ over the Persians in July, 1733, had become known, the Porte sent Dragoman Ghika to inform the ambassadors of the event. Before he was admitted to the Bailo, he showed the Venetian dragoman the purse of a hundred sequins given him by the French Ambassador and the gold snuff box set with little diamonds from the English Ambassador. Emo was surprised. He had nothing of equal value; consequently he sent some one to buy a gold watch and chain while he studiously prolonged the conversation. Fortunately, the gift arrived in time.¹⁴⁴ The second incident arose when Ali Pasha requested two chairs for the kiosk of Mahmud. Emo had none in the Ragionateria, but he took Ghika into the best room in the house and let him select two chairs. They had decorated frames and were upholstered in crimson velvet, but they did not exactly suit Ghika. He asked that some gold decoration and fringe be put on them. Emo

¹⁴²

Emo, op. cit., 2 December, 1733, IV, pp. 185a-b.

¹⁴³

See Appendix A: Glossary.

¹⁴⁴

Emo, op. cit., 13 August, 1733, IV, pp. 96a-b.

145
complied with this request and sent them immediately.

146
A summary of this practice of presenting gifts to
officials of the Porte may be made from two of Emo's brief,
inimitable characterizations. "Such courtesies [complimentary
remarks about his brother, who had been the Bailo from 1720
to 1724] have, in this country, their price which I have not
147
been able to refuse." "As regards gifts this court
148
is a whirlpool which is never filled."

The gifts suggest not only the home life of the Turks,
but reveal the products of Venetian factories of the eighteenth
century. His mentioning economy in connection with the gifts
149
may be interpreted as evidence of the financial situation of
the Republic or of his pride in being careful.

To be fair to both Emo and the Turks in this matter of
presents and money, it may be said that no evidence exists
that the former was particularly imposed upon by the latter.

145

Emo, op. cit., 2 December, 1733, IV, pp. 185b-186b.

146

The practice was not reciprocal; Venice did not permit
her ambassadors to receive gifts of permanent value: Hazlitt,
op. cit., p. 528. Emo received after his public entrance as
ambassador extraordinary a gift of flowers, fruits, and sherbets
carried with much pomp by forty men: op. cit., 24 December,
1732, III, p. 229b.

147

Ibid., 15 May, 1732, III, pp. 39b-40a.

148

Ibid., 9 February, 1733, III, p. 254b.

149

Ibid., 26 November, 1732, III, p. 215b; 9 February, 1733,
III, pp. 254a-b; 19 January, 1734, IV, p. 232b.

The practice was general among all the ambassadors. ¹⁵⁰ Emo was, moreover, shrewd. "Fixed prices" did not exist in the Mediterranean world, and he knew how to bargain. When Yanon ¹⁵¹ Khoja requested thirty purses for his support in the settlement of a Turkish-Venetian problem, Emo refused to give that amount. The price was then reduced to twenty purses. ¹⁵² Emo offered six, and that was the number finally paid. The Turks also purchased favor among themselves. Topal Osman sent at Bairam in 1732 to Mahmud a harness set with jewels, which ¹⁵³ was valued at fifty thousand crowns. Yanon Khoja sent ¹⁵⁴ many purses to the palace to win the support of the favorites.

The duties thus far described were the experiences of any bailo. Emo also had a number of special problems. One of these, which engaged a great deal of his attention in the first months of his mission, was the obtaining of the official announcement of Mahmud's accession to the throne. It was a Turkish custom to send such a letter by a messenger to the courts of Austria,

¹⁵⁰ Emo, op. cit., 2 December, 1733, IV, p. 186b; Vandal op. cit., pp. 26, 76, 252.

¹⁵¹ A purse consisted of five hundred piasters: Emo, op. cit., 28 May, 1734, IV, pp. 325b, 327b.

¹⁵² Ibid., 4 May, 1734, IV, p. 309a et seq.; 29 May, 1734, IV, p. 337a.

¹⁵³ Hanway, op. cit., p. 107 and note.

¹⁵⁴ Emo, op. cit., 2 December, 1733, IV, p. 183a; 27 February, 1734, IV, pp. 253a-b; 13 April, 1734, IV, p. 300a.

Poland, Russia, and Venice. When messengers departed to the capitals of the first three, in December, 1730, Emo sought to discover why Venice had been neglected.¹⁵⁶ He negotiated for several weeks with the Reis Effendi and the Capitan Pasha in order to obtain the letter.¹⁵⁷ Finally January 24 was set as the date when he might have an audience with the Grand Vizier, but two days before that time the Vizier was dismissed.¹⁵⁸ Emo then hoped to receive the announcement in connection with his audience with the new Vizier on February 13, but Ibrahim considered that to be a day of compliments only and the Bailo merely received promises.¹⁵⁹ The letter was finally given in an audience with Ibrahim on March 1.¹⁶⁰ Then the departure of the Venetian dragoman was delayed for nearly two months, until the latter part of April, because of the weather.¹⁶¹ Venice was just as deliberate in regard to her reply as the Porte had been in sending the announcement. In November, the Republic sent Emo the notification of his appointment as ambassador

155

Emo, op. cit., 28 November, 1730, I, pp. 79a-80a.

156

Ibid., 1 January, 1731, I, p. 115a.

157

Ibid., 9 January, 1731, I, pp. 124a-126a.

158

Ibid., 20 January, 1731, I, p. 139b; 25 January, 1731, I, pp. 145a-b.

159

Ibid., 21 February, 1731, I, pp. 151b-154a.

160

Ibid., 7 March, 1731, I, pp. 178a-180a.

161

Ibid., 28 March, 1731, I, p. 219b; 4 April, 1731, I, p. 227b; 3 May, 1731, I, pp. 257a-b.

extraordinary to present the reply.¹⁶² Another interval occurred while he waited for his credentials and the necessary gifts.¹⁶³ Even after they arrived, their presentation was deferred, first because of an epidemic¹⁶⁴ and then because of the weather.¹⁶⁵ The congratulations of Venice were finally extended to Mahmud on December 20, 1732,¹⁶⁶ twenty-eight months after he had begun to reign. Thus did travelling conditions, deliberation, and formality retard diplomatic courtesy.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Passarowitz, there were frequent disputes between the Turkish and Venetian subjects of neighboring territories in the Morea and on the adjacent islands. Their settlement and adjustment were a part of the duties of Emo's predecessors¹⁶⁷ and of his own.¹⁶⁸ After an attack by Turkish subjects, the imposition of new restrictions on trade or new duties on food, or the enslaving of Venetians, petitions were forwarded to the Bailo, who presented to the Porte memorials asking for a redress of grievances. The issuing

162

Emo, op. cit., 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 237b-238a.

163

Ibid., 1 July, 1732, III, p. 129a; 27 September, 1732, III, p. 175b; 19 October, 1732, III, pp. 178b, 181a.

164

Ibid., 19 October, 1732, III, pp. 178b, 181a.

165

Ibid., 24 December, 1732, III, pp. 233a-b.

166

Ibid., 24 January, 1733, III, p. 242b et seq.

167

Diedo, op. cit., pp. 181-186.

168

Emo, op. cit., 23 July, 1730, I, pp. 15b-16a.

of firmans ordering reparation was the usual result.¹⁶⁹ Often these were delayed because of other affairs seemingly more pressing or because of the policy of the Porte to act deliberately.¹⁷⁰ The Turks also protested against unfriendly acts of the Venetians, especially those of Vonitza and Prevesa. Such accusations were handled peacefully through the usual diplomatic channels of the Vizier, the Reis Effendi, the Bailo and their dragomans, except when Topal Osman was Grand Vizier and Yanon Khoja was Pasha of Lepanto. The tempestuous Topal was easily aroused by complaints against the Venetians. Once, swearing on the head of the Grand Signor, he told Dragoman Brutti that he had ordered the Venetian villages of Vonitza and Prevesa to be burned and charged Brutti three times to tell Emo of this decision,¹⁷¹ which was, however, not carried out. Another time he said: "he understood readily that the Republic did not wish to maintain peace since she permitted disorders to go unpunished for so long a time."¹⁷² So threatening was his attitude that

169

Emo, op. cit., 10 March, 1731, I, pp. 193b-194b; 26 April, 1731, I, pp. 245a-247a; 18 May, 1731, I, pp. 263b-265b; 29 September, 1731, II, pp. 95b-97a; 30 October, 1731, II, pp. 126b-127a; 8 November, 1731, II, pp. 142b-145a; 18 January, 1732, II, pp. 224b-225a; 7 March, 1732, II, pp. 275a-b; 18 August, 1732, III, p. 134b; 13 September, 1733, IV, pp. 125b-127b; 23 November, 1733, IV, p. 167b et seq.

170

Ibid., 14 March, 1731, I, pp. 198b-202b.

171

Ibid., 18 January, 1732, II, pp. 219a-223b.

172

Ibid., 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 228a-b.

Emo agreed to have the situation on the boundaries near these towns investigated; consequently a dragoman from the embassy and a Turkish Agha were sent. These representatives improved the situation by transferring certain families from Venetian to Turkish territory.¹⁷³ After the dismissal of Topal Osman and during the term of Ali Pasha as Vizier, Yanon Khoja continued to make complaints,¹⁷⁴ but the policy of Ali Pasha and the Reis Effendi in regard to such disputes was pacific.¹⁷⁵ A minor aspect of the boundary question was the occasional flight of Turkish fugitives from justice into Venetian territory. Emo and the local officials coöperated with the Porte in returning such fugitives.¹⁷⁶

A part of Emo's duties consisted in gathering information about commercial conditions.¹⁷⁷ Venice was no longer the great commercial city she had been in the preceding centuries. She had once been able to withstand the entire force of Genoa in

173

Emo, op. cit., p. 230a et seq.; 18 February, 1732, II, pp. 258b-259a; 15 May, 1732, III, p. 32b; 14 June, 1732, III, pp. 68a-71a; Diedo, op. cit., pp. 240-241, 246.

174

Emo, op. cit., 30 June, 1732, III, p. 81a et seq.; 11 July, 1732, III, p. 104a.

175

Ibid., pp. 88a-89b, 96b-97b; 11 July, 1732, III, pp. 104a-105a; 30 July, 1732, III, p. 119b; 20 September, 1732, III, p. 152b.

176

Ibid., 27 April, 1731, I, pp. 252a-254a; 5 October, 1731, II, p. 103a et seq.; 7 March, 1732, II, p. 274b; 31 March, 1732, II, p. 301a.

177

Ibid., 4 November, 1730, I, p. 68b.

the struggles for commercial and naval supremacy, but with a shifting of trade routes and interests to the Atlantic Ocean, her commerce began to decline. The competition of nations in the eighteenth century¹⁷⁸ was too active for a city-state weakened by such wars as the siege of Candia and the struggles for the Morea. Emo realized the decline of Venetian commerce and plead most earnestly for better regulation. He found there was at times excess of certain articles in the Venetian shops in Constantinople, so that it became necessary either to hold them indefinitely or to sell them at a loss. He proposed that the number of ships sailing to Constantinople at one time be reduced to two and those to Smyrna to four, and that these come less frequently but regularly. At Bairam and in September seemed to him the best time for their arrival. He made such suggestions for the first time in July, 1731.¹⁷⁹ He could not help comparing Venetian methods with those of France and England. These countries had found it profitable to regulate the number of ships and to proportion the amount of wool and other articles to the demand. Venice should do likewise, he again maintained.¹⁸⁰ France had become a successful competitor in the wool trade,¹⁸¹ because of the number of her merchants

178

Molmenti, op. cit., pp. 45-53; Hazlitt, op. cit., p.279.

179

Emo, op. cit., 1 July, 1731, II, pp. 2a-7b.

180

Ibid., 19 August, 1732, III, pp. 135a-139a, 142a-143a.

181

Ibid., 27 October, 1732, III, p. 196a.

and the protection of her trade by laws and agreements. For the third time he stated that there were too many Venetian ships coming to Constantinople at the same time.¹⁸² Emo's own words were indeed a sad comment upon the state of the city whose wealth, power, and fame had been so closely associated with commerce: "It is certain that in the companies of other nations, all is peace;"¹⁸³ "The trade of the Venetian nation sees itself reduced to such servitude that the small remainder of its existence depends upon managing it with great delicacy and upon neglecting nothing."¹⁸⁴

These suggestions were constructive, but they were few in number. He spent more time in defending and protecting commerce as it existed. The Treaty of Passarowitz had provided that the Porte punish corsairs who attacked Venetian ships.¹⁸⁵ Emo frequently reported such attacks, appealed to the Porte, and obtained firmans providing for the restitution of the cargoes and the punishment of the corsairs.¹⁸⁶ After he had heard that Algerians were en route to Constantinople, he requested and obtained promises of protection from them for Venetian ships.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸²Emo, op. cit., 20 March, 1733, III, pp. 279b-280a.

¹⁸³Ibid., 19 August, 1732, III, p. 142a.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 27 October, 1732, III, p. 196b.

¹⁸⁵Cappelletti, Giuseppe, Storia della Repubblica di Venezia, XI, pp. 201-204.

¹⁸⁶Emo, op. cit., 30 November, 1730, I, p. 83a et seq.; 3 July, 1731, II, p. 9b et seq.; 14 August, 1731, II, p. 45b; 28 December, 1731, II, p. 197a; 14 June, 1732, III, pp. 72a-b.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 22 February, 1731, I, p. 161a; 10 March, 1731, I, pp. 188b-190a; 21 May, 1733, III, pp. 330a-331b.

Some of his most involved and troublesome negotiations followed the successful attack of two Venetian ships against three Tunisian vessels and the burning of the latter, December 6, 1733, near the island of Mytilene. He received protests from Yanon Khoja, the Capitan Pasha, after deputations of Turkish subjects and of Tunisians had come to Constantinople to demand reparation. The French Ambassador having paid his respects to Yanon Khoja and the English Ambassador having gone to the country, Emo could call upon this official, according to ambassadorial precedence. He requested permission, and the Capitan Pasha granted it but with "no love showing in his face." During the visit Emo hoped that the Capitan Pasha would start discussing the subject, but he did not do so. The following day, the Porte presented the official protest: the Venetian captains had violated the Treaty of Passarowitz in punishing the Tunisians, the Porte had been offended in its own house by a friendly power, the houses and fruit trees of subjects had been damaged by the firing, and satisfaction must be given.¹⁸⁸ While Emo awaited advice from the Senate, he used all his resources to gain favor and to obtain information. He selected gifts that had evidently pleased Yanon Khoja at other times; he obtained the confidence of one of the Capitan Pasha's assistants;¹⁸⁹ and he began giving money. When a ship belonging

188

Emo, op. cit., 12 December, 1733, IV, pp. 193a-201b.

189

Ibid., 15 December, 1733, IV, pp. 202a-203a.

to some corsairs was wrecked near Corfu, the Proveditor-General of the Sea sent six Turks, who had been on the vessel, to Constantinople on board a Venetian ship. Emo sent a dragoman to inform the Capitan Pasha of their arrival in order to show the willingness of the Republic to abide by the Treaty.¹⁹⁰ The captains of the Tunisian ships asked the Porte for a ship to help in replacing their loss, but at first they obtained only the promise of the chartering of two French vessels. This offer did not satisfy them. When Ali Pasha was on his way to the Arsenal, January 6, 1734, they threw themselves at his feet and begged him to give them a ship. He then commanded that they be given supplies and the tartan which the Capitan Pasha had seized in the Archipelago.¹⁹¹ This vessel was soon put in order,¹⁹² but they remained. Finally they departed the latter part of February,¹⁹³ after having been in Constantinople about ten weeks. During this interval Yanon Khoja's attitude was not at all encouraging. Complaints began to be heard about the slowness of the answer from Venice.¹⁹⁴ When Emo's instructions, expressing disapproval of the conduct of the Venetian captains as being contrary to the public intentions and orders of the

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Emo, op. cit., 9 January, 1734, IV, pp. 224a-b.

¹⁹¹

Ibid., LS, pp. 221b-222b; SS, V, pp. 56b-57a.

¹⁹²

Ibid., 19 January, 1734, LS, IV, pp. 227b-228a.

¹⁹³

Ibid., 27 February, 1734, IV, p. 251a.

¹⁹⁴

Ibid., p. 252b.

Republic, arrived on February 27, he immediately notified the Porte. Dragoman Ghika called to learn their contents, which were¹⁹⁵ informally given. The Vizier was not satisfied with this type of presentation and requested a written statement. Emo¹⁹⁶ did not wish to comply but finally gave one in Italian. An interval of twenty-four days passed without action because¹⁹⁷ of the season of Bairam. Then Emo was informed that before he would be admitted for an audience the Vizier must hear the sentiments of the Tunisians. In the meantime Emo had succeeded in discovering that Yanon Khoja was the advocate of the¹⁹⁸ Tunisians. The Vizier gave him Emo's written statement and the memorials of the captains of the destroyed ships. It was evident that the destiny of the affair rested in the hands of the Capitan Pasha. Emo was reminded by Dragoman Ghika of the treatment which the English Ambassador received when Topal¹⁹⁹ Osman was in power. Emo tried again to moderate Yanon Khoja's temper through influencing the latter's assistants and bestowing gifts. Emo also asked the Reis Effendi to end the negotiations, but this official denied any knowledge of them.

195

Emo, op. cit., 1 March, 1734, IV, pp. 261b-263b.

196

Ibid., 22 March, 1734, IV, p. 272b et seq.

197

Ibid., p. 277b.

198

Ibid., 10 April, 1734, IV, p. 288b et seq.

199

See pp. 53-54.

Finally Emo submitted and promised the Capitan Pasha six purses. The result was a brief statement from that official to the Vizier to the effect that the Tunisians had not obeyed the boundaries within which they and the Venetians were not to mistreat one another and since there was neither fortress nor cannon at the place of contention, the Tunisians had nothing due them. Emo was not satisfied. He wished the Porte to admit that the corsairs could be pursued in every place where the Sultan did not have a fortress or cannon.²⁰⁰ After the payment of the six purses to the Capitan Pasha, he made a longer statement than his first one. The Tunisians were to receive²⁰¹ orders not to commit acts of violence against the Venetians. The next step should have been the issuing of a firman and the presenting a copy of it to Emo in an audience with the Vizier, but weeks passed before the negotiations were thus terminated.²⁰² The audience was not held until July 10, 1734. Then another delay of three weeks occurred before the firman was issued which commanded the corsairs of Algeria, Tripoli, and Tunis to respect the regulations against attacking Venetians in certain regions.²⁰³

200

Emo, op. cit., 4 May, 1734, IV, pp. 308b-315b.

201

Ibid., 28 May, 1734, IV, pp. 324a-329b.

202

Ibid., 15 July, 1734, IV, p. 357b.

203

Ibid., 6 September, 1734, IV, pp. 390b-393a;
Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 65; Diedo, op. cit., pp. 269, 277.

Well might Emo characterize these negotiations, which lasted from December 6, 1733, to August 1, 1734, as a "long and most thorny affair."²⁰⁴ The delays of the Porte, the demands of the Capitan Pasha for money, and the authority this official exercised were unpleasant parts of the negotiations. Venice gained, however, in the decision rendered because of the persistence and diplomacy of her Bailo.

The demands made upon Venice were shown in another case. The activity of the Spanish corsairs in January, 1732, caused the loss of some sail cloth which a Turkish subject was taking to Constantinople on board a Venetian vessel. This man presented his claim in Constantinople and demanded an indemnity from Emo. The latter informed his Government and waited for instructions.²⁰⁵ During this interval, the Capitan Pasha repeatedly requested that reimbursement be made.²⁰⁶ Emo quoted the reply from Venice as merely saying that Spain had been notified of the circumstances;²⁰⁷ consequently the Capitan Pasha was not satisfied and continued to demand payment.²⁰⁸ In reality the instructions of August 28, 1732, had

²⁰⁴

Emo, op. cit., 6 September, 1734, IV, p. 384b.

²⁰⁵

Ibid., 6 February, 1732, II, p. 243b et seq.

²⁰⁶

Ibid., 31 March, 1732, II, p. 304a; 5 April, 1732, III, p. 6a; 22 April, 1732, III, pp. 17a-18b; 4 June, 1732, III, pp. 54b-55a; 29 July, 1732, III, pp. 108b-110b.

²⁰⁷

Ibid., 20 September, 1732, III, pp. 162b-163a.

²⁰⁸

Ibid., 19 October, 1732, III, pp. 181a-b; 9 February, 1733, III, pp. 252b-254a.

given Emo permission to settle with the Turk by paying cautiously²⁰⁹ and privately a moderate compensation; and in May, 1734, he²¹⁰ carried out the instructions by paying the Turk 275 piasters.

Another arduous task and another diplomatic victory for Emo was the renewal of the Treaty of Passarowitz. The declaration, "and the continuance of the peace between the most serene and most powerful emperor of the Moslems and the Republic of Venice, remains established through the duration of his empire,"²¹¹ was the part of the Treaty which started a great deal of discussion before April, 1733. The Porte contended that the peace terms were not binding after the deposition of Achmet III. Emo maintained that according to the law of nations a change of sovereigns did not mean that treaties were thereby void. He sought to have the Treaty confirmed as a perpetual one, but the Turks at first objected to that.²¹² After several weeks of negotiations the Porte sent Emo a draft of the Treaty which contained only twenty-two instead of the twenty-six articles of the original. Emo objected to this change and won his point.²¹³ Another draft was brought, which

209

Emo, op. cit., 17 April, 1734, IV, pp. 307a-b.

210

Ibid., 7 May, 1734, IV, pp. 318b-319b.

211

Cappelletti, op. cit., p. 206.

212

Emo, op. cit., 1 April, 1733, III, pp. 291b-298a; 5 April, 1733, III, pp. 298a-303b; 11 April, 1733, III, pp. 306a-307b.

213

Ibid., 21 May, 1733, III, pp. 317b-327b.

contained the term "new peace," instead of "ratification."
Again Emo objected, and the term "confirmation" was finally
included as he wished it to be.²¹⁴ Emo received the official
copy in an audience, May 20, 1733,²¹⁵ and sent it by Captain
Dandolo to Venice.²¹⁶

While these negotiations were being carried on, the other
foreign ministers began to manifest their interest in the re-
newal. The Russian Resident sought to win favor by suggesting
to some Turks that in exchange for this renewal Venice might
be made to cede Vonitza and Prevesa to the Porte.²¹⁷ The
English and Dutch Ambassadors were disturbed in not having been
asked to act as mediators since their predecessors had served
in that capacity when the original treaty was made. Talman's
attitude also seemed questionable, and only the Marquis de
Villeneuve supported Emo. The French Ambassador told the
English Ambassador there was no reason for Venice to ask for
mediation since there was no dispute.²¹⁸ Emo defended his

214

Emo, op. cit., 28 May, 1733, III, pp. 336b-341a.

215

Ibid., IV, pp. 4a-b; Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 65.

216

Emo, op. cit., pp. 5b-6b; 1 June, 1733, IV, p. 14b.

217

Ibid., 11 April, 1733, III, pp. 306b-307a; 21 May, 1733,
III, pp. 317b-318a; 1 June, 1733, IV, pp. 15b-16a.

218

Ibid., 1 June, 1733, IV, pp. 17a-21b.

action by stating that mediators had served only in congresses, never in Constantinople, and that he had followed the procedure which had been used for the renewal of the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1705.²¹⁹ These discussions did not prove serious. He reported later the friendly attitude of the English and Austrian representatives, but he was not so sure of that of the Dutch Ambassador.²²⁰ After harmonious relations were restored among these foreign representatives, Emo began to be bothered by the delay of action in Venice. He was asked frequently by Dragoman Ghika why Captain Dandolo had not returned.²²¹ The Captain returned September 15,²²² but the negotiations were not completed until November 9, when Emo and the Grand Vizier exchanged signed copies of the renewed Treaty.²²³ Zinkeisen called this renewal "the last renowned act, with which Venice left the stage . . . in oriental affairs."²²⁴

²¹⁹ Emo, op. cit., 13 August, 1733, LS, IV, pp. 86b-88b; SS, IV, pp. 133b-139b.
²²⁰ Ibid., LS, IV, pp. 91a-b; 20 August, 1733, IV, pp. 104a-105b.
²²¹ Ibid., 20 August, 1733, IV, pp. 100a-101a; 10 October, 1733, IV, p. 135b.
²²² Ibid., 10 October, 1733, LS, IV, pp. 135a-138a; SS, V, pp. 1a-3b.
²²³ Ibid., 12 November, 1733, LS, IV, pp. 157b-158a; Diedo, op. cit., pp. 249-251.
²²⁴ Zinkeisen incorrectly gave Bailo Contarini credit for this important piece of diplomacy and persistence: op. cit., p. 582.

In contrast to such prolonged negotiations with distrust, fear, or bitterness, was the Bailo's charitable work in aiding enslaved Venetians. He was often satirical as regards the Turks, but his patriotism and deeply religious nature responded to the task of redeeming Venetians from slavery and especially if it meant their return to the Christian faith. When the slaves were released during the revolt of 1730, three came to the embassy. He sent two of these home by way of Cattaro, but kept the third, who was too weak to make the long journey on foot. ²²⁵ In this case and in others ²²⁶ Emo's part was known by the Turks, but there was also secret aid given. This was true in the case of runaways, who were kept at the embassy until an opportunity came to send them away in disguise. ²²⁷ He aided either openly or secretly thirty men ²²⁸ and women during his stay in Constantinople.

The experiences of Emo at the Porte showed diplomacy at its best and its worst. Patriotic zeal and the prevention of war through skilful handling of unpleasant situations were evident in both the Turkish officials and Emo. There was

225

Emo, op. cit., 4 November, 1730, I, pp. 69b-70a.

226

Ibid., 28 November, 1730, I, p. 83a; 30 November, 1730, I, p. 88b; 26 April, 1731, I, pp. 248a-b.

227

Ibid., 7 March, 1732, II, pp. 277a-b.

228

In addition to the three preceding notes: 29 September, 1731, II, pp. 100a-b; 10 March, 1731, I, pp. 190a-191b; 19 June, 1734, IV, pp. 344a-b.

slowness of negotiations on both sides. Diplomatic procedure was almost interminable. The courier system prevented immediate action, but there was also deliberate delay on the part of Emo, the Turkish Ministry, and the Venetian Senate. An even more undesirable feature was the purchasing of favor, or bribery, if you please. The relations between the two Powers revealed the decline of Venice in commerce as the other European Powers developed theirs, her weakness in military and naval affairs, and consequently her failure of leadership of the diplomatic corps at the Porte.

CHAPTER III

The War with Persia; the Relations of the Ottoman Empire with Russia as regards Asia

The war with Persia, 1730 to 1736, was in reality an episode in the development of the relations between Turkey, Persia, and Russia during the longer period, 1700 to 1739. It was not only significant in itself, but it was closely related to the expansion of Russia and the enmity between that state and the Ottoman Empire. In the treaty of 1700 between Russia and the Porte, Azov was given to Peter the Great.¹ To counteract this gain the Porte built a strong fortress at the eastern extremity of the Crimea, with which it could command the entrance to the straits of Kertch. The Russians continued to strengthen their position by erecting a fortress at Taganrog and new fortifications on the coast of the Black Sea. This policy and their aggressions² on Turkish territory provoked the Porte to declare war in 1710. When peace was concluded in the following year, Azov and the adjacent territory were to be restored to the Turks, and the fortifications built by the Russians were to be destroyed.³ Peter the Great failed to fulfill these terms, and through the mediation of England and Holland another treaty with the same terms was

¹ Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 198.

² Creasy, op. cit., pp. 109-110, 114-116.

³ Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 60; Marriott, op. cit., p. 133.

signed in 1712.⁴ Again there was delay on the part of Russia in carrying out the provisions,⁵ and she showed her real intentions by proposing to Charles VI that same year an offensive and defensive alliance against the Turks, but the project was not accepted.⁶ Russia's failure to comply with the treaty of 1712 brought about preparations for war by the Turks.⁷ A third treaty was then made in 1713,⁸ which was observed by the Russians.⁹ Seven years later a treaty of "perpetual peace" was signed by the two states,¹⁰ but the causes for antagonism remained. Quarrels continued between the Tartars of the Crimea and the Cossacks and in the disputed territories between the Black and Caspian seas. Russia needed and desired free navigation on the Black Sea, which belonged¹¹ to the Porte.

During this period Persia had been having difficulties. Shah Hussein had been deposed by rebels, and his son, Shah

⁴ Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 61.

⁵ Creasy, op. cit., p. 130.

⁶ Martens, F., Recueil des Traités et Conventions conclus par La Russie avec les Puissances Etrangères, I, p. 28.

⁷ Creasy, op. cit.

⁸ Noradounghian, op. cit., pp. 61, 203 et seq.

⁹ Creasy, op. cit., p. 131.

¹⁰ Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 227 et seq.

¹¹ Marriott, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

Tahmasp, was not strong enough to gain control of his kingdom without assistance. He asked aid of Russia in 1722, who thus found an opportunity to obtain a stronghold at Derbent and Baku on the Caspian and in Gilan, Mazanderan, and Astrabad.¹² The Turks also profited by the weakness of Shah Tahmasp and captured Georgia in 1722-1723.¹³ The following year Russia and Turkey made a treaty which partitioned the northern provinces of Persia between them.¹⁴ This treaty was more advantageous to the Russians, who were in possession of the greater part of the territory assigned to them, than to the Turks, who had yet to conquer theirs.¹⁵ The latter conquered Hamadan, Erivan, and Tabriz during 1724 and 1725, and finally the Persian rebel, Ashraf, ceded these places to the Porte in 1727. In that same year Tahmasp Kuli Khan joined Shah Tahmasp, whose fortunes were thereby aided for a few years. This new general completely defeated the rebel forces during the following three years and placed his master in a position to object to the conquests of the Turks and to demand restitution of all the territories taken.¹⁶

¹² Hanway, op. cit., I, pp. 12-13; Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 233.

¹³ Sykes, Sir Percy, A History of Persia, II, p. 237.

¹⁴ Ibid.; Noradounghian, op. cit.

¹⁵ Creasy, op. cit., pp. 152-153.

¹⁶ Sykes, op. cit., pp. 238-243.

Instead of meeting this demand with war, Achmet III and his ministers were willing to negotiate. Persian ambassadors arrived in Constantinople the last of July, 1730, and were well received. The ministry believed that war would not really occur, but the demands of the Persians were for complete restitution. They were offered Tabriz, Hamadan, and Kermanshah with the adjoining territories in return for a moderate annual tribute and a renunciation of Georgia.¹⁷ This proposed cession was one of the factors in provoking the revolt of September¹⁸ 28.

Just as the war reacted on the political situation in Constantinople, the latter affected the war. Affairs after the revolt were so complicated that they engaged the chief attention of the Turkish government during October and November, and the war was in the background. The declaration had not been made before November 25, when the Council was called ostensibly for that purpose, but really to do away with Ali Patrona and the most important rebels.¹⁹ Rusbek Pasha had been sent earlier²⁰ in the month to Persia as Seraskier, but after the assassination of the rebels an order was sent that he be beheaded because

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Emo, op. cit., 5. September, 1730, I, pp. 24a-25a;
11 October, 1730, I, pp. 45b-46b.

¹⁸

See p. 34.

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See p. 41.

²⁰

Emo, op. cit., 12 November, 1730, I, p. 74b.

he too was an Albanian. He was replaced by Ali Pasha,²¹ who was later the most permanent vizier of these years. Meanwhile objections to the war were being made by the learned on the ground that it was unjust and against the Mohammedan religion to wage war against brothers in the faith. There were also rumors that the real enemy was Russia and that the Turks would aid the Persians in a war against that expanding Power.²² In addition the news brought by couriers early in November was unfavorable for the Turks.²³

During the reigns of Catherine I and Peter II, Russia made no attempt to gain more territory in Persia.²⁴ The successes of the Turks in 1724 and 1725 caused Russia to make an alliance with Austria against the Porte in 1726.²⁵ This step showed that Russia feared the Turks and considered them her enemy in spite of the treaty of 1720. When in 1730 Anne became Empress of Russia, expansion at the expense of Persia and the Ottoman Empire became an important policy,²⁶ and Russian attention followed every phase of the Turkish-Persian war. Emo had been in Constantinople only about six weeks when he reported

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Emo, op. cit., 17 December, 1730, I, p. 104b.

22

Ibid., 1 November, 1730, I, pp. 63b-64b.

23

Ibid., 12 November, 1730, I, p. 75b.

24

Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 643.

25

Martens, op. cit., p. 32 et seq.

26

Manstein, General Christopher Hermann von, Contemporary Memoirs of Russia, from the Year 1727 to 1744, p. 51 et seq.

the unhappiness of Neplyneff, the Russian Resident, when the Khan of the Tartars was cordially received by Mahmud.²⁷ Not long after that, he commented on the enmity between Russia and the Porte.²⁸ By the spring of 1731 their distrust for one another was increasing every day,²⁹ but Ibrahim tried to conceal it under dissimulations and diplomacy.³⁰

The disturbed conditions in Constantinople during the first months of Mahmud's reign had been advantageous for Shah Tahmasp. He had maintained his resolute demands for the release of all the territory occupied by the Turks, and he had not been idle. By January, 1731, one part of his army had been advanced toward Bagdad,³¹ which was being protected by Achmet Pasha, and the other part to Erivan.³² These movements were confirmed by later couriers and by letters from the Russian commander near Erivan to Neplyneff.³³

During the months of January, February, and March the Pate

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Emo, op. cit., 12 November, 1730, I, pp. 74a-b.

²⁸

Ibid., 17 December, 1730, I, pp. 105a-b.

²⁹

Ibid., 26 April, 1731, I, p. 239b.

³⁰

Ibid., 14 June, 1731, I, pp. 299b-300a.

³¹

Emo always used the name "Babylonia" instead of "Bagdad."

³²

Emo, op. cit., 17 December, 1730, I, p. 105a; 14 January, 1731, I, p. 127a.

³³

Ibid., 25 January, 1731, I, pp. 146b-147a; 22 February, 1731, I, pp. 157b-158a; 4 April, 1731, I, p. 227a; 26 April, 1731, I, p. 239a.

followed two policies: it negotiated with the ambassadors from Shah Tahmasp for a peaceful settlement and it continued to prepare for war. The learned men of Constantinople and the officials in power sought to maintain peace.³⁴ They treated the Persian ambassadors with more consideration than the Porte usually showed toward the representatives of an unfriendly state.³⁵ The Reis Effendi, the Kiaya and "the former Reis Effendi," that is, the one who held that office under Achmet III, even went to their residence. This unusual proceeding and extraordinary attention from Turkish officials showed the conciliatory intentions of the Porte. The Persians declared, however, they were not able to recede from their demands for the entire restitution of their territory.³⁶ Consultations were also being held with the person who represented himself as the brother of Shah Tahmasp, but whom the Persian ambassadors³⁷ and Neplyneff declared to be an imposter.³⁸ In spite of this evident irritation toward the official representatives, conferences were resumed with them and it was thought early in March that an agreement would be reached which would permit

³⁴ Emo, op. cit., 14 January, 1731, I, pp. 127a-128a.

³⁵ Ibid., 22 February, 1731, I, p. 158b.

³⁶ Ibid., 24 February, 1731, I, p. 173b.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 173b-174a; 9 March, 1731, I, pp. 183b-184a.

³⁸ Ibid., 9 March, 1731, I, p. 184a.

their departure after Ramazan, or about the middle of April,
for Bagdad to sign a peace treaty.³⁹ The letters of Ali Pasha,
the Seraskier, however, so aroused the Porte that they were
sent later in March.⁴⁰ The Porte did not trust too much to
these diplomatic negotiations, but sent immense sums of money
and provisions to Achmet Pasha⁴¹ and to the Seraskier,⁴² and
renewed the efforts at the Arsenal to provide ships for the
transportation of supplies.⁴³ European troops had not as yet
been sent.⁴⁴ These preparations were discontinued while the
revolt of March, 1731, was the chief concern of the Govern-
ment,⁴⁵ and were begun again when Achmet Pasha sent word that
he was in great danger of being attacked, although an emissary
from Shah Tahmasp had arrived in Bagdad to negotiate for peace.
The ministry expressed the fear that the sending of this
representative was only a ruse on the part of the Shah to cover
his really belligerent intentions.⁴⁶

39

Emo, op. cit., pp. 182b-183b.

40

Ibid., 17 March, 1731, I, pp. 203a-204b; 28 March, 1731,
I, pp. 217a-b.

41

Ibid., 14 January, 1731, I, p. 128a; 25 January, 1731, I,
p. 147b; 22 February, 1731, I, pp. 158a-b; 9 March, 1731, I, p. 184b.

42

Ibid., 9 March, 1731, I, p. 184b.

43

Ibid., 14 January, 1731, I, p. 129a; 22 February, 1731, I,
p. 160a.

44

Ibid., 22 February, 1731, I, p. 159b; 9 March, 1731, I, p. 184b.

45

Ibid., 4 April, 1731, I, p. 227a.

46

Ibid., 26 April, 1731, I, pp. 240a-b; 27 April, 1731, I,
pp. 249b-250b.

The fighting had actually begun in March between the northern divisions of the two armies. A courier arrived from Ali Pasha to announce that he had been successful in two battles.⁴⁷ This news was confirmed in about a week by the arrival of an Agha with a prisoner to be presented to the Sultan. This Persian was well received, served coffee and sherbet by the Kiaya, and then presented to the Vizier. Ibrahim accused the Shah of being a violator of the treaty signed during Achmet III's reign and confirmed by Mahmud. The Persian's patriotism made him "respond superbly and in tones not corresponding to his state" in defense of his sovereign. This arrogance was punished by his being beheaded. Although the Mufti had approved of this act, murmurs were heard of a general disapproval.⁴⁸ The Porte then had the Persian ambassador, who was coming from Bagdad to Constantinople brought and imprisoned⁴⁹ on Tenedos.

Ali Pasha sent news of a third victory and the defeat of three thousand Persians, but, as Emo observed, "these little successes are not to decide the war." Tahmasp Kuli Khan had advised Shah Tahmasp to avoid a pitched battle and to let

⁴⁷ Emo, op. cit., 18 May, 1731, I, pp. 267a-269b.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 30 May, 1731, I, pp. 279b-280b.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 14 June, 1731, I, pp. 299a-b.

penury, sickness, and tedium combat the enemy in camp, while Ali Pasha longed for a battle.⁵⁰ After this information was received, orders were sent to the Seraskier to advance to Tabriz and to force the Shah to fight.⁵¹ A few weeks later news was received of a great victory by the Turkish army at Kermanshah on July 15. Constantinople was not disposed to rejoice, and another courier brought the unfavorable news that the Turks had suffered a defeat almost immediately after the victory.⁵²

Achmet Pasha had been ordered to advance to aid Ali Pasha who was marching toward Tabriz.⁵³ As early as this there had been suspicions of Achmet's loyalty, but with the news that he was carrying out his instructions, opinion changed in his favor.⁵⁴ As he marched, he laid waste the country. But with all the reported advantages, the abhorrence the people had for the war did not lessen; they were disturbed by the scarcity and the high prices of food.⁵⁵ The silence which followed the arrival of a courier suggested that he had brought unpleasant notices.

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Emo, op. cit., 15 August, 1731, II, pp. 55b-56a.

51

Ibid., 18 August, 1731, II, p. 61a.

52

Ibid., 8 September, 1731, II, pp. 72a-b.

53

Ibid., pp. 72b, 73b-74a.

54

Ibid., 28 September, 1731, II, pp. 92b-93b.

55

Ibid., 29 September, 1731, II, p. 94a.

The marching of the combined Turkish armies toward Tabriz was proceeding slowly and with difficulty. There was the feeling that even the capture of that city would be only temporary and would not pay.⁵⁶ This pessimistic attitude gained nothing from the reports of dissatisfaction in the army of Achmet as it marched, of the wound received by Ali Pasha, and of the dispersing of the latter's troops. A victory of Achmet Pasha did not mean a great deal to the people,⁵⁷ but the Government rewarded him and his officers with costumes and other gifts.⁵⁸ Then came in November the news of a great victory and the occupation of Hamadan by Achmet Pasha, who asked permission to return to Bagdad. The Porte refused his request and ordered him to remain at Hamadan and "to profit by every opening" for peace.⁵⁹ Before he could have received these orders, he sent couriers to report on the likelihood of peace and to plead again for permission to return to Bagdad. Letters also came from the Shah who protested against the cruelty and injustice of the Sultan in despoiling the territory of his brother-in-religion. A Council was accordingly called. Topal Osman, the Vizier, opened the consultation by asking every one to reflect and to

56

Emo, op. cit., 5 October, 1731, II, pp. 107a-108a.

57

Ibid., 29 October, 1731, II, p. 118b et seq.

58

Ibid., p. 122b.

59

Ibid., 16 November, 1731, II, pp. 150a, 159a-b.

express sincerely his opinion regarding the war. The Mufti, the Capitan Pasha, and the Agha of the Janissaries passionately maintained that the end of the war was necessary. The war was denounced as ruinous in the price to be paid for the acquisition of the regions and for retaining them. A report of these opinions was sent to the Sultan, who approved of the orders to be sent to Achmet Pasha to negotiate a peace.⁶⁰

During this same period Neplyneff had offered the services of Russia as a mediator. They were finally accepted,⁶¹ and Prince Scherbatoff came to Constantinople as envoy extraordinary,⁶² but the terms he proposed were not accepted. Neplyneff still sought to attain his object by means of Dragoman Ventura and Saim Mehemet, the Capitan Pasha. He was seen frequently with the Dragoman and it was rumored that he met the Capitan Pasha at night. This intimacy resulted in the dismissal of Saim Mehemet and the summary execution of Ventura, on December 1.⁶³ This action revealed the attitude of the Porte toward Russia's attempt to mediate. While peace was desired, it was being sought

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Emo, op. cit., 30 November, 1731, II, pp. 167b-169b.

61

Ibid., 15 August, 1731, II, pp. 57b-58a.

62

Ibid., 7 November, 1731, II, pp. 136b-137b; 30 November, 1731, II, pp. 160b-162a, 171b-172a.

63

Ibid., 30 November, 1731, II, p. 166a et seq.; 20 December, 1731, II, pp. 174a-178b; Diedo, op. cit., pp. 239-240.

with Persia alone and without the aid of that perhaps greater enemy, Russia. About six weeks later Emo described Neplyneff as returning greatly agitated from a conference with the Reis Effendi regarding the disturbances of the Tartars on the frontiers.⁶⁴

On December 18, a messenger arrived announcing a great victory and Ali Pasha's entrance into Tabriz.⁶⁵ A confirmation of this report arrived in a few days, and the artillery announced for three days the end of the war.⁶⁶ Peace terms were, however, not readily agreed upon. The Persians at first objected to the cession of Tabriz,⁶⁷ then they persistently refused to give it up. After this unexpected news was received, a council was held to determine whether a great part of the occupied territory should be released in order to obtain peace, or whether the war should be resumed. Again a great many of those present openly declared the war to be ruinous; "long and not pacific arguments" followed, but no decision was reached. It was believed that Topal Osman was opposed to the war. Then the Sultan refused to meet the demands of Persia. This decision was attributed to the influence of the Defterdar, who reasoned

⁶⁴ Emo, op. cit., 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 240b-241b.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 20 December, 1731, II, pp. 186b-187a.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 28 December, 1731, II, pp. 198b, 199b-200a.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 239b-240b.

that if the war continued the troops would be occupied and there would be less likelihood of a revolt.⁶⁸ Almost immediately after this decision, the secretary of Achmet Pasha brought letters announcing the signing of a treaty, January 10, with most advantageous terms for the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁹ The terms were not announced, but one of Emo's confidants told him that orders had been sent to Ali Pasha to withdraw from Tabriz, which was to be given to Persia.⁷⁰ in spite of the decision of the Sultan and the Defterdar. When it was known that this city and its territory were to be ceded to Persia, there was criticism, and little groups of persons were found to be armed.⁷¹ So strong was public feeling and the wish of the Defterdar against this territorial loss that the Mufti and Topal Osman were dismissed,⁷² because they had desired peace. Later the news came that even the soldiers resisted their general when they were ordered to withdraw, that Hamadan and Kermanshah with the surrounding territory had also been ceded, and that Achmet Pasha had returned to Bagdad.⁷³ The terms were thus only gradually made

⁶⁸ Emo, op. cit., 17 February, 1732, II, pp. 251a-255b.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 25 February, 1732, II, pp. 271b-272a; 7 March, 1732, II, p. 278b.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 7 March, 1732, II, pp. 279a-280b, 285a-b.

⁷¹ Ibid., 29 March, 1732, II, p. 288b.

⁷² See pp. 54-55.

⁷³ Emo, op. cit., 5 April, 1732, III, pp. 4b, 5a.

known. Other terms were heard: the Aras River was to be the boundary between the Turkish and Persian possessions, and of all the Turks had conquered since 1722 they were to have only Georgia.⁷⁴ Even so, the exact provisions were not known. It was thought that when the Seraskier came to take up his duties as Grand Vizier, the terms would be announced, but they were not.⁷⁵

The treaty of peace was finally signed, and almost immediately there were hints of a renewal of the war.⁷⁶ Shah Tahmasp had accepted peace terms while Tahmasp Kuli Khan was engaged in subduing the Abdolleees of Herat.⁷⁷ When the general returned and learned the treaty provisions, he refused to accept them. He maintained that all the occupied territories should be returned before peace should be made.⁷⁸ The Porte knew that it had a great military leader to combat, and began greater preparations for the renewed struggle: money was sent to Achmet Pasha; Topal Osman and Saim Mehemet, the former Capitan Pasha, received military appointments and were ordered

⁷⁴ Emo, op. cit., 25 April, 1732, III, p. 23b.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 15 May, 1732, III, pp. 28b, 29b-30a; 4 June, 1732, III, p. 50a.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 14 June, 1732, III, p. 62a.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 62b-63a; Hanway, op. cit., IV, p. 42.

⁷⁸ Hanway, op. cit., pp. 63-65.

to advance toward Bagdad; Ali Pasha, who had been the Defterdar, was to have charge of the troops in Georgia; the troops in Constantinople were commanded to prepare to go to Asia; the construction of eighty ships, which would be small enough to be used on rivers, was started.⁷⁹

The situation became more serious when it was learned that early in the year (1732) Russia and Persia had made a treaty of perpetual peace, in which the latter had received Gilan in exchange for commercial privileges in the province for Russia.⁸⁰ Several months later Emo saw a copy of the treaty and wrote: "The Persians have paid with usury; while so ample are the commercial privileges granted the Russian nation, that in ceding the province of Gilan, Russia has ceded only the title to the land, she retains the profit of the rich country without feeling the heavy burden of encumbrances."⁸¹ Neplyneff had confided to Emo that Gilan was not a profit but a thorn for Russia and that she desired Georgia. The Turks were displeased and believed that Russia had instigated the renewal of the war.⁸² The Porte accordingly entered upon a period of intense work. Secret conferences were held without intermission. Troops were mobilized, provisions were collected, and money was sent to Achmet

⁷⁹Emo, op. cit., pp. 66a-b.

⁸⁰Ibid., 30 June, 1732, III, p. 75b et seq.; Manstein, op. cit., p. 58; Sykes, op. cit., pp. 253-254; Zinkeisen, op. cit., note on p. 643.

⁸¹Emo, op. cit., 19 October, 1732, III, p. 189b.

⁸²Ibid., 30 June, 1732, III, pp. 75b-78b.

Pasha and the other commanders in Asia. All this activity provoked criticism and a menacing attitude in the army and the people; the usual violent means of death and exile were used to keep this rebellious feeling from increasing.⁸⁴ A representative from Shah Tahmasp was guarded carefully and consulted frequently, but no satisfactory arrangement was derived from these negotiations.⁸⁵ Topal Osman was replaced by Mehemet as Seraskier.⁸⁶ Neplyneff was treated more graciously than he had been when he complained about the Tartars,⁸⁷ but his offer again of mediation was not so promptly acted upon. He held a courier in readiness for eight days while he waited for the Porte's answer.⁸⁸ Finally he was informed that the Sultan was gratified by the good intentions of the Empress, but that the time was not opportune to profit by them.⁸⁹

In the fall of 1732, the war took on a very serious aspect. Shah Tahmasp was deposed by Tahmasp Kuli Khan, who declared himself the regent during the minority of the infant son of the

⁸³ Emo, op. cit., 11 July, 1732, III, p. 98b; 29 July, 1732, III, p. 114b.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 18 August, 1732, III, pp. 125a-b; 20 September, 1732, III, pp. 158b-159a.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 28 August, 1732, III, pp. 148a-b; 20 September, 1732, III, p. 160a.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 19 October, 1732, III, p. 186b.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 27 September, 1732, III, pp. 170a-b.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 19 October, 1732, III, pp. 188b-189a.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 27 October, 1732, III, p. 194a.

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Shah. Tahmasp Kuli Khan was more warlike than the deposed Shah had been. As soon as this information reached Constantinople, troops and money were sent to influence the Persian princes to restore their sovereign to his throne, but these offers of assistance and protection were of no avail.⁹¹

The year 1733 was most important in the progress of the war and in the relations with Russia. The Turks won their greatest and last victories. The attitude of Russia became more threatening than it had been. With the chief Persian army near Ispahan, the Porte in January ordered the Tartars to attack the northern provinces and to lay them waste. Neplyneff objected to their passing through Russian territory,⁹² and one of the long drawn out controversies of the Porte with another Power began. The Khan of the Tartars replied by sending a description of the route he planned to use, which was partly through Russian territory. Neplyneff was informed of the intentions of the Khan. In a conference with the Reis Effendi, Neplyneff maintained that if the Tartars used that route it would be considered an open infraction of the "perpetual peace" signed in 1720.⁹³ When the news came that twenty-five thousand Tartars

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Emo, op. cit., 24 November, 1732, III, pp. 200b-201b.

⁹¹

Ibid., pp. 203a-b.

⁹²

Ibid., 24 January, 1733, III, pp. 237b-238a; Manstein, op. cit., pp. 64-66.

⁹³

Emo, op. cit., 21 March, 1733, III, p. 287a et seq.

were advancing, Neplyneff protested that they would not be able⁹⁴ to avoid Karabagh, and Russian territory would be violated. He was told that the Khan had found another route, but Neplyneff maintained there was no other way. The irritation was increased when letters of the Resident were found addressed to officials in Karabagh. When he told the Reis Effendi that they were written to the court at St. Petersburg, the even-tempered, moderate Reis Effendi⁹⁵ denounced him as a liar. The feeling was not improved by the finding of Russian soldiers⁹⁶ in the Persian army. At this point Emo expressed his belief that the Vizier was waiting for the end of the war with Persia⁹⁷ before he acted on the Russian problem. The Vizier frequently made use of dissimulation, and it was learned that when he announced that the Tartars had crossed into Persia, they had not done so. He asked that a part of them be allowed to pass, and Neplyneff replied that he would write to St. Petersburg for instructions.⁹⁸ This problem continued to be the basis of negotiations and concern, but it proved no more serious than that for the time being. Emo summarized these relations: "Incredible is the art and the dissimulation of the Prime Minister

94 Emo, op. cit., 29 May, 1733, IV, p. 10b.

95 Ibid., 1 June, 1733, IV, pp. 22b-23b.

96 Ibid., 22 August, 1733, IV, p. 116b.

97 Ibid., pp. 119a-b.

98 Ibid., 26 August, 1733, IV, pp. 120a-121a.

in concealing his inner resentment, soothing this Russian Resident, and not carrying the affair to the extremity to which the reported accidents of the Tartars and of Karabagh would have inevitably conducted them at other times." ⁹⁹ When the Tartars did advance, they defeated the Cossacks. Neplyneff offered money, "and not a little," to the Vizier for the retirement of the Tartars. ¹⁰⁰ He continued trying to influence not only the chief minister but also subordinate officials and other men of reputation and credit. The Porte showed its desire not to break with Russia in presenting Neplyneff with twenty Russian subjects who had been captured by the Tartars and sent to Constantinople to be sold as slaves, and who were bought at ¹⁰¹ public expense.

To return to the actual war, Achmet Pasha was shut up in Bagdad and was being besieged by Tahmasp Kuli Khan. Topal Osman was made Seraskier for the second time in order to rescue Achmet Pasha. ¹⁰² The Seraskier could not advance according to his plans, because the Persians had devastated the land and were holding the river passages. The Grand Vizier called a Council in which he offered to go to the front, but this

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Emo, op. cit., 14 September, 1733, IV, p. 130b.

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Ibid., 28 October, 1733, IV, pp. 154b-155a.

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Ibid., 14 November, 1733, IV, pp. 162b-163b.

¹⁰²

Ibid., 21 February, 1733, III, p. 268b.

suggestion was rejected. While the people objected to the war, there was less criticism after Topal Osman became Seraskier. Ali Pasha wished, however, to reduce their criticism and he began in May, 1733, to announce victories which had not taken place. During the succeeding months this scheme was used several times, but the people were not greatly deceived. When the first reports were not confirmed, they resumed their first sadness and murmured. The situation was not a happy one. Discontent existed, and the fear of a revolt remained. Then, to use Emo's figure of speech, "a propitious wind blew from Asia, scattered the clouds, and restored serenity to this sky." Topal Osman's great victory of July 19 was announced by the palace cannons during the night of August 7. He had won a strenuously fought battle near Bagdad, and the nine months' blockade of that city was ended. Tahmasp had been wounded and put to flight, leaving about thirty thousand men on the battlefield or captured. So jubilant was the capital that instead of sending a simple Agha, according to custom, to inform the foreign ministers, Dragoman Ghika was sent, and the guns boomed for three days. Another victory was announced eight days

¹⁰³Emo, op. cit., 21 March, 1733, III, pp. 284a-285b.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 11 April, 1733, III, pp. 311b-312a; 29 May, 1733, IV, p. 8b.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 29 May, 1733, IV, pp. 9a-b.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 10 July, 1733, IV, pp. 58b-59b; 26 August, 1733, IV, pp. 120a-121a.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 13 August, 1733, IV, pp. 93a-97a.

later, and there was incredible joy in Constantinople. Three thousand purses were sent to Topal Osman to be distributed to the troops. After the messenger described the friendly meeting of Achmet Pasha and Topal Osman outside Bagdad, the people called these two the restorers of the Empire.¹⁰⁸ The Vizier boasted to the Marquis de Villeneuve that Topal Osman had collected enough spoils of war to fortify and arm a new city.¹⁰⁹

This rejoicing was short-lived. The victories did not bring the much desired peace; instead of losing courage Tahmasp Kuli Khan was aroused to make another effort on the battlefield. He would not listen to peace proposals which did not include the restitution of all the provinces. The victorious Seraskier, on the other hand, was disturbed because food was beginning to be scarce and his soldiers were going home, contrary to his orders. He asked for money to keep them united and contented. Achmet Pasha also requested money and troops. As usual, these requests were followed by a Council, but the decision or outcome was different from the usual one. The public treasury did not contain the money to meet these requests. The Sultan was asked to contribute three thousand purses from his own treasury. These were sent to Topal Osman, but only courteous

108

Emo, op. cit., 22 August, 1733, IV, pp. 113a-114b.

109

Ibid., pp. 117a-b.

words and expressions of hope were sent to Achmet Pasha. Topal Osman then sent a request that his successor be appointed: he was reduced to only a few troops, he was old and weak, his troops lacked food. Again came the complaints from Achmet Pasha that he lacked all necessities. These requests were accompanied by reports of the energy and animation Tahmasp Kuli Khan was displaying in preparing for another attack. Such accounts would have been discouraging in themselves, but the war was not the only problem before the Porte. During the latter part of 1733 it was having many conferences with the Austrian, Russian, and French representatives regarding the question of the Polish succession.¹¹¹

Another Ottoman victory was announced in November by the Grand Vizier, but Emo was not certain that it had occurred and there were murmurings that it had been a defeat. This suspicion was confirmed by the frequent conferences of the ministers, the orders for the troops to march in spite of the season, and the sending of money and provisions.¹¹² The victory had really taken place and was officially announced later by the palace guns. Letters from Topal Osman said that Tahmasp Kuli Khan had asked for peace, but the Seraskier had sent him the reply that

110

Emo, op. cit., 10 October, 1733, IV, pp. 140a-142b; see also Hanway, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

111

Emo, op. cit., 28 October, 1733, IV, pp. 151a-b.

112

Ibid., 14 November, 1733, IV, pp. 164a-165a.

the Empire did not treat with a usurper and a rebel. This information was interpreted as meaning the end of the war, but the sending of troops, provisions, and munitions aroused suspicions again.¹¹³

Then came the news of Topal Osman's death, after a brave resistance in spite of his infirmities and age, and the defeat of the Turkish forces. As Emo observed, the death of the Seraskier was a signal victory for the Persians.¹¹⁴ Achmet Pasha's loyalty had been suspected frequently,¹¹⁵ and Topal's successor, Abdullah Kiuprili, was chosen more because of his family name than because of his personal ability. He was inexperienced and displeasing to the army.¹¹⁶ With such opponents Tahmasp Kuli Khan, who has been called "that scourge of heaven"¹¹⁷ and "the last great Asiatic conqueror,"¹¹⁸ would not have the adversities he had suffered. A rumor was also circulating that he had never asked for peace but had offered it on condition that the Porte restore all the provinces,

113

Emo, op. cit., 24 November, 1733, IV, pp. 174a-175b.

114

Ibid., 9 December, 1733, IV, pp. 187b-188b.

115

Ibid., 29 September, 1731, II, p. 93b; 29 July, 1732, III, p. 115a; 21 February, 1733, III, p. 269a; 11 April, 1733, III, pp. 312b-313a; 29 May, 1733, IV, pp. 9b-10a.

116

Ibid., 9 December, 1733, IV, p. 192a.

117

Hanway, op. cit., p. 40.

118

Sykes, op. cit., pp. 240, 247.

including Georgia.

Once more the troops were objecting to the war. The Vizier sought to win them by announcing that he would lead the army, by increasing their pay, and by presenting the officers with gifts. A new method for maintaining secrecy was introduced. At different times couriers from the front had been carefully guarded, but in the early part of 1734, they were not even permitted to enter Constantinople. They were met several days' distance, from the city, and only their news was brought to the Vizier. Evidently the reports were not to the taste of the Government, but the repeated offers of the Dutch and English ambassadors to act as mediators were rejected. It was said late in January that a treaty had been negotiated by Achmet Pasha and Tahmasp Kuli Khan, but the announcement was not accepted as true until later. The proposals proved so unfavorable that they were denounced by Ali Pasha in a Council, and it was decided that the war should continue. This decision

¹¹⁹ Emo, op. cit., pp. 189b-190a.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 15 December, 1733, IV, pp. 204a-b.

¹²¹ "A day's journey is commonly reckoned 24 miles;" Hanway, op. cit., note on p. 3.

¹²² Emo, op. cit., 19 January, 1734, IV, pp. 230a.

¹²³ Ibid., 22 January, 1734, IV, pp. 227b-232b, 234b-236a; 27 February, 1734, IV, pp. 254b-256a.

¹²⁴ Ibid., 30 January, 1734, LS, IV, pp. 238b-241a; SS, V, pp. 67a-69a.

¹²⁵ Ibid., 26 February, 1734, LS, IV, pp. 249a-250a; Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 65.

called forth expressions of discontent. Fires began breaking out at the same time in various parts of the city. The usual governmental devices for subduing and suppressing rebellious feeling were used: the exiling of Albanians, the closing of coffee shops, and the stationing of policemen about the city. Troops and munitions were being sent to the commanders, otherwise the war would have been forgotten with the European situation absorbing more and more attention, Emo reported in April, 1734. Letters from Russian commanders in Erivan to Neplyneff contradicted the statements being made in Constantinople that Tahmasp Kuli Khan was having opposition among his own people and that he lacked troops. There were no actual hostilities reported, but the Porte continued to send supplies, obtained two thousand purses from the Sultan's treasury, and maintained secrecy in regard to the information received from the commanders. In September there were reports about that the Porte really was willing to cede all the parts occupied by

126

Emo, op. cit., 21 March, 1734, IV, pp. 267a-269a.

127

Ibid., 13 April, 1734, IV, p. 302a.

128

Ibid., 9 May, 1734, IV, p. 323a.

129

Ibid., 27 February, 1734, IV, p. 254a; 7 May, 1734, IV, p. 317a; 19 June, 1734, IV, p. 340b; 14 August, 1734, IV, p. 371b; 28 October, 1734, IV, p. 412b.

130

Ibid., 29 May, 1734, IV, p. 334b.

131

Ibid., 29 May, 1734, IV, p. 334b; 19 June, 1734, IV, p. 340b; 9 October, 1734, IV, p. 406b; 28 October, 1734, IV, p. 412a.

the Turks, but feared that the internal tranquillity would be
disturbed by such action.¹³² Emo's last statements regarding
the war reported that Tahmasp Kuli Khan had suppressed a revolt
and was more firmly established on the throne than he had been.¹³³

Emo's narrative of the war was complicated by the courier
system, the various changes in policy, and the secret negoti-
ations of the Russians. While couriers were going from
Constantinople with instructions to the commander-in-chief to
continue the war, other messengers were on the way to the
capital to announce the signing of a peace. While Neplyneff
intimated a friendliness for the Porte and offered assistance,¹³⁴
it was rumored that Russia was giving aid to the Persians,
and she had actually made a treaty with them. It was as if Emo
were weaving with a number of shuttles without knowing the
pattern; no one was laid down with certainty that it would not
be used again.

In spite of the difficulty of obtaining news and the con-
flicting rumors, Emo's account of the war was accurate. It

¹³²

Emo, op. cit., 1 September, 1734, IV, pp. 381a-b; 12
September, 1734, IV, p. 398a.

¹³³

Ibid., 17 November, 1734, IV, pp. 413a-b. The amount of
material written by Emo about the war during 1734 was a great
deal less than for the other years. This brevity may be account-
ed for by the secrecy with which news from the front was guarded,
by the lack of activity there, partly by the state of Emo's
health, but more definitely by the greater interest in the
question of the Polish succession.

¹³⁴

Ibid., 15 May, 1732, III, pp. 30a-31b; 14 June, 1732,
III, pp. 65b-66a.

contained the same material which four of his contemporaries recorded but in greater quantity: these were General Manstein¹³⁵ in his Memoirs, the Marquis de Villeneuve in his despatches¹³⁶ to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Paris, Senator Diedo¹³⁷ in his history of Venice, and Jonas Hanway in his history of¹³⁸ British trade. From these and other sources, Hammer, Zinkeisen, Creasy, and Sykes wrote their histories, and the¹³⁹ similarity of their accounts with Emo's is testimony to his ability to collect and to record facts. His narrative was very important also in that it pertained to the chief years of the war. Unless Tahmasp Kuli Khan were deposed or the Porte changed vitally in character and in policy, the outcome, that of defeat¹⁴⁰ for the Ottoman Empire, was evident when Emo left Constantinople in 1734.

His reports of the war revealed several conditions: the instability of the Government and the bad financial state of the treasury, which reacted on the progress of the war in the delay

135

Manstein, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

136

Vandal, op. cit., p. 211 et seq.

137

Diedo, op. cit., pp. 240-245, 251-254.

138

Hanway, op. cit., p. 40 et seq.

139

Hammer, op. cit., p. 402 et seq.; Zinkeisen, op. cit.,
p. 638 et seq.; Creasy, op. cit., p. 159 et seq.; Sykes, op. cit.,
p. 247 et seq.

140

Zinkeisen, op. cit., pp. 646-647.

or failure to send adequate supplies; the close relation between public opinion and the policies of the Government; and the antagonism between Russia and the Ottoman Empire which was to influence their relations in Europe.

CHAPTER IV

The Relations of the Ottoman Empire with France, with Austria, and with Russia as regards Europe

While the war with Persia was going on, a diplomatic war was being waged in Constantinople which was an outgrowth of the relations between Russia and the Porte from 1700 to 1730 and which developed into actual warfare with Russia in 1736 and with Austria in 1737. There was a close relation between the war with Persia and the diplomatic struggle. The plan of the Porte to weaken the Persians by Tartar attacks had provoked a controversy with Russia. The distrust and fear of Russian expansion in Asia and the assistance which Russia gave the Persians influenced the Turks in their attitude toward the activity of Russia in Poland in 1733 and 1734. In addition, the war with Persia kept the Porte occupied, was a great drain on its resources, and thus prevented it from taking a more definite stand against the Russians. There was also the belief in Constantinople that the various peace proposals were accepted by the viziers Topal Osman and Ali Pasha in order that they might wage a war against Austria.¹

Although the relations of the Porte with France, Austria,

¹ Emo, op. cit., 17 February, 1732, II, pp. 254a-b; Hanway, op. cit., pp. 115-116.

and Russia centered mainly around the question of succession to the Polish throne, there were some minor problems. One of these was the attacks of the corsairs on Austrian ships, and Talman had experiences similar to those of Emo in that the Porte² was very deliberate in answering his protests.

In the course of ceremonial routine Resident Talman did not have the smooth relationship which Emo experienced. Talman encountered his first difficulties from his fellow diplomats over a seemingly trivial point of ambassadorial precedence. As a resident minister his position was subordinate to that of the ambassadors of France, England, and Holland and the bailo of Venice. These preceded him in audiences which were scheduled³ for all the foreign representatives. After being appointed in 1731 as internuncio to present Austria's letter of congratulation to Mahmud, he maintained that this title had the same rank as that of ambassador.⁴ The three ambassadors and the Bailo considered the rank of an internuncio as not equivalent⁵ to theirs. This dispute brought about a suspension of civilities

² Emo, op. cit., 24 February, 1731, I, pp. 174a-176b; 14 August, 1731, II, pp. 50a-b; 8 September, 1731, II, p. 67a; no date, evidently on or near 20 December, 1731, II, pp. 193b-194a; 14 June, 1732, III, p. 73b; 20 March, 1733, III, pp. 280b-281a.

³ Ibid., 21 May, 1732, III, pp. 40b-41a; 4 June, 1732, III, pp. 45b-46a.

⁴ Ibid., 16 November, 1731, II, pp. 149a-150b; 20 December, 1731, II, p. 187a et seq.; 28 December, 1731, II, p. 202a.

⁵ Ibid., 16 November, 1731, II, pp. 151b-152b.

by Talman with the other embassies and a refusal of Lord Kinnoul and the Marquis de Villeneuve to send an escort for his formal entrance as internuncio. Emo's statements about sending an escort were equivocal, but he followed the precedent established by the English and French ambassadors. The Dutch ambassador, however, sent one.⁶ Such a dispute would not have had any direct bearing on the relations between Talman and the Porte except to place him in a rather conspicuous position in not being able to make so splendid an appearance, but it proved to be only the beginning of Talman's ceremonial difficulties. Topal Osman, the Vizier, treated him ungraciously when the procession for the formal entrance was going through the streets. It was halted and delayed for several hours while messages went back and forth regarding the route to be followed. The night was too far advanced for the procession to be seen when it reached Pera, and the magnificent display received no applause.⁷ A similar attitude was shown by the Vizier in connection with Talman's audience, which was to take place on February 19. On the seventeenth he was informed that he must appear the next day for an audience with the Vizier or he would not be admitted on the nineteenth for an audience with the Sultan. In spite of the short notice, he succeeded in preparing

⁶ Emo, op. cit., 18 January, 1732, II, p. 204a et seq.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 209b-211b.

for the improvised audience.

The fact that Talman was the representative of Austria, the traditional enemy of the Porte and the ally of Russia, and that he frequently consulted with Neplyneff may have been a reason for so peremptory a summons. Villeneuve's refusal to send an escort and his cordial relationship with Topal Osman may have influenced the Vizier against Talman. In 1732 the prestige of Villeneuve was greater than that of any other diplomat at the Porte. He was not subjected to such treatment as were the others by Topal Osman, who sent some rather threatening messages to Emo,⁹ treated Lord Kinnoul in a most undignified manner,¹⁰ and received Talman's gifts quite ungraciously.¹¹ Even after Topal Osman's dismissal the attitude of the Porte was not entirely favorable to Talman. He was not permitted to retain the title of internuncio, more because of his personal rather than of his public character, Emo asserted.¹²

The year 1732 was not so critical a period in the Austro-Russian and Turkish relations as 1733 or 1734, but the evidence of ill-feeling against Talman, the knowledge that Russia had

⁸ Emo, op. cit., 25 February, 1732, II, pp. 263a-264a.

⁹ See p. 92.

¹⁰ See pp. 53-54.

¹¹ Emo, op. cit., 7 March, 1732, II, pp. 284b-285a.

¹² Ibid., 4 June, 1732, III, p. 46b.

made a treaty with Persia and was thus unfriendly to the Porte,
the increasing attention paid to Bonneval,¹³ the pacific atti-
tude of Topal Osman toward Persia and his otherwise belligerent
attitude rather alarmed Emo who gave credence to the rumors
of the possibility of a war of Turkey in the European direction.¹⁴
The likelihood of such a war was lessened by a change of
viziers¹⁵ and the renewal of war by Tahmasp Kuli Khan.¹⁶ It was
in 1732, however, that Russia decided in a council to make war
on Turkey, at a suitable future time.¹⁷

The following year the question of the succession to the
Polish throne created more intense ill-feeling than existed in
1732. From the viewpoint of its consequences and the number of
Powers concerned this problem became most important. The con-
troversy between Russia and the Porte regarding Russian inter-
vention in Poland arose from articles in the treaties of 1713
and 1720. The following restrictions were common to both
treaties: Russian troops were to be withdrawn from Poland within

¹³ Emo, op. cit., 3 February, 1732, II, pp. 243a-b; Vandal,
op. cit., pp. 173-177.

¹⁴ Ibid., 17 February, 1732, II, pp. 254a-b, 256b; 7 March,
1732, II, pp. 282a-283a.

¹⁵ Ibid., 29 March, 1732, II, pp. 290b-291b.

¹⁶ See p. 120.

¹⁷ The plan was to begin hostilities in 1734: Zinkeisen, op. cit., p. 660. The war actually started in 1736.

two months from the signing of the treaties; no troops were to remain under the pretext that they were no longer in the service of the Czar; Russia was neither to interfere in the affairs of Poland nor to send troops into that country under any pretext; if assistance were to be sent to Pomerania, Russian troops could pass through neither Poland nor her dependencies; when returning from Pomerania, Russian troops could pass once only through Poland; and only if the king of Sweden and the Poles allied themselves against the Russians could the Czar's troops enter Poland without breaking the treaty of peace.¹⁸ The treaty of 1720 contained the additional provisions that if the Czar's troops had entered Poland after an alliance of Poland and Sweden directed against Russia, they were to be withdrawn when the king of Sweden withdrew his forces; that if some Christian Powers entered Poland to change the constitution, the Czar might, after informing the Porte, enter Poland, but he was not to change the constitution or restrict the liberty of the Republic.¹⁹ The Polish Succession was a matter of negotiation between the Porte and Austria, since the latter was an ally of Russia. France opposed Austria and Russia and sought to persuade the Porte to an aggressive alliance against the other two Powers. While Venice was definitely neutral, England and Holland were semi-neutral. The end of the Franco-English

¹⁸

Noradounghian, op. cit., pp. 203-204, 228-229.

¹⁹

Ibid., p. 229.

alliance in 1731²⁰ and the alliance between England and Austria²¹ had been reflected in Constantinople by the meeting of the English, Dutch, Austrian, and Russian representatives in frequent secret conferences.²²

There had been a few hints that the Polish question would be a troublesome one for the Porte and that ill-feeling existed between Poland and Russia. When the Turkish envoy was in Poland, he was told that Russian troops would have to pass through the country in order to help the Emperor of Austria,²³ and Talman pointed out to Emo on a map the route that Russian troops would have to use through Poland into Hungary.²⁴ When Serarconski, the Polish envoy extraordinary, came to present²⁵ felicitations to Mahmud,²⁶ arriving in November, 1732, it was noticed that he did not establish the usual relations with Neplyneff, by announcing his arrival, which were customary between diplomats at a court. When Serarconski received letters complaining that a party of Cossacks had crossed the Polish

20

The Cambridge Modern History, VI, p. 61.

21

Emo, op. cit., 3 May, 1731, I, p. 256a.

22

Ibid., 18 August, 1731, II, p. 61a et seq.; 16 November, 1731, II, pp. 156a-157a.

23

Ibid., 21 July, 1731, II, p. 25b et seq.

24

Ibid., pp. 28a-b.

25

Ibid., 11 July, 1732, III, pp. 103b-104a.

26

Ibid., 25 November, 1732, III, pp. 207b-209b.

frontiers, he made complaints to the Porte and to Neplyneff. The Reis Effendi arranged a meeting so that arriving one after the other, Serarconski and Neplyneff met for the first time late in January or early in February, more than two months after the arrival of the former in Constantinople. This conference revealed further the state of feelings, and incidentally the difference between the skilled Neplyneff and the Polish envoy. The former said that if precise and public notices had been presented instead of private letters, he would have responded promptly, but under the circumstances he did not feel obliged to do so.²⁷ His remarks were rather heated and bitter. The incident suggested that the unfriendly feeling between Poland and Russia might prove stronger than Russia's wish to observe the treaties of 1713 and 1720.

A special courier arrived in the night of March 1, 1733, announcing the death of King Augustus II of Poland. Before his departure Serarconski made arrangements that his cousin, who had accompanied him, would be recognized as his successor, and the Vizier promised to consider him as of the rank of the resident ministers.²⁸

As early as October 10, 1730, the Marquis de Villeneuve had been notified of Louis XV's plan to support Stanislaus

27

^{Emo}, op. cit., 11 February, 1733, III, pp. 258a-b.

28

Ibid., 20 March, 1733, III, pp. 272b-275a.

Leczinski, his father-in-law, as candidate for the Polish throne. There had also been negotiations between Versailles and St. Petersburg in 1732 regarding this candidature and the recovery of Azov by Russia, but nothing came of them; consequently the Marquis de Villeneuve started with much diligence and caution to win the support of the Porte in favor of the French candidate as soon as the news of King Augustus' death reached Constantinople.³⁰ During the night of March 24 the Marquis de Villeneuve was called to the Vizier to be informed that letters had arrived saying the Poles were supporting King Stanislaus.³¹ For the next four months the Porte was too diverted by the war with Persia to take much interest in the Polish question, but when Russian troops entered Poland and after the victories of Topal Osman in July, 1733,³² were known, the election became a very important part of the Porte's foreign affairs. It was discussed in at least nine conferences with Villeneuve, ten with Talman, six with Neplyneff, and two each with the English and Dutch ambassadors. Emo's information regarding these conferences was obtained in conversations with the Austrian, Russian and English representatives.

²⁹

Vandal, op. cit., p. 184 et seq.

³⁰

Emo, op. cit., 28 October, 1733, IV, p. 152a.

³¹

Ibid., 11 April, 1733, III, pp. 315b-316a.

³²

Ibid., 13 August, 1733, IV, pp. 99b-100a.

The negotiations started in August with Ali Pasha's
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audiences with Villeneuve, Talman, and Neplyneff. Talman was
asked to intervene between Russia and the Porte in order to
keep the question of the Tartars' activities from becoming a
34
serious one. In these audiences with Talman and Neplyneff the
Grand Vizier wished them to believe that the Porte was in-
different to the Polish election, but after letters came from
the Primate of Poland, the residents were called for a second
audience. Neplyneff maintained that Russia did not approve
of the election of King Stanislaus because Peter the Great had
promised the Poles that he would not be permitted to acquire
the throne. Neplyneff, furthermore, asserted that the Primate's
support did not mean that of the entire Republic. The Vizier
then reminded Neplyneff of the treaty of 1720, "through [the
provisions of] which it was not easy for Russia to send troops
35
into Poland."

Ali Pasha proceeded cautiously. On September 29, it was
36
learned in Constantinople that King Stanislaus had been elected.
He sent credentials to Staniski, the Polish envoy, who presented
them to the Vizier. After this audience, Staniski was assigned

33
Emo, op. cit., 22 August, 1733, IV, pp. 118a-b.

34
Ibid., 26 August, 1733, IV, p. 119b et seq.

35
Ibid., 14 September, 1733, LS, IV, pp. 131a-132a; SS, IV,
pp. 116b-117a.

36
Ibid., 10 October, 1733, LS, IV, pp. 146a-b.

a larger house and his daily allowance increased from seven to twelve piasters.³⁷ Such action would seem to show that the Porte was in favor of King Stanislaus, but Ali Pasha adopted a policy of dissimulation in his relations with Villeneuve and Neplyneff. Each of these diplomats thought that he had found in the Grand Vizier a protector. While Ali Pasha declared to Villeneuve that the Porte would not suffer Russia to violate her promises not to disturb the liberty of the Poles and not to send troops into their state, he was encouraging Neplyneff to believe that the Porte had resolved not to take part in the affair.³⁸ After Talman received news, the first of November, that King Stanislaus had withdrawn first to Marienburg and then to Danzig and that Russian troops were near Warsaw, he notified the Reis Effendi, who showed indifference by replying that the Porte wished only to see the Poles contented. So tepid a response was not pleasing to Villeneuve, who had hoped he could induce the Porte to order the Tartars to attack the Russians and divert their attention from Poland.³⁹

The Vizier was forced later in the month to discard the seemingly disinterested attitude. The question became more serious when the son of King Augustus II agreed to abide by the Pragmatic Sanction and to adopt a policy in regard to Courland

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Emo, op. cit., 28 October, 1733, IV, pp. 156a-157a.

³⁸

Ibid., p. 151b et seq.

³⁹

Ibid., 14 November, 1733, IV, pp. 160b-162a.

which would be favorable to Russia, and accordingly won the support of Austria and Russia. He was elected by a minority on October 5 and took the title of King Augustus III.⁴⁰ On November 22, a Council was held in Constantinople, which lasted several hours and which was spent mainly in discussing the relations with Russia. An indictment was drawn up against that Power for having hindered the passage of the Tartars, having favored Persia, having sustained claims in regard to Karabagh, and having violated the treaty of 1720 in regard to Poland. The Vizier expressed his view that there should be no breaking of peace with Russia until that with Persia was assured.⁴¹ He was forced, however, after the meeting of the Council to satisfy public opinion in some manner and to use a less gentle and moderate tone with Neplyneff. In an audience he told Neplyneff that if the Empress did not recall her troops from Poland according to the treaties, the Grand Signor would be gravely offended. Neplyneff was given a letter for his sovereign to that effect.⁴² Talman was also called and given a letter for Prince Eugene, in which the Porte complained of Russian oppression in Poland. Talman informed Emo that war was threatening between Russia and the Porte, but he believed that peace would be maintained with Austria and that he would be the mediator.

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Manstein, op. cit., pp. 60, 67 et seq.

41

Emo, op. cit., 24 November, 1733, IV, pp. 175b-177a.

42

Ibid., 28 November, 1733, IV, pp. 179b-180a.

Emo learned from another source that the Porte wished that the Elector of Saxony, or King Augustus III, be made to leave Poland.⁴³ Later Emo reported that these letters were read to the residents in the presence of "various Turkish subjects of condition" and that Villeneuve was informed of their contents. Emo thought it easy to believe that the ingenious mind of the Vizier had had these letters exchanged in the night for others⁴⁴ which had much more moderate terms.

The relations with Russia seemed more amicable in December, but Villeneuve continued to be misled and hoped to induce the Porte to start a great diversion in Asia.⁴⁵ Russia defended the presence of her troops in Poland as a means for protecting liberty there, and this question was not so provocative as that of the Tartars' activities, over which a war seemed inevitable. It was significant that Talman announced in January the alliance between Austria and Venice, and he informed Emo that if the Turkish armies advanced against Russia, Austria would consider herself attacked.⁴⁶ This attitude was more threatening and assertive than in preceding months.

43

Emo, op. cit., p. 179a et seq.

44

Ibid., 9 December, 1733, IV, pp. 190b-191a.

45

Ibid., 22 December, 1733, IV, pp. 206b-207b.

46

Ibid., 8 January, 1734, IV, p. 215a et seq.

The following month this view was openly supported by Prince Eugene's reply to the letter sent the last of November. This reply was read to Ali Pasha in an audience, and he was not able to conceal his thoughts by an indifferent expression. The Prince defended the policy pursued by Russia in Poland and reminded the Porte of the alliance between Austria and Russia. After this audience Talman went to Neplyneff, and the two diplomats enjoyed together the description of the Vizier's face as he heard the letter read.⁴⁷ The reply from St. Petersburg was equally firm in defending the Russian policy in Poland and in demanding satisfaction for the inroads of the Tartars.⁴⁸

In February the Khan of the Tartars came westward and was stationed with some of his tribes near Bender. Before his return to the Crimea after the revolt of 1730, he had promised assistance to the French if they wished to restore Stanislaus Leczinski to the Polish throne,⁴⁹ and Villeneuve remembered this promise. After the death of King Augustus II, he sent Baron de Tott with instructions and presents to the Khan, who sent word in August, 1733, that everything was in readiness for his troops to march westward.⁵⁰ Emo wrote later that Villeneuve had used "powerful means" to induce the Tartars to come.⁵¹ Their presence

47

Emo, op. cit., 26 February, 1734, IV, p. 243a et seq.

48

Ibid., 21 March, 1734, IV, pp. 265b-267a.

49

Vandal, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

50

Ibid., p. 197 et seq.

51

Emo, op. cit., 19 June, 1734, IV, p. 339a.

was of importance to both France and Russia. Emo paid tribute to the Vizier's ability to commercialize their presence as holding out hope to Neplyneff that since they were inactive the Porte had not yet decided upon war and as misleading Villeneuve in thinking that the Tartars would be ordered to attack the Russian troops near by.⁵² Neplyneff protested against the Tartars' being near Bender and said that any hostility would be considered an infraction of peace. The Vizier replied that their presence was no different from that of the Russian troops. The Porte also permitted Caluminski, a Russian refugee in the Ottoman Empire since his support of Charles XII, to join the Khan's forces.⁵³ When Neplyneff protested against this last act to Dragoman Ghika, the latter gave an answer which was perhaps prepared, Emo thought, and which might be considered a definition of sovereignty: "the Porte could regulate [affairs] in its own house according to its pleasure and not be obliged to give an account of such acts." Neplyneff notified St. Petersburg of the release of Caluminski, and Talman confided to Emo that the name of this Russian was so abhorred and feared in Russia that his release was capable of influencing strongly the feelings of that court.⁵⁴ The advance of some of

⁵² Emo, op. cit., 26 February, 1734, IV, p. 247b.

⁵³ Ibid., 13 April, 1734, IV, pp. 303a-b.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 17 April, 1734, IV, pp. 307b-308a.

the Tartars from Bender to Chocim seemed an act favorable to the French cause and leading to a rupture with Russia. The English and Dutch representatives were asked to remonstrate with Neplyneff in order to improve relations.⁵⁵ The Tartars made no attacks, however, and by the last of May it was a common belief that they would return to the Crimea without any action.⁵⁶ Neplyneff seemed more tranquil during the month of May, and Turko-Russian relations continued to be improved during the first half of June.⁵⁷

Meanwhile the Porte had given Villeneuve some reason to be hopeful by receiving Staniski with greater pomp than ordinarily accorded ministers of second rank. Talman and Neplyneff regarded this audience as evidence of an adverse policy to their governments, since Staniski represented King Stanislaus and the Primate. Many considered this audience the result of Villeneuve's influence, but Emo though it was simply the policy of the Vizier.⁵⁸ In March the coming of an envoy from King Aufustus was announced,⁵⁹ and there was a great deal of wondering about how he would be received. Villeneuve believed that he would not be permitted to enter Constantinople.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Emo, op. cit., 9 May, 1734, IV, pp. 320b-323a.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 29 May, 1734, IV, pp. 335a-b.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 19 June, 1734, IV, pp. 339b-340a.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 27 February, 1734, IV, pp. 256a-258b.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 21 March, 1734, IV, p. 271a.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 13 April, 1734, IV, p. 304a.

He arrived at Nish in May, where he was courteously received but detained according to orders. The pasha of Nish wished to forward the letters which the envoy carried, but the Pole⁶¹ refused to give them up.

On June 19 Villeneuve was called unexpectedly for an audience to hear the news that the French and Swedish troops had liberated Danzig and the Russians had lost a great many men.⁶² Later Villeneuve and Staniski received the same news, but Neplyneff discredited the report, because he had heard that the French had been totally defeated. Emo believed that the Russians had been defeated. The fact that the greater part of the Tartars had returned to their territory suggested that the Porte did not intend to wage war. The Porte would not intervene because of the Persian war and because the Vizier was determined not to break with Russia, Emo was told by a confidant.⁶³

News of the surrender of Danzig to Count Munnich of Russia on June 30 reached Neplyneff on August 17. The latter sent word to the Vizier and expressed the hope that Stanislaus would not find asylum in Ottoman territory. The reply was in general terms and showed no irritation on the part of the Vizier,⁶⁴ but

⁶¹

Emo, op. cit., 29 May, 1734, IV, pp. 336a-b.

⁶²

Ibid., 19 June, 1734, IV, p. 341a.

⁶³

Ibid., 2 July, 1734, IV, p. 351a et seq.

⁶⁴

Ibid., 19 August, 1734, IV, pp. 377a-b.

the Russian victory was not a hopeful sign for an improvement in the relations of that Power with the Porte and the Turks appeared very much agitated. In an audience with Lord Kinnoul the Vizier used bitter invectives against Russia's violation of treaties in erecting fortresses which she had agreed to abolish and in interfering in Poland. Lord Kinnoul sought to temper the bitterness by maintaining that Russia had had only pacific intentions and that she was forced to remain until she was assured of tranquillity between the Poles and their Diet. The Vizier replied that he wished to know nothing of the Diet, but that Neplyneff had promised the troops would be withdrawn soon after the reduction of Danzig and that the mediating Powers were responsible for this withdrawal. England, Holland, and Austria were considered as the mediating states, and the representatives of the last two were also asked to remonstrate with Russia. This unfriendly attitude was attributed to the influence of Bonneval and Villeneuve. These audiences were followed by conferences of the representatives of England, Holland, Austria, and Russia, and Neplyneff promised that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as the Poles showed their willingness to obey King Augustus III. The English ambassador was less ready to vouch for this promise than the Dutch ambassador. The ministers sought to adjust matters by having the Porte recognize King Augustus III, but Ghika replied that the Porte was not disposed to recognize a king who was rejected

by a kingdom and who had been placed on his throne by a few and
that Stanislaus would regain his throne.⁶⁵ A few weeks later
the Vizier bitterly denounced Russia to Talman. While the
latter justified the Russian policy, he promised to write to
Vienna.⁶⁶ These audiences revealed a bitter feeling which
might and did lead to war, and Neplyneff also hinted of its
possibility to Emo.⁶⁷

A minor phase of the negotiations concerned the attacks
of Austrian and French merchant ships against one another in
the Archipelago while the war of Austria against France, Spain,
and Savoy was taking place for the succession to the duchy of
Parma. In the attacks reported, the Austrian ships were always
the aggressors. Sometimes the French ships which were attacked
had Turkish passengers. In such instances the complaints were
from both Villeneuve and the Porte, and an indemnity demanded
from Talman.⁶⁸ When Villeneuve protested against the Austrians'
being aided by Turkish subjects, the Porte dismissed Mustapha
Bey and imprisoned him until information about furnishing
materials could be obtained.⁶⁹ The Vizier sent firmans to the

⁶⁵

Emo, op. cit., 12 September, 1734, IV, pp. 394b-397a.

⁶⁶

Ibid., 23 September, 1734, IV, pp. 399a-b.

⁶⁷

Ibid., 9 October, 1734, IV, pp. 406b-407b.

⁶⁸

Ibid., 22 January, 1734, IV, pp. 336b-337a; 23 March, 1734,
IV, p. 286b; 28 May, 1734, IV, pp. 332a-b; 19 June, 1734, IV,
pp. 343a-b.

⁶⁹

Ibid., 13 April, 1734, IV, pp. 301b-302a.

Ottoman ports and islands forbidding the supplying of armaments
to ships.⁷⁰ Some of the Austrian ships were seized by Turks
and Talman's protests were answered by the Vizier's saying that
he would have to consult Villeneuve.⁷¹ A month later the ships
had not been released.⁷² In this respect as in others, France
was shown more consideration than Austria or Russia.

It was during the last half of 1734 that Bonneval became
very influential at the Porte. The Marquis de Villeneuve had
been instructed in 1729 not to communicate with Bonneval in
any respect.⁷³ In 1734 Villeneuve asked to be relieved from
such rigorous instructions and then without waiting for a reply
began seeing his countryman.⁷⁴ The Vizier also began consulting
Bonneval and permitted him to plan a reorganization of the
army according to European methods.⁷⁵ While these conferences
did not have the result which Villeneuve hoped for, that of
intervention by the Porte in favor of King Stanislaus, they
were significant in preparing the Turks for the wars of 1736 and

⁷⁰ Emo, op. cit., 17 April, 1734, IV, pp. 305a-306b;
Noradounghian, op. cit., p. 65.

⁷¹ Emo, op. cit., 24 July, 1734, IV, pp. 364b-365b.

⁷² Ibid., 19 August, 1734, IV, p. 377b.

⁷³ Vandal, op. cit., p. 136 et seq.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 228 et seq.

⁷⁵ Emo, op. cit., 24 July, 1734, IV, pp. 365a-b; 14 August,
1734, IV, p. 374a; 19 August, 1734, IV, p. 375a; 1 September,
1734, IV, p. 380a.

1737.

Emo left Constantinople more than a year before the first of these two wars began, but his despatches contain a great deal of information about the conditions which produced those wars. While the policy of Ali Pasha had been at first to conciliate and to mislead the French, Austrian and Russian representatives, there was an increasing bitterness toward the last two. There existed not only the antagonism of the Porte for these Powers, but also a belligerent attitude on the part of Russia in disregarding treaties.

SUMMARY

Emo called Constantinople "this grand theatre," and in many respects the events and conditions from 1730 to 1734 were dramatic. The formal entrances to the embassies, the processions to the audiences, and the audiences themselves were magnificent pageants. The major acts were those of a complicated tragedy with some of the elements of a mystery play and of a puppet show. While Mahmud I looked on the stage from behind a curtained window, he was not the one who managed the puppets: that was done by the Kizlar Aghasi and the Sultana Valideh, with the assistance of the Mufti and the Defterdar for a part of 1731 and 1732. The stage was large, and there were many actors. In the foreground were the grand viziers, the Reis Effendi, the dragomans, the Capitan Pasha, and the diplomatic representatives. Among these Topal Osman, Ali Pasha, the Grand Vizier, Dragoman Ghika, Yanon Khoja, Neplyneff, Talman, Villeneuve, and Emo were the most prominent. In the background the pursuit of malcontents took place. With a few exceptions these unfortunate persons were too far back to be recognized and were unimportant so far as their position counted, but they had great potentiality as far as revolts were concerned and their cries from the wings often disturbed the chief actors. The gifts which were presented revealed the personal interests of the actors. Emo was not only one of the actors, but, in

present-day terms, he was also one of the property managers as far as costumes were concerned and he was always a press reporter. He gave biographical sketches of the Turkish officials, described their personal appearance, and characterized them so vividly that his readers know them as definite personalities: the violent Topal Osman, the placid, dissimulating, suave Ali Pasha, the moderate Reis Effendi, and the energetic Yanon Khoja.

The information given by Emo revealed two kinds of historical material: the continuity and fixed character of Turkish ceremonies and customs, especially as regards ambassadors; and an account of events and conditions from 1730 to 1734.

The descriptions of the audiences and other ceremonies by Emo show that the same routine was being followed in the costume of the bailo, the management and personnel of the audiences, the payment of the Janissaries, and the gifts presented as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Emo's experiences were similar to those of his fellow diplomats as regards the presentation of gifts and the use of money to purchase favor. These practices, the great delay in negotiations, the occasional unsympathetic attitude of the foreign representatives for one another's special problems, and the quarrels over questions of ambassadorial precedence were the unpleasant features of eighteenth century diplomacy at the Porte.

As a patriotic representative, Emo studied the causes for the commercial decline of Venice in the last century of her independence. In his negotiations he appeared more serious-minded than the majority of eighteenth century Venetians as described by Molmenti and Monnier. He maintained amicable relations with the Porte in spite of troublesome disputes which arose in adjoining territories of the Morea and which resulted from the piracy of the corsairs. His greatest accomplishment was the renewal of the Treaty of Passarowitz as one of "perpetual peace."

With a rather prejudiced attitude toward the Turk, Emo gave a great many facts about the political and social conditions of the time from which the following conclusions can be drawn: the government was unstable because of the lack of leadership in Achmet III and Mahmud I and because of the general dissatisfaction which was more far-reaching than its phase under these two sultans; public opinion was a very important factor in influencing the government; the grand vizier was not so supreme in the government as had been the case earlier, but was controlled largely by a palace group.

As a neutral but keenly interested observer Emo has left a valuable record of the war with Persia and the negotiations of the Porte with the other European Powers. These problems were closely related to Russian expansion in southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe. The years 1730 to 1734 were only a

subdivision of the longer period from 1700 to 1739, but they were very important years in revealing the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the acquisitive interest of Russia and Austria in Polish affairs. The result of these conditions and of chronic ill-feeling was the war of the Turks against the Russians and Austrians from 1736 to 1739.

Finally, there is sufficient evidence to show that Emo was a persistent searcher for information, was an accurate observer, and fulfilled the Venetian ideal of a representative as described by Rawdon Brown: "While the favourite of a despotic sovereign could, like Wolsey, take upon himself the functions of several departments at once, and leave behind him comparatively few traces of his eccentric course, the Venetian official was obliged to report in writing every measure he took, every piece of intelligence he received; and, however great his capacity or his zeal, he could not encroach on the duties of a colleague or go one step beyond what was written."¹

¹
Brown, op. cit., p. V.

APPENDIX A

Glossary of Turkish and Italian words

Aga,¹ see Agha.
Agha, a general officer.

Bailo, the title of the Venetian ambassadors in Turkey and Syria.
Bairam; the name of two great Moslem festivals.
Bairano,¹ see Bairam.
Bostanji, a gardener.
Bostanji-bashi, the head gardener.
Bostanzi,¹ see Bostanji.
Bostanzi Bassi,¹ see Bostanji-bashi.

Caftan, a costume of honor for ceremonies.
Caftano,¹ see Caftan.
Caichi,¹ see Caique.
Caimecan,¹ see Kaimakam.
Caique, a rowboat used on the Bosphorus.
Capigi Bassi,¹ see Kapuji.
Capigi Passi,¹ see Kapuji.
Capitan Pasha, an admiral.
Capitan Passà,¹ see Capitan Pasha.
Cat-serif,¹ see Hatti-sherif.
Catzerif,¹ see Hatti-sherif.
Chaichio,¹ see Caique.
Chaush-bashi, the chief of the ushers, a high official.
Chiaia,¹ see Kiaya.
Chiaus Bassi,¹ see Chaush-bashi.
Chiaus Passi,¹ see Chaush-bashi.
Chislar Aga,¹ see Kizlar Aghasi.
Culchiaia,¹ see Kulkiaya.

Defterdar, a treasurer.
Dragoman, an interpreter.

Giovani di lingua, student interpreters, who were of lower rank than dragomans and who later became dragomans.

Hatti-sherif, an irrevocable Turkish decree countersigned by the sultan.

¹

The forms used in the manuscript copies of Emo's despatches.

Kaimakam, a lieutenant or deputy.

Kapuji, a gatekeeper.

Kiaya, a lieutenant [in some cases equivalent to a chief-of-staff, or executive secretary].

Kislar Aga,² see Kizlar Aghasi.

Kizlar Aghasi, "general of the girls," the black eunuch in charge of the palace of the harem.

Kulkiaya, the lieutenant or chief-of-staff of the Janissary corps.

Mufti, a Moslem legal authority.

Podesta, a municipal judge.

Procurator, an administrator, as of St. Mark's Cathedral.

Proveditor, a functionary having oversight of public services and the government of provinces.

Ragionateria, a collection of merchandise lodged with the bailo to be used as gifts.

Ramasan,² see Ramazan.

Ramazan, the Moslem month of fasting.

Reis Effendi, an important minister of state, the minister of foreign affairs.

Seraschier,² see Seraskier.

Seraschiere,² see Seraskier.

Seraskier, a commander-in-chief.

Spahi, a cavalry soldier.

Spai,² see Spahi.

Spaia,² see Spahi.

Sultana Madre,² see Sultana Valideh.

Sultana Valideh, the Queen Mother.

Teftedar,² see Defterdar.

Defterdar,² see Defterdar.

Topizi,² see Topji.

Topji, an artilleryman.

Triaca, a soothing draught, a Venetian drug greatly in demand in Turkey.

Validè,² see Sultana Valideh.

2

The forms used in the manuscript copies of Emo's despatches.

APPENDIX B

A List of the Despatches with Places Where Written and Dates

<u>Number</u>	<u>Place Where Written</u>	<u>Date</u>	
1	Acque di Spignon	27 May	1730.
2		7 June	
3	Acque di Pelo Rosso	14	
4	Porte di Quieto	28	
5		2 July	
6	Bocche di Cattaro	10	
7		12	
8	Acque di Corfù	21	
9		23	
10		25 ¹	
11	Acque del Zante	1 August	
12	Acque del Tenedo	4 September	
13		5	
14		15	
15	Pera di Costantinopoli	28	
16		29	
17		2 October ²	
18		11 ²	
19		[no date] ³	
20		13 October	
21		15	
22		1 November	
23		4	
24		12 ²	
24 ⁴		28	
25		30	
26		30	
27		17 December	
28		17	
29		1 January, (1731, N.S.)	
30		9	
31		14 ²	

¹ With a postscript in the Small Set, I, pp. 12a-b; place, date, and postscript omitted in Large Set, I, p. 18a.

² With a postscript.

³ In the first paragraph of No. 21, Emo stated that the preceding despatches were sent via Vienna: I, pp. 57b-58a; consequently No. 19 was written the same day that No. 18 or No. 20 was or on the intervening day.

⁴ So numbered in both sets.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Place Where Written</u>	<u>Date</u>
32	Pera di Costantinopoli	18 January
33		20
34		25
35		21 February
36		22
37		23 February
38		24
39		7 March, 1731. ⁵
40		9
41		10 ⁵
42		14
43		17
44		27
45		28
46		3 April
47		4
48		5
49		24
50		26
51		26
52		26
53		27
54		3 May
55		4
56		18
57		18 ⁶
58		30
59		30
60		31
61		31
62		14 June
63		15
64		1 July
65		3
66		3
67		21 ⁵
70 ⁷		28 ⁵

5

With a postscript.

6

With two postscripts.

7

So numbered in both sets. According to subject matter, No. 70 follows No. 67 most logically. The opening paragraph of No. 70 refers to the fire which was mentioned in the postscript of No. 67: II, pp. 29a-35a. There are no references to No. 68 and No. 69 in the other despatches.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Place Where Written</u>	<u>Date</u>
71	Pera di Costantinopoli	28 July 1731.
72		14 August
73		14
74		15
75		18
76		8 September
77		8
78		14
79		27
80		29
81		29
82		5 October
83		5
84		29
85		29
86		30
87		30
88		7 November
89		8
90		16
91		16
92		30
93		30
94		30
95		20 December
96		20
97	[not given]	[not given] ⁸
98	Pera di Costantinopoli	28 December
99		28
100		18 January (1732 N.S.)
101		18
102		18
103		3 February
104		3
105		6
106		17
107		18
108		25 ⁹
109		7 March, 1732. ⁹
110		7
111		29
112		29

⁸ Probably 20 December or soon after; in No. 98 Emo stated that the usual letter carriers had departed a few days ago for Cattaro: II, p. 195b. With a postscript.

⁹ With a postscript.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Place Where Written</u>	<u>Date</u>
113	Pera di Costantinopoli	31 March, 1732. ¹⁰
114		5 April
115		5
116		22
117		22
118		25
119		15 May
120		15
121		21
122		4 June
123		4
124		4
--- ¹¹		4
125		14
126		14
127		30
128		30
129		30
130		11 July ¹⁰
131		11 ¹⁰
132		29
133		29
134		30
135		18 August
136		18
137		19
138		28
139		28
140		20 September
141		20
142		21
143		27 ¹²
144		19 October
145		19
146		27
147		27
148		24 November
149		25
150		26 ¹⁰
151		24 December
152		24
153		24 January (1733, N.S.)
154		24

10

With a postscript.

11

Without a number in both sets.

12

With two postscripts.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Place Where Written</u>	<u>Date</u>
155	Pera di Costantinopoli	9 February. (1733, N.S.)
156		11
157		11
158		21
159		20 March, 1733.
160		20
161		21 ¹³
162		1 April
163		5
164		11
165		11
166		21 May
167		21 ¹³
168		28 May
169		28
170		29
171		1 June
172		12
173		13
174		16
175		18 ¹³
176		9 July
177		10
178		11
179		26
180		1 August
181		13 ¹⁴
182		13
183		20 ¹³
184		21
185		22 ¹³
186		26
187		13 September
188		14 ¹⁵
189		10 October ¹³
190		10 ¹³

13

With a postscript.

14

Part of No. 181 mixed with No. 180: LS IV, pp. 80a-84b, 89b-90a; for correct order see SS, IV, pp. 135b-139a.

15

Date of SS given: IV, p. 169a; the date of 19 September in LS is obviously incorrect according to information in first paragraph of No. 189; IV, p. 135a.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Place Where Written</u>	<u>Date</u>
191	Pera di Costantinopoli	27 October, 1733.
192		28
193		12 November
194		14
195		23
196		24
197		28
198		2 December
199		9
200		12
201		15
202		22
203		22
204		8 January (1734, N.S.)
205		9
206		19
207		22
208		30
209		26 February
210		27
211		1 March, 1734.
212		21
213		22
Information from Emo to the Grand Vizier regarding the Corsairs. ¹⁶		
214	Pera di Costantinopoli	23 March
215		10 April
216		13
217		17
218		4 May
Information Presented by Yanon Khoja to the Grand Vizier regarding the Tunisians.		
Information from the Ambassador of Venice to His Excellency <u>Reis Effendi</u> regarding the Tunisians.		
219	Pera di Costantinopoli	7 May ¹⁷
220		9 ¹⁷
221		28
Information Presented by Yanon Khoja regarding the Tunisians.		
222	Pera di Costantinopoli	28 May

¹⁶ Not given in SS.

¹⁷ With a postscript.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Place Where Written</u>	<u>Date</u>
223	Pera di Costantinopoli	29 May 1734.
224		19 June 18
	Memorial from Emo regarding the Tunisians.	
225	Pera di Costantinopoli	19 June
226		27 19
227		2 July
228		31 9
229		15
230		24
231		13 August
232		14
233		19
234		1 September
235		6
	The Orders Issued by the Sultan regarding the Tunisians.	
236	Pera di Costantinopoli	12 September
237		23
238		9 October
239		9
240		28
241		17 November 19
242		1 December 19
243	Acque di Porto Quieto	15 March, 1735.
244		23
	Speech by Emo to the Full College after His Return	
		20 May

18

With two postscripts.

19

With a postscript.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Manuscript Copies of Angelo Emo's Despatches

The exact origin of the two manuscript copies of Angelo Emo's despatches in the University of Illinois Library is not known. Attempts to trace them to their origin have, however, revealed some valuable facts. From Emo's statements that he consulted the copies of his predecessors' despatches, which were in the embassy in Pera,¹ and from numerous cross references in his own despatches to preceding ones,² it is known that a copy of every despatch was kept there in addition to the two copies sent to Venice via Cattaro and Vienna respectively. The Venetian embassy in Pera was taken over by the Austrian Government in 1797 and returned to the Italian Government in 1866. A letter from Baron P. Aloisi, the present Italian Ambassador to the Turkish Republic, states that the embassy archives do not now contain copies of the despatches of Angelo and Giovanni Emo.³ Since the same copyist wrote Despatches

¹ Emo, op. cit., 21 September, 1732, III, pp. 167b-168a; 13 August, 1733, IV, p. 80b.

² For example: In No. 79 there is a reference to Nos. 43 and 47: Ibid., II, p. 89b. There are more than thirty such references in Despatches 79-240.

³ I have given the originals or copies of all such letters to the catalog department of the University Library.

1-215 in the four-volume set of Angelo Emo, referred to as LS in my footnotes, and all the despatches in the four-volume set of Giovanni Emo it might be assumed that this copyist was a Venetian dragoman; but it is not probable because this set has many more omissions of words, phrases, and short paragraphs than the six-volume set (one volume of which is missing), referred to as SS. This last set has a few missing words, at least thirteen.

It was customary for the bailos' families to preserve copies of the despatches and of the speeches made to the Full College and even to sell them.⁴ These copies may have been made for the Emo family. They were made in a blank book rather than on loose leaves which were bound together later; there is an occasional note at the end of one volume referring to the next volume and sand still remains between the leaves.

These copies were purchased from Karl W. Hiersemann, of Leipzig, by the University in 1914 and received in 1923. They had been purchased by Herr Hiersemann in 1913 from Sotheby, Wilkinson, and Hodge in London at one of the sales of the Sir Thomas Phillipps collection of manuscripts.⁵ Sir Thomas obtained them in 1830 from Lord Guilford's collection. Lord Guilford travelled in the Ionian Archipelago between 1778 to 1792, was in Italy again in 1811, and resided later in Corfu where he was

⁴ Brown, op. cit., pp. xliv-xlv; Yriarte, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

⁵ Letter from Herr Hiersemann, dated December 24, 1929; letter from Mr. T. Fitzroy Fenwick, the grandson of Sir Thomas Phillipps, dated March 2, 1930.

Chancellor of the Ionian University. Upon his return to England in 1827 he brought these Italian manuscripts with him.⁶ A book plate of Bernardo Nani appears in both of the four-volume sets of Angelo and Giovanni Emo. I have not learned anything about this owner of the manuscripts. A letter from Conte N. H. Alvise Emo-Capodilista states that any "documents" of these two ancestors which may have been in the family archives were lost or dispersed when the family moved to Padua in 1821. The copies in the University Library may have been obtained from the Emo family at this time by Bernardo Nani and from him by Lord Guilford or by Lord Guilford directly from the Emo family, their having been in Nani's possession earlier.

The bill of sale sent by Herr Hiersemann classified some of the manuscripts as "contemporary" and others as "original." The two sets of Angelo Emo's despatches and the one of Giovanni Emo were classified in neither way. He classified, however, the Despatch of a Bailo regarding the war of Turkey with Persia as a contemporary manuscript. I have identified this copy as Despatch 117 of Giovanni Emo, written on January 6 or January 22, 1723, or between those dates. It was written by the same copyist as Despatches 1-215 of the four-volume set of Angelo Emo and as the despatches of Giovanni Emo. These sets were therefore made by the same copyist from 1720 to 1734 or very shortly after

the last date. The remaining Despatches 216-244 of the four-volume set of Angelo Emo were written by another copyist, and all in the five volumes of the six-volume set were written by a third copyist.

The authenticity of these sets has been established by the fact that they were in the possession of such great manuscript collectors and scholars as Lord Guilford and Sir Thomas Phillipps. In addition I have compared the few footnotes referring to Angelo Emo's despatches in Vandal's biography of the Marquis de Villeneuve and in Hammer with the manuscripts. Of nine such references in Vandal, there are two discrepancies in the dating of the despatches⁷ and a similar discrepancy in Hammer,⁸ but the subject matter is the same. Both Vandal and Hammer used the originals in the Venetian archives.

The two copies of the despatches are not identical. In addition to the differences given in the foregoing paragraphs and in Appendix B, there are marginal headings in the four-volume set and variations in the abbreviations and the proper names. Both sets abound in abbreviations of every part of speech and even of proper names, but there are fewer abbreviations in the four-volume set. Neither set follows a consistent style of abbreviations and of names. The most flagrant example of incon-

⁷ Vandal, op. cit., pp. 144-145, 167, 174-175, 198, 202, 228, 229, and notes.

⁸ Hammer, op. cit., p. 409.

sistency in the spelling of names is that of Yanon Khoja, the Capitan Pasha, whose name sounded to the Italian ear as: Ianon Koza, Giannon Koza, Iannon Koia, Giannon Koia, Ianon Choggia, Ianon Chozza, Iannon Coggia.

In accordance with a custom prevalent in Italy and especially in Venice, ⁹ three of the despatches have been printed as a memorial for the Visinoni-Ancillotto wedding. These were the descriptions of Emo's formal entrance as bailo; his first audiences with Mehemet, the Grand Vizier, and Mahmud I; and his first visit with the Capitan Pasha.

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